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Abstract 
Welborne, Bozena C. (Ph.D., Political Science, Department of Political Science) 
Between the Veil and the Vote: Exploring Incentives to Politically Incorporate Women in the 
Arab World  
Thesis directed by Associate Professor David S. Brown 
 The 30th anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) renewed debate on proposed mechanisms to increase women’s presence in 
the political sphere of the developing and developed world. Despite common perceptions that 
women’s political opportunities are uniformly limited across the Arab world, considerable 
variation exists. While women still lack the right to suffrage in Saudi Arabia, more than 20 
percent of parliamentary representatives in Tunisia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates are 
women. My research explores the incentives behind this unexpected variation through both 
cross- national statistical and case study analysis, relying on data gathered during two years of 
fieldwork and from over 100 interviews across Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan. I posit that 
international economic influence plays a key role in creating incentives to politically incorporate 
women and partially explains the different levels of women’s political inclusion across the 
region. Alongside the humanitarian reasons for promoting women’s issues, there is a decidedly 
material interest for women’s empowerment in countries that receive significant financial inputs 
through development projects that increasingly conflate the status of women and 
democratization. Furthermore, with the passage of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and their explicit focus on women’s issues, there are significant reputational benefits for 
improving a country’s image via women’s empowerment. Consequently, Arab policymakers 
hope strategic gender-related political reforms translate into greater donor and investor 
confidence in other indicators of development and democratization.  
 
To evaluate my argument, I consider the impact of multiple types of foreign capital on 
three possible dimensions of women’s political incorporation: descriptive representation  (the 
percentages of women in Arab legislatures), policy (gender quota adoption), and legal (women’s 
political, economic, and social rights) realms, with each dimension representing an empirical 
chapter in the dissertation. I use statistical data covering 22 Arab League member countries from 
the period of 1990 until 2009 for this analysis. My findings reveal robust relationships between 
women’s political status and variables representing international economic influence via foreign 
capital. Subsequent case analysis elaborates on the importance of external funding in sustaining 
grassroots movements pushing for more progressive political outcomes for women. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
   
 "If you go to the protests now, you will see something you never saw before: 
 hundreds of women. They shout and sing, they even sleep there in tents. This is not just 
 a political revolution, it's a social revolution." 
                         Tawakul Karman, Yemeni Activist (2011)1 
 
Arab women have always had a reputation for docility in the Western press, meekly 
accepting subjugation within patriarchic Muslim societies, part and parcel of the Orientalist 
vision of the women behind the veil. Yet, the wave of uprisings igniting the Arab world in 2011 
immediately dispelled this notion, revealing Arab women at the forefront of protest movements 
in Egypt and Yemen organizing events and spreading the news of dissent via new media, as well 
as marching next to their male brethren in the ubiquitous Tahrir (Independence) Squares across 
the region.2 Across Syria, Bahrain, and Libya women have taken singularly prominent roles in 
protesting autocratic leaders amid serious danger. As famed Egyptian feminist and human rights 
activist, Nawaal el Saadawi, proclaimed to Democracy Now: “Women and girls are, beside the 
boys, [sic] are in the streets. We are calling for justice, freedom, and equality, and real 
democracy, and a new constitution where there is no discrimination between men and women, no 
discrimination between Muslim and Christians, to change the system and to have real 
democracy.”3   
In reality, this is not a new role for the Arab woman as her participation in the Algerian 
and Moroccan revolutionary independence movements back in the 1950s and 1960s poignantly 
                                                
1 Finn, T. 2011. “Tawakul Karman, a Yemeni activist, provides thorn in side for Saleh.” The Guardian, March. 
Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/25/tawakul-karman-yemeni-activist-saleh 
2 Women had a significant role in the Tunisian demonstrations launching the so-called Arab Spring and marched 
side by side with their male counterparts. In Egypt, the most notorious activist of the revolution alongside dissident 
Google executive, Waled Ghoneim, was Asmaa Mahfous—a 26-year-old female activist whose compelling online 
appeal for the youth of Egypt to march in the streets next to her against Mubarak and demand popular justice 
quickly became a YouTube and facebook sensation and a rallying cry for the protest movement. 
3 Available at http://www.democracynow.org/2011/1/31/women_protest_alongside_men_in_egyptian 
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attests. Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 movie, “The Battle of Algiers,” highlights the sacrifices of 
Algerian women for the cause of independence—in particular through a scene where a young 
woman partakes in a suicide mission against the French at a local café.  Not only have Arab 
women been participating in protests against corrupt regimes and lobbying for increased rights 
since the beginning of the 20th century, in many Arab countries they have also been voting in 
elections since the early 1940s (Iraq, Syria, Djibouti, and Palestine under the British Mandate) —
well in advance of select countries in Western Europe (see Table 1.1 below). With the exception 
of the Gulf states, most Arab nations extended full suffrage and the right to political contestation 
to women prior to the 1990s. However, women were not regular fixtures in the halls of power 
until the advent of the 1990s and the 2000s. The region exhibits significant variation in the 
percentages of women within elected and appointed legislatures ranging from 28 percent in 
Tunisia’s lower house of Parliament to zero percent in representative councils within Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, and Qatar (see Table 1.1 below). 
Variation in women’s general political participation exists over time, as well. During the 
1940s and 1950s socialist sentiments inspired secular Arab leaders to enfranchise North African 
women earlier than their Middle Eastern counterparts (Brand 1998; Richards and Waterbury 
2007). In the late 1990s foreign aid conditional on Arab states’ human rights record galvanized a 
government-sponsored renaissance of women’s non-profits in the Middle East, increasing 
women’s access to the public sphere. Since the advent of the Millennium Development Goals in 
2000 and their explicit emphasis on women’s empowerment as one of eight fundamental goals 
for development, the majority of the Arab world has officially embraced the formal inclusion of 
women into the political, economic, and social arena with varying results.   
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 Table 1.1 Women’s Political Inclusion in 22 Arab League States 
 
Arab League 
Member State 
 
Lower House 
 
Upper House 
 
Year Suffrage 
Granted 
 
Gender Quota  
Algeria 7.71 % 5.15 % 1962 YES 
Bahrain  2.5 % 27.5 % 2002 NO 
Comoros 3.03 % unicameral 1956 NO 
Djibouti 13.85 % unicameral 1946 YES 
Egypt 12.70% Not available 1956 YES 
Iraq 25.23% unicameral 1948 YES 
Jordan 10.83% 15% 1974 YES 
Kuwait 8% unicameral 2005 NO 
Lebanon 3.13% unicameral 1952 NO 
Libya 7.69% unicameral 1964 NO 
Mauritania 22.11% 14.29% 1956 YES 
Morocco 10.46% 3.33% 1963 YES 
Oman 0% 19.44% 2003 NO 
Palestinian Authority 13% unicameral 1946  
(Under British 
Mandate) 
YES 
Qatar 0% unicameral 2005 NO 
Saudi Arabia 0% unicameral Not Applicable NO 
Somalia 6.78% unicameral 1956 YES 
Sudan (north) 25.14% 17.86% 1964 YES 
Syria 12.40% unicameral 1949 NO 
Tunisia 27.57% Not available 1959 YES 
United Arab Emirates 22.50% unicameral 2006 
 (Limited) 
NO 
Yemen 0.33% 1.80% 1967  
(South Yemen) 
1970 
 (North Yemen) 
NO 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database; University of Stockholm and Institute for 
 International Development and Electoral Assistance (2011 data).  
 
Therefore, Arab women’s recent political mobilization and participation is not 
unprecedented, but where does it stem from and why does it vary so much across the region? My 
dissertation explores the incentives informing this unexpected variation through both cross-
national statistical and case study analysis relying on data gathered during two years of fieldwork 
and from over 100 interviews across Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Yemen. It explores in greater 
detail the role of international economic influence in creating recent incentives to incorporate 
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women through instruments such as development assistance and conditional aid, but also 
considers the less transparent effects of the influx of foreign direct investment and remittances to 
the region. Foreign capital flows are generally understood to affect domestic policy across the 
fiscal and monetary spectrum (Garrett 1998), but they have also been shown to impact social 
policy, as well (Moghadam 2002; Ross 2008). Alongside the humanitarian reasons for promoting 
women’s issues, there is a decidedly material interest in promoting gender empowerment for 
countries that receive significant financial inputs through development projects conflating 
women’s issues and democratization. There are also reputational gains from incorporating 
women and presenting a Westernized image to the broader world. Arab policymakers are keenly 
aware of such incentives and hope strategic gender-related political reforms translate into greater 
donor and investor confidence in other indicators of development and democratization.  
I evaluate these hypotheses by analyzing the impact of three types of foreign capital 
(development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances) on three possible 
dimensions of women’s political incorporation: women’s descriptive representation; the adoption 
of gender-related policies such as women’s quotas; and the extent of women’s rights across the 
political, economic, and social spectrum. Foreign capital does not operate in a vacuum and its 
effects at best facilitate, if not determine, the fate of Arab women. Levels of women’s civil-
society activism as well as the commitment of incumbent leaders to progressive reforms 
certainly have an equally important effect on women-friendly legislation (Brand 1998; Jamal 
2010).  However, these phenomena are more difficult to quantify and will be elaborated on 
through the in-depth case analyses of the three countries in which I conducted fieldwork: 
Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. 
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Political Incorporation Revisited 
Political incorporation must be defined from the outset since it can represent the endgame 
of successful grass-roots political mobilization (the societal-change model) or a strategy for co-
optation by political elites (the elite-led model).4 Until recently, political opposition and 
grassroots mobilization was still weak in many Arab countries though growing with the 
increasing popularity of informal Islamic networks (see Clark 1994; Denoeux 1993; Esposito and 
Tamimi 2000).5 Consequently, I consider the problem of women’s political inclusion initially 
through the lens of the political elite’s incentives to incorporate women and the likely factors that 
would motivate them—external monies.  
Clark (2004) ventures political inclusion is more of a strategic calculation on the part of 
in-groups (here elite males), rather than a question of the mobilization capacity of the out-group. 
In Arab political culture women easily compose a prominent out-group considering the 
restrictions on their political participation mandated by conservative and religious mores.6 The 
decision to incorporate such an out-group would be contingent on women framing themselves as 
viable coalition partners to the reigning patriarchic establishment. The growing economic or 
political importance of an out-group or the elite’s need for a bulwark against a threatening 
                                                
4 Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate review these models in their contribution for “The Politics of Democratic 
Inclusion” edited by Christine Wolbrecht and Rodney Hero. For further reference, see examples of the societal 
change model in the work of Ronald Inglehart 1997 and Christine Wolbrecht 2000. The origins of the elite model lie 
in the work of Anthony Downs 1957 and William Riker 1965. Ellen Lust-Okar’s 2003 book entitled “Structuring 
Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions” applies an elite interest-based framework to 
the problem of political inclusion in the Middle East. 
5 Refer to Yasmine Haddad’s The Islamic Revival Since 1988: A Critical Survey and Bibliography. New York: 
Greenwood Press (1997) and John Douglas Ruedy’s Islam and Secularism in North Africa, Palgrave Macmillan 
(1996) 
6 Most commonly this is in reference to the famous hadith recorded by Sahih al-Bukhari (5:59:709) where the 
prophet Mohammed stated, “Such people as ruled by a lady will never be successful.”  
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opposition can represent sufficient incentive to consider allying with controversial partners such 
as women. The Moroccan case is particularly insightful here considering King Mohammed IV 
openly courted women’s networks in the wake of 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks in a bid to 
ally against a perceived Islamist political threat with what was popularly interpreted as a 
secularizing feminist movement (Sadiqi 2010). In a similar vein, Ellen Lust-Okar (2005) aptly 
demonstrated how states shape and control incentives and relationships among the political 
opposition in the Middle East by pragmatically allying with divergent political interests and 
groups within Arab societies.7 There is evidence that women are increasingly representing such a 
veto-player in the Arab states’ bid to retain secular control over their countries, thus a 
consideration of women’s changing political influence in the region is in order.  
Changes in structural factors can also render out-groups such as women attractive to the 
in-group by creating new political opportunities for the former. Most notably, the influx of 
foreign capital specifically targeting women, whether through conditional aid or foreign direct 
investment geared at employing women as cheap labor, changes the calculus of women’s 
economic and even political importance. Moghadam (2000) argues that women may become the 
sign or marker of political goals and of cultural identity not only during processes of revolution 
and state building, but also when power is being “contested or reproduced.” In the past, Laurie 
Brand (1998) described how the Tunisian state explicitly promoted women to high profile 
positions to sideline the Islamist al-Nahdah faction and rewarded women for supporting 
government crackdowns on Islamists. Recent Islamist political overtures to women in Yemen, 
Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait—all countries with movements ideologically tied 
                                                
7 Consider the initial strategic alliance of Egypt’s Nasserist politicians with socialists and the subsequent alliance 
with Islamists to serve as a bulwark against rising socialist discontent. 
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to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, imply religious groups increasingly view women as 
politically important as well. Interestingly, many Islamist groups embraced female constituencies 
in looking to expand their followers despite significant opposition to any form of women’s 
political participation (Blaydes 2007; Dris-Aït-Hamadouche 2007). Islamic parties in the recent 
Kuwaiti and Yemeni parliamentary elections encouraged women to vote for their candidates, if 
not to actually run for elected office (Fattah 2006; McElhinny 2005), while some of the most 
successful Islamist politicians in Jordan and Morocco have been women.8 Such a move 
demonstrates the increasing salience of female constituencies politically and economically across 
interest groups. Furthermore, today all states in the Middle East and North Africa, with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia, allow female electoral participation and have appointed at least one 
woman to a cabinet post—some within the past five years. 
Importantly, recent surveys indicate Arab populations are in fact getting more 
conservative on women’s issues (Telhami 2006; Zogby 2002). Thus, a puzzle emerges since 
political elites seem to be reaching out to female constituencies in societies that are still highly 
opposed to the idea of women’s political participation and at a time when the threat of Islamic 
radicalism is very real. Cultural and institutional explanations can only go so far in elucidating 
increasing women’s political opportunities vis-à-vis reigning elites. Assuming political 
incorporation is an elite-driven process, cultural factors may be important in the aggregate, but 
are very much manipulated or even ignored to serve leader’s interests. “Secular” North African 
leaderships in countries with devoutly Islamic populations highlight this phenomenon. Potential 
institutional effects are similarly constrained by the will of authoritarian leaders. Structural 
                                                
8 See Hayat Massimi of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front or Bassima Hakkaoui of the Justice and Development 
Party in Morocco. 
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factors, however, are not as easily manipulated nor as easily ignored.  
The growing impact of increased capital flows on gender-related policy change remains 
under-explored (see Bush 2011; Nanes 2010; Welborne 2011). The mechanism this dissertation 
elaborates on represents a departure from the standard line of thought on modernization theory as 
well as the Gender in Development (GAD) and Women in Development (WID) paradigms by 
recognizing the diversity of foreign financial instruments and their divergent effects on 
incentives to incorporate women. Importantly, the nature of these flows changes the strategic 
calculus of elites in terms of possible alliance partners. These new investment dynamics 
potentially create novel political opportunities for women by directly empowering them through 
funding for women’s organizations and by providing employment opportunities allowing local 
women with a measure of financial autonomy. 
Globalizing Women’s Issues and the Impact of Foreign Capital 
 A rich literature explores the effects of foreign capital or “economic globalization” on 
human rights and related humanitarian issues, but scholarship specifically investigating its 
impact on women’s political status as a subset of these agendas is scarce (Burkhart 1998; 
Hafner-Burton 2005; Henderson 1996; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; McLaren 1998; 
Meyer, 1996, 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Two schools of thought discuss foreign 
capital’s possible effects on the status of women: the Gender and Development (GAD) paradigm 
and the Women in Development (WID) approach (see Hafner-Burton and Pollak 2002; 
Rathgeber 1990; Razavi and Miller 1995). The Gender and Development’s (GAD) neo-Marxist 
paradigm focuses on the unequal gender relations fostered by economic development and 
globalization, while the Women in Development (WID) paradigm views women as an 
 	   9 
independent interest group whose status can be improved through economic development and 
trade. The two approaches are a product of the shift from the gender-blind development 
strategies of the 1950s and 1960s (Hafner-Burton and Pollak 2002) to the adoption of “gender 
mainstreaming” as the cause célèbre of international organizations such as the World Bank and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) today. Both perspectives envision foreign 
capital as a monolithic concept—a belief this dissertation aims to challenge in the ensuing 
empirical chapters. 
 The 1995 United Nations Fourth World Women’s Conference in Beijing was a landmark 
event for endorsing the notion that economic development was contingent on women’s 
empowerment. This idea was further entrenched through the United Nations Millennium Goals 
(2000), which included women’s empowerment as one of eight priorities for state development. 
As one of the largest sources of development project funding, the World Bank played a central 
role in popularizing the norms and agendas informing “appropriate” strategies for economic 
development and, increasingly, those strategies included gender empowerment (Finnemore 1996; 
Myers 1996). In fact, close to $3.1 billion dollars in aid has been earmarked for gender-sensitive 
programming.9 The Arab world has certainly responded to these international incentives with its 
leaders newly “re-enfranchising” their women and existing Arab women’s networks quick to 
respond by organizing gender-related conferences and awareness campaigns funded by willing 
foreign donors. 10My interview subjects across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco universally agreed 
“gender empowerment” was an idea only recently imported from the West and had mixed feeling 
                                                
9 Williams, M. 2007. Gender and Trade: Impacts and Implications for Financial Resources for Gender 
Equality, (Commonwealth Secretariat, Background Paper WAMM (07). 
10 The U.N.’s Arab Development Reports (2002, 2005) connected Arab countries’ flailing economic growth to the 
low social status of women and recommended measures to enhance women’s societal roles, which also highlighted 
the broader importance of women’s incorporation to Arab leaders. 
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as to its underlying motivation. Certainly, the legacy of September 11th is prominent in the rising 
popularity of the women’s agenda and its promotion by international organizations and the U.S., 
in particular. As Western scholarship grapples with how to heal the rift between Islam and West, 
a significant amount of research has focused on the gender component of their differences. Many 
scholars believe that resolving the “gender gap” in Arab society is integral to the international 
community’s efforts to democratize and moderate the region with these selfsame efforts often 
promoted through official development assistance and conditional aid (Fish 2002; Inglehart and 
Norris 2003a, 2003b; Landes and Landes 2001; Lewis 2002).  
Conditional aid and development assistance have an intuitive and very deliberate 
relationship with changes in gender-related policy, but what of the other types of foreign capital 
flowing into the region and their impact? Foreign Direct Investment can enhance Arab women’s 
status by offering women employment opportunities otherwise unavailable to them as it did in 
Tunisia and Morocco through the textile industry (Moghadam 1999; White 2001). Furthermore, 
it can directly offer them an independent source of income to fund political campaigns in 
countries where political parties are largely obsolete as in Jordan. However, the nature of the 
foreign investment and the sectors it targets are of primary importance in determining whether 
women can leverage their newfound economic status toward political influence (Burns, and 
Verba 1999; Moghadam 1999; Ross 2008; Schlozman, Sapiro 1983). Ross (2008) and 
Moghadam’s (2005) research demonstrates how these progressive effects exist only when 
foreign direct investment is geared toward low-wage export-oriented industries, which tend to 
hire cheap, docile labor—women. If the focus of foreign investment is the petroleum industry, as 
in the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), patriarchic relations tend to be reinforced. 
 	  11 
This is partially due to the somewhat “macho” nature of the industry, but also because the source 
of foreign exchange bolsters household incomes sufficiently to render women working 
unnecessary in the eyes of their families. Ross (2008) claims remittances flowing into the region 
have the same effect as oil-oriented investment and effectively nullify the need for women to 
pursue employment and consequently gain financial independence. Overall, a deeper exploration 
of the effects of foreign capital on women’s political inclusion is necessary as globalization has 
increased the amounts and types of monies flowing into the Arab world and these may be 
partially, if indirectly, responsible for the changes observed in women’s political status. 
Research Design 
In this study I use both large-N quantitative methods to test my primary hypotheses and 
case studies to unpack and reinforce the mechanisms underlying my findings. For the statistical 
portion of this analysis I use data covering 22 Arab League member countries from the period of 
1990 until 2009. The first stage of the analysis required reliable measures of the core concept 
under investigation—women’s political inclusion. Starting with Maurice Duverger’s “The 
Political Role of Women” in 1955, scholarship has focused on women’s political participation as 
measured by their presence in legislatures and the executive (also see Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Lakeman 1976; Norris 1985; Paxton 1997; Rule 1981, 1987, 1994; Ramirez, Soysal and 
Shanahan 1997). Alongside legislative and executive representation, another common measure 
for women’s political incorporation is their presence in political parties as well as how 
representative party platforms are of women’s interests (Caul 1999; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 
1994; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Paxton and Kunovich 2005; Wolbrecht 2000). A more 
nuanced approach to measuring women’s political influence may be through their aggregate 
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levels of government employment (see McClain and Karnig 1990) or a consideration of 
substantive political outcomes (see Browning, Marshall and Tabb’s 1984). In this dissertation, 
women’s political incorporation is modeled across three dimensions – the legislative (descriptive 
representation), socio-legal (political, economic, and social rights), and policy realms (gender 
quota adoption) with each representing an empirical chapter in the dissertation. I operationalize 
these three dimensions using data on women’s legislative representation from the Inter-
Parliamentary Union; on women’s political, economic, and social rights from the Cingranelli-
Richards Human Rights Data Project; and independently coded data on the adoption of gender 
quotas from the University of Stockholm and the International Institute for Development and 
Electoral Assistance’s (IDEA) Quota Project. I rely on the aforementioned three indicators of 
women’s incorporation to broadly capture Schmidt et al.’s (2002) benchmarks for the democratic 
inclusion of out-groups: “(1) full access to participation, (2) representation in important decision-
making bodies, (3) influence in government decision, (4) adoption of policies that address group 
concerns, and (5) socioeconomic parity” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 4). As discussed earlier, 
suffrage (benchmark one) is no longer an issue for most of the region’s women with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the U.A.E. However, women’s access to governing 
institutions is still limited and their low levels of institutional representation attest to this.11 
Consequently, I use the percentages of women within directly elected legislatures to capture 
Schmidt et al.’s second benchmark. The adoption of gender quota policies relates to the political 
influence of women’s networks within society and government, and insures there are 
representatives who share women’s concerns within government (benchmarks three and four). 
                                                
11 Arab Parliaments averaged 10 percent female representation in 2010 according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
compared to the global average of 19 percent. Still, this is a large increase from the 3 percent average of 2000. 
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However, electing women does not always insure women-friendly policies in the Middle East, as 
we shall see chapter five. That is why I also use Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) measures of 
women’s political, economic, and social rights which address women’s capacity to enjoy the 
political opportunities often constitutionally guaranteed unto them, but rarely enforced in many 
Arab countries. Cingranelli and Richards’ indicators partially channel the fifth benchmark 
referring to “socioeconomic parity” through their consideration of women’s social and economic 
rights vis-à-vis men. Certainly, this is one of the most difficult benchmarks to attain as 
socioeconomic disparities between the genders are still quite prominent in the West, as well. 
Analyzing all three of these indicators of women’s political incorporation across varying political 
arenas offers a clearer understanding of women’s inclusion as a function of Arab political 
systems.  
While data for women’s descriptive representation are accessible for the period under 
inspection, statistics for the number of women in political parties, the passage of relevant 
legislation, and the activism of feminist networks are difficult to obtain for the Middle East over 
time and are best dealt with anecdotally. 12  Consequently, the case study chapter (chapter five) 
aims to explore these social variables, interpreting them through the lens of theories of collective 
action; namely, the societal change model (women’s grassroots mobilization); the elite-led model 
(top-down initiatives from the monarch); and the political opportunity structures model 
(international economic influence). The three countries chosen for this analysis represent the 
                                                
12 While there are significant obstacles to obtaining data on informal networks without conducting fieldwork in the 
region, aggregate numbers of political representation are available directly from large data gathering organizations 
such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-Parliamentary Union. Furthermore, 
the passage of relevant gender policy and information regarding the ratification of relevant treaties can be coded 
from anecdotal evidence documented within the literature on gender and the state in the Middle East (Brand 1998, 
Moghadam 2005, UNIFEM 2005). 
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primary regions of the Arab world: North Africa (Morocco), the Middle East (Jordan), and the 
Persian Gulf (Bahrain).  They are also illustrate a sliding scale of progress in terms of women’s 
status with Morocco at the top with most progressive in terms of women’s political participation 
and influence, and Bahrain at the bottom (see Table 5.1 showcasing Freedom House’s ratings on 
women’s political, social, and economic freedoms for the three countries in chapter five).  
In any analysis of majority Muslim countries, the traditional subordination of women in 
the Islamic faith often serves as an explanation for explicit policies limiting women’s political 
participation (Ahmed 1992; Donno and Russett, 2004; Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Unifem 2005). Steven Fish (2002) emphasizes that the political manifestation of Islam impedes 
women’s access to resources and by default economic as well as political power. Importantly, 
Islam is not uniformly practiced across Arab nations and is certainly not the primary factor 
impeding women’s participation in the aforementioned Lebanese example. If the effect of Islam 
were constant across the Arab world, we would not see any variation in women’s political 
participation, legal rights, or in patterns of their political incorporation. As stated before, the 
percentage of women in national legislatures irrespective of gender quotas ranges from above 20 
percent in the United Arab Emirates to zero in the cases of Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia in the 
same sub-region of the Arab world (i.e. the Persian Gulf). This lends credence to the importance 
of alternative explanations. While measures of religiosity collated from the World Values Survey 
would be ideal; the survey only contains information on five Arab countries. A potential measure 
for gauging broader ideological attitudes may be the ratification of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
though the decision to ratify it may be more political than ideological, and the majority of Arab 
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countries have ratified it with reservations (even Saudi Arabia).13 Therefore, I ultimately restrict 
my focus to a Muslim-majority region to control for the effect of Islam. This allows for an 
exploration of structural factors (demographics and economic development) and institutional 
factors (electoral systems, regime type) beyond religion or culture that contribute to the nature of 
gender policy in Arab countries. 
Main Findings 
 The ultimate findings of this dissertation reveal a complex picture. First, the empirical 
analysis presented across the next three chapters reveals the intricacy of foreign capital’s effect 
on incentives to incorporate women. While the WID and GAD literatures posit economic 
globalization’s effects would be monolithic, each chapter reveals this is not the case when 
considering development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances as separate 
phenomena. Development assistance has the most consistently positive association with 
women’s political incorporation and is predictive of women’s greater legislative representation 
and the adoption of gender quotas. While not an unexpected relationship, these results directly 
contradict scholarship claiming foreign aid has limited impact on policy change in developing 
country settings (see opus of William Easterly). Importantly, this is a regional study and is thus 
impossible to generalize to the broader world. However, the research here reveals that context 
may be important in gauging the effectiveness of development funding. Certainly, the strategic 
import of the Middle East and North Africa likely renders aid less fungible when it comes to 
gender empowerment and thereby easier to successfully earmark for specific projects. Perhaps 
this is because Arab leaders themselves are increasingly co-opting women voters and politicians 
as bulwarks against Islamist pressure as shall be discussed in chapter five. Thus, their interests 
                                                
13 Kenworthy and Malami (1999) find a positive effect of CEDAW on women’s legislative participation, but the 
results are sensitive to outliers. Paxton (1997) finds no effect. 
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align with those of Western donors (Brand 1998; Sadiqi 2009; Salime 2007). Finally, 
development assistance also exhibits a positive association with progress in terms of women’s 
economic and social rights, again contradicting previous research showing it had no effect on 
women’s rights, overall (Richards and Gelleny 2007).  
 Foreign Direct Investment and Remittances exhibit more complicated relationships with 
women’s political incorporation. Their relationship to women’s political inclusion is less 
transparent than aid, but still compelling. Foreign direct investment exhibited the strongest 
positive association with Arab women’s legislative representation—a finding partially explained 
by the background of many of the women who successfully ran for office. Investigating the 
successful candidates of legislative elections in Morocco and Jordan quickly showed their ties to 
the foreign business community and highlighted lucrative jobs that allowed many of these 
candidates to independently fund their campaigns. This is especially salient in countries like 
Jordan where political parties are less established and cannot be relied on to fund expensive 
electoral campaigns. Foreign direct investment was also positively associated with women’s 
economic and social rights, revealing that providing women with economic opportunity through 
employment may yet be the most successful method for empowering them in the Middle East 
and North Africa. 
 In the third and fourth chapter, I also included remittances into the empirical analysis—
initially with the intent to use them as a control for rival sources of foreign exchange to aid and 
investment (i.e. that could potentially dampen the effect of each). Surprisingly, remittances had 
their own impact, increasing the likelihood of adopting gender quotas, while deleteriously 
affecting women’s social and economic rights. The latter result is in line with Michael Ross’ 
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(2008) conjecture that by bolstering household income, remittances weaken incentives for 
women to work, which would in turn affect the likelihood of women lobbying for improved 
labor laws. Yet, remittance’s positive effect on quota adoption implies there is a more 
complicated story at hand, which I shall delve into more deeply in the conclusion to this 
dissertation. 
 Finally, the case analysis portion of the dissertation nuances the preliminary statistical 
findings by exploring variation in women’s political incorporation across the countries of 
Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, and through the prism of a dynamic interaction between the state, 
women’s grassroots mobilization, and international economic influence (Jamal 2010). The 
comparison of the three kingdoms reveals striking, though unsurprising, insights into how 
substantive political reforms are achieved by Arab women (see Table 5.2 in chapter five). In all 
three cases, the individual monarchs exhibited a commitment to promoting gender 
empowerment, but the most successful—Morocco—also hosted an explicitly feminist women’s 
movement independent from the monarchy, though enjoying amicable relations with it. In the 
Jordanian and Bahraini cases, the state set up umbrella NGOs (the Jordanian National Women’s 
Commission and the Bahraini Supreme Council for Women) to manage women’s participation, 
ultimately stifling grassroots mobilization and resulting in largely cosmetic policy change. 
Moroccan feminists were able to successfully frame themselves as indispensable to the regime’s 
attempts at moderating and secularizing the nation in the wake of the Casablanca terrorist attacks 
in 2003 and pragmatically used their bargaining chip to push through groundbreaking legislation 
in the Moudawana reforms of 2004.14 Importantly, the diverse NGOs and organizations 
                                                
14 The Moudawana laws or Moroccan personal status code was adopted in 1957 and regulated all aspects of familial 
life; marriage, polygamy, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. 
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comprising the Moroccan women’s movement were sustained by external funding and 
development assistance for the past two decades, and it is not clear they would have been as 
successful without this foreign support (Brand 1998). 
Implications 
The issue of gender in the Arab world is one of paramount political and economic 
importance as recent rumblings in the region attest to. Exploring the roots of gender inequality is 
not only important in and of itself, but has implications for a variety of pressing global issues. 
For example, Inglehart and Norris (2003a, 2003b), as other scholars (Landes and Landes 2001, 
Lewis 2002, Fish 2002), claim the big divide between Islam and the West is gender, not 
democracy. Their research finds Muslim populations are just as likely to support democracy and 
economic liberalism as populations in Western states. Muslims and their Western counterparts 
want democracy, but disagree on issues such as divorce, abortion, gender equality, and gay 
rights. Inglehart and Norris maintain that precisely these issues, and specifically gender 
discrimination, determine whether substantive democratization can occur in the Middle East 
since attitudes toward gender and homosexuality reveal state and societal tolerance of politically 
“marginalized” groups. Alongside this, scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize 
gender’s role in development. The UNDP recently stated, “no society can achieve the desired 
state of well-being and human development, or compete in a globalizing world, if half its people 
remain marginalized and disempowered.” Consequently, tracking substantive progress in the 
political status of Arab women has implications for scholars and policymakers alike, exploring 
incentives for democratization and economic development in the developing world and in 
Muslim countries, specifically.  
Furthermore, identifying the diverse impact of foreign capital on gender-related 
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indicators illustrates the complexity of economic globalization and highlights the necessity to 
disaggregate such broad concepts to their component parts. In focusing on the fiscal and 
monetary effects of foreign capital flows, researchers are neglecting to see how various financial 
instruments are changing social values and social policy in developing countries through 
conditional incentives and perceived reputational benefits. The WID and GAD paradigms are 
only capturing one side of the argument in focusing on foreign capital as a monolithic concept. 
Thus, my research should also inform the literature on capital controls and re-energize inquiry 
into the larger societal pros and cons of adopting such policies if specific types of financial 
capital actually have positive social effects. 
Finally, the most basic contribution of this dissertation lies in its identification of 
significant variation in women’s political incorporation across the Middle East and North Africa, 
as well as introducing a plausible mechanisms explaining whether and why Arab states empower 
their women politically. Such knowledge allows us craft more appropriate policy across a wide 
range of issues. 
Overview of Chapters 
 The proceeding chapters explore the different dimensions of women’s political 
incorporation across the Middle East in more depth. Chapter two focuses on Arab women’s 
legislative representation and the factors that contribute to its variation. It represents the first 
statistical evaluation of regional patterns in descriptive representation for the Middle East and a 
starting point for quantitative analyses of the region. Chapter three considers the policy arena 
through an examination of factors contributing to the likelihood of adopting three types of gender 
quotas: political party quotas, legislated candidate quotas, and reserved seats. Half of the 22 Arab 
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League member states have already adopted quotas (most of them in the new millennium) and 
these three types are equally represented across the region. Taking into account that gender 
quotas are the most globally widespread electoral reform in the new millennium, it is particularly 
instructive to disclose why they are popular in such a conservative and predominantly Muslim 
area. Chapter four introduces the notion of women’s political capacity examining it through Arab 
women’s political, economic, and social rights, and focusing on personal status laws. Chapter 
five considers two other factors conditioning the variation in women’s political incorporation 
that are not as readily quantified—state commitment to gender reform and the nature of women’s 
grassroots mobilization. This chapter effectively compares the interaction of top-down vs. 
bottom-up strategies for women’s political inclusion, while framing external finance as a 
political opportunity structure motivating the success of gender empowerment. The conclusion 
summarizes the primary findings of this research and introduces avenues for future research. 
  
 
 
 	  21 
CHAPTER 2: A NEW BEGINNING. EXPLORING WOMEN’S DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION  
 
“This [women’s empowerment] is all showmanship for the international community.” 
                  Interview with employee of Subul Assalam Center 
         Fes, Morocco, June 2008. 
In the last 20 years scholarship exploring women’s participation in politics experienced a 
renaissance, partially inspired by their increasing presence in legislative and executive bodies15. 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union reported women’s worldwide legislative representation rose from 
an average of 11percent to 19 percent over the last decade. Many of these female representatives 
are now in positions of power due to gender quotas explicitly allowing them entry into the 
political sphere, as well as other less institutionalized pressures stemming from the international 
arena. This new legislative “presence” may also be due to the global diffusion of “neo-liberal” 
sentiment valorizing the rewards of gender equality across both the political and newly the 
economic spectrum (Bakker 2007; Braunstein 2002; Hafner-Burton and Pollock 2002). 
Furthermore, the widespread initiatives of the international women’s movement (Berkovitch 
1999; D’Itri 1999; Rupp & Taylor 1999) contributed to publicizing women’s political under-
representation and its associated vulnerabilities.  
Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s Bretton Woods institutions touted the potential 
multiplier effect of gender equality as key for realizing the Millennium Development Goal 
targets in 2015. Gender-related research has rushed to capitalize on this lucrative trend 
generating a cottage industry centered on the relationship of women and globalization, women 
and development, women and democracy, culminating in women holding up “Half the Sky” 
according to the bestseller by Nicholas D. Kristof and Wendy WuDunn (2009).16 Effectively, 
                                                
15 Get stats from IDEA/Gender Reader 
16 Topics of interests have ranged from addressing gender parity through assessments of voting, campaigning, and 
execution of office to knowledge, attitudes, activism, and the substance of political influence.  
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women’s empowerment has become the latest cause célèbre of the international community, 
attracting global attention and now a significant amount of both private and public investment. 
Per a statement made by United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, on March 8th, 2009: 
“Supporting women is a high-yield investment, resulting in stronger economies, more vibrant 
civil societies, healthier communities, and greater peace and stability.17”The United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) reflects this gender bias, openly stating on its 
website that 67 percent of its basic education programs focus on girl’s education, 60 percent of 
clients receiving loans from USAID-supported microfinance institutions are women, and a third 
of all clients receiving USAID-supported enterprise development services are women.18 
As the introductory quote from the World Bank illustrates from the 1990s onward gender 
empowerment started making “business sense” and attracted concomitant financing from the 
international community. No part of the globe is more cognizant of these changing incentives to 
politically and economically incorporate women than the Middle East and North Africa—a 
region keenly aware that much of the world primarily identifies it with the repression of women 
and eager to disabuse foreign investors of this “distasteful” notion. Nary a day goes by without 
an Arab newspaper announcing a conference on women’s empowerment sponsored by the 
United Nations Development Program or a new women-oriented project promoted by one of 
USAID’s contractor agencies (International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems) and their European counterparts (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 
French Development Agency, etc.). The focus on Arab women has extended to the global press 
                                                
17 Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/ 
18 Ibid.  
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with pundits across the media touting a “feminist revolution” based on the role of women in 
2011’s revolutionary protests (Power 2011; Varner 2011; Wolf 2011).  Heady projections on the 
future of Arab women abound: 
“…Since feminism is simply a logical extension of democracy, the Middle East's despots are 
facing a situation in which it will be almost impossible to force these awakened women to 
stop their fight for freedom – their own and that of their communities.”19 
                
 “The uprisings sweeping the Arab world have toppled not only dictatorships. Gone too 
are the old stereotypes of Arab women as passive, voiceless victims. Over the past few 
months, the world has seen them marching in Tunisia, shouting slogans in Bahrain and 
Yemen, braving tear gas in Egypt and blogging and strategizing in cyberspace. Egyptian 
activist Asmaa Mahfouz, 26, became known as the Leader of the Revolution after she posted 
an online video call to arms, telling young people to get out onto the streets and demand 
justice. In Libya, female lawyers were among the earliest anti-Gaddafi organizers in the 
revolutionary stronghold of Benghazi.”20 
           
“Arabs were bemused that the Western media was shocked — shocked! — to find women 
protesting alongside men. "There was this sense of surprise, that 'Oh, my god, women are 
actually participating!'  says Egyptian activist Hadil El-Khouly.”21 
                        
But have Arab women really been as absent from the political sphere as the Western 
press hints at and what role has the international promotion of women’s equality had in 
encouraging their formal and informal political participation and inclusion? Women’s informal 
participation is difficult to measure short of tracking anecdotal evidence (see Brand 1998), 
however data on their formal political participation and inclusion is more readily available. 
Taking advantage of the availability of this new data, the following chapter demonstrates that 
Arab women have, in fact, had formal political roles in Arab Parliaments for a substantial portion 
of the 20th and 21st century (see Figure 2.1 below).  
                                                
19 Wolf, N. 2011. “The Middle East Feminist Revolution.” Al Jazeera Opinion. Available at 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201134111445686926.html 
20 Powers, C. 2011. “Silent No More. The Women of the Arab Revolutions.” TIME, March. Available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2059435,00.htm 
21 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.1 Sub-Regional Patterns of Women’s Legislative Representation  
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2010); Inter-Parliamentary Union (2010)* 
While there has been significant grass-roots lobbying from local feminists encouraging 
the opening of the public sphere to women and urging women to formally participate in politics 
(see Carapico 2003; Moghadam 2004; Moha and Sadiqi 2010; Schwedler 2002), we can safely 
assert that the majority of initiatives to integrate women have been top-down endeavors (Brand 
1998). They are often the byproduct of strategies that political leaders use to co-opt or 
enfranchise segments of the population in hopes of retaining power whether by pleasing a new 
constituency or, as I will argue, pleasing a donor or investor, which in the long run may be one 
and the same since the latter can be beneficial for all. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the 
international economic factors that would impact political elite’s decisions to incorporate women 
                                                
* The regional typologies can be broken down into the following countries: Maghreb=Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Egypt; Gulf=Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman; Levant=Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestinian Authority, Iraq; Africa=Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Comoros 
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and galvanize the top-down strategy of gender empowerment. I statistically evaluate the effect of 
international economic influence on the increasing trend in Arab women’s legislative 
representation by operationalizing it through two iterations of global finance: foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA).  
For this analysis, I use data on women’s legislative representation from the World Bank 
and the Inter-Parliamentary Union and explore the following questions: 1) Does the presence and 
growth in official development assistance and foreign direct investment have an effect on levels 
of women’s legislative representation across 22 Arab League member states? 2) Does the 
influence of one type of capital vs. another type impact the representational outcomes seen in the 
Persian Gulf countries vs. the rest of the Arab world?  I disaggregate the countries of the Gulf 
due to several characteristics that render the experience of Arab women from the Arabian 
Peninsula unique. One is their oil-wealth, which biases capital flows towards foreign direct 
investment, as many of these economies hardly need development assistance. In fact, they 
largely serve as a source of remittances for North Africa and the Levant. Furthermore, Ross 
(2008) and Moghadam (2000) make the argument that oil-based economies reduce the number of 
economically active women by decreasing the need for them in the labor force, which in turn 
reduces women’s political influence.22 Oil wealth also renders Gulf economies unaccountable to 
their constituencies, further neutralizing the need for these monarchies to be sensitive to demands 
for equal representation (Friedman 2006). Finally, the proximity to Mecca and the susceptibility 
of Gulf Cooperation Council countries to Saudi influence is conducive to a more “conservative” 
                                                
22 Oil and gas industries crowd out export-oriented manufacturing industries that usually hire women or result in 
significant financial disbursements from the state, which mitigate the need for a two-wage household. Thus, the 
nature of resource endowment has a tremendous effect on women’s political opportunities and status. I control for 
this by incorporating a Gulf dummy variable. Admittedly, this is an imperfect measure since Algeria has significant 
oil wealth, though most of the “resource curse” arguments in the gender context strictly apply to the Gulf. 
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interpretation of gender relations and women’s roles in society.  
The ultimate findings reveal that foreign direct investment is positively correlated with 
increases in women’s legislative representation. Yet, as we shall see through the ensuing 
chapters, FDI does not have a similarly resonant effect on other indicators of women’s 
incorporation, hinting that the role of FDI in promoting gender empowerment is very much 
contingent on the context and institutionalized change in question.  
Arab Women’s Changing Political Roles 
Starting with Maurice Duverger’s “The Political Role of Women”, scholarship has 
focused on women’s political participation as measured by their presence in legislatures and the 
executive (also see Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lakeman 1976; Norris 1985; Paxton, 1997; 
Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; Rule 1981, 1987, 1994).23 Yet, why would levels of 
legislative representation be important in gauging women’s political incorporation in the Middle 
East and North Africa, specifically? Many argue this is solely a cosmetic indicator and plays into 
the interests of Arab leaders unwilling to substantively change the status quo for women, but 
needing to concede some institutions in the interest of looking progressive to the Western world. 
Ideally, measures of formal participation should include more sensitive indicators reflecting not 
only women’s formal representation, but also degrees of women’s political influence, and so 
capture the substance of their political integration. Yet, research has shown that seeing women in 
                                                
23 Alongside legislative and executive representation, another common measure for women’s political participation 
is women’s presence in political parties, as well as how representative generic party platforms are of women’s 
interests (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994, Caul 1999, Wolbrecht 2000, Paxton and 
Kunovich 2005). A more nuanced approach to measuring women’s political influence may be through their 
aggregate levels of government employment (see McClain and Karnig 1990) or a consideration of substantive 
political outcomes (see Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984). Finally, scholars have taken to using the United 
Nation’s recently developed Gender Empowerment Measures (Slusser 2009) as well as the Cingranelli-Richards 
Human Rights Dataset’s measures for women’s political status to capture the sum of women’s experience in the 
political arena.  
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political offices increases the interest and participation of other women (Burns, Scholzman, and 
Verba 2001; Hansen 1997). Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) reveal in their global cross-national 
analysis that female MPs serve as role models for the next generation of women—a finding that 
has some resonance in the Arab world. In their descriptive role female representatives bring the 
discussion of women into politics and the broader public realm even though the policies they 
promote often do not explicitly address women’s issues. Hence, the number of women serving in 
Arab parliaments and other political institutions is not a negligible factor.  Stephanie Nanes’ 
(2010) research on municipal councilors in Jordan reveals the symbolic import of female 
representatives: “This is the big question about “impact on society” and the transformation of 
women’s political status. Several [Jordanian] women mentioned that a key change that had taken 
place was that it was no longer 3ayb, “shameful,” for an unrelated man and woman to speak to 
each other in public. Prior to her service on the council, one female councilor reported, such an 
exchange would have been extremely problematic in her small village. Now it is normal. “If they 
want something from the council, they have to come talk to me,” she noted. Creating cracks in 
invisible but powerful gender barriers is no small accomplishment in some of the more rural 
parts of Jordan. Another important benefit of the women’s quota on the municipal level in Jordan 
appears to be simply putting women in the public sphere and making her part of the give and 
take of politics. One council member aptly described this as women being part of qarda wa-
dayn, which literally translates as “loan and debt.” This is the set of exchange relations that 
define local politics in Jordan. Women are increasingly seen as capable political agents, since 
male and female constituents come to female councilors to get help with municipal business” 
(Nanes 2010, 12). 
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Still, the Arab world trails the rest of the globe in gender parity with the average 
percentage of women in Arab legislative assemblies at a low 9.2 percent compared to the global 
average of 19 percent (see Table 2.1 below). This number has increased substantially in less than 
a decade rising from an average of 4 percent in 2000 to the 10 percent it is today (see Table 2.2 
below). Over the last ten years data collection improved spurred by the myriad development 
projects cropping up in the region and the information now available finally allows for more 
systematic comparison and exploration of the dramatic changes transpiring in the last twenty 
years. 
Table 2.1 Average Percentages of Women in Parliaments Worldwide 
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Region Single House/ Lower House 
Upper 
House/Senate 
Both Houses 
Combined 
Nordic countries 42.1% --- --- 
Americas 22.7% 23.7% 22.9% 
Europe - OSCE member countries 
including Nordic countries 22.0% 19.7% 21.6% 
Europe - OSCE member countries 
excluding Nordic countries 20.1% 19.7% 20.0% 
Asia 18.6% 16.4% 18.4% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 18.3% 20.4% 18.6% 
Pacific 13.2% 32,6% 15.3% 
Arab States 9.2% 7.6% 8.8% 
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Table 2.2 Regional Percentages of Women in Parliaments 1955-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Source: Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes (2007, 266) 
 
Women’s Legislative Representation  
Arab women’s political participation and representation has a longstanding pedigree with 
considerable variation across the individual Arab countries. This phenomenon is further 
exemplified by the disparate chronologies of each country when granting universal suffrage. 
Women attained the right to vote as early as 1946 in Djibouti, yet as late as 2005 in Kuwait. 
While women still lack the right to suffrage in Saudi Arabia, Iraq recently claimed the title to 
most female parliamentarians in the region through their 2010 parliamentary elections via the 25 
percent quota. A few governorates (or provinces) exceeded the requirement and documented up 
to 32.1 percent female candidates elected (IFES 2010).24  In fact, 8 out of 14 governorates 
elected women beyond the expected quota numbers, including Kerbala, Salah Al-Din, Ninewa, 
and Baghdad. Tunisia has long occupied the post of the Arab country with the most female 
legislative representatives coming in at 28 percent—a full six percent directly elected above the 
national quota of 22 percent. From 2002 onward most of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries extended some form of suffrage to women: Bahrain again in 2002 after a multi-year 
suspension, Oman in 2003, Kuwait and Qatar in 2005, and the United Arab Emirates extended 
                                                
24 The governorate of Wassit. 
Region 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Nordic 
Countries 
10.4 9.3 16.1 27.5 24.4 38.2 
Western 
Democratic 
3.6 4 5.5 8.6 12.8 22.7 
Eastern Europe 17 18.4 24.7 27 8.4 15.7 
Latin America 2.8 2.7 5.2 8.1 10 17.1 
Africa 1 3.2 5.3 8 9.8 16.3 
Asia 5.2 5.3 2.8 5.6 8.8 15.3 
Middle East 1.2 1.2 2.9 3.5 3.9 8.1 
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limited suffrage in 2006.25 Extending the franchise to women, as has been the case recently in 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain, is also potentially telling of a sea change 
in state-opposition relations, alliance strategies and changing elite interest group composition, 
whether it is a response to internal dynamics or fueled by external pressure (or perception 
thereof). Adding yet another actor or interest group such as women to a system that is already in 
a precarious equilibrium is never a trivial decision (Lust-Okar 2006), and the choice of 
instituting universal suffrage or gender quotas may alter political balances in unforeseen ways 
(Krook and O’Brian 2010). Any change in electoral policy will impact how potential rents are 
disbursed and can re-combine old actors disrupting status-quo politics (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 
2006).  
In the last decade, shades of women’s interests crept into politics at the highest level. In 
Morocco a revision of inheritance laws was recently pushed into the spotlight by a group of 
illiterate women dubbed the “Soulaliyate”, potentially representing a seminal achievement in 
terms of women’s lobbying for policy change at the national level (La Marocaine 2010). 
Bahrain’s family law debate is used as an arena for Sunnis and Shiites to address differences 
through the prism of women’s issues. 26Women’s quotas are being hijacked by smaller 
conservative tribes displaced by the current electoral system in Jordan to finally get a seat and 
access to rents in Parliament (Masri 2008). Finally, the Kuwaitis directly elected four female 
legislators in 2009, two of which successfully pushed the Constitutional Court to rule wearing 
                                                
25 The U.A.E. does not have universal suffrage. Rather a group of 4000 electors, a third of whom are women elect 
representatives to the Parliament. 
26 It is important to note that what many dismiss as a “trifling” issue in the West—i.e. gender empowerment, has 
crosscutting implications in the Arab world for religion, class, and sex. Gender equality in many respects cuts at the 
heart of the differences between Islamic culture and neo-liberal Western ideals as the article “The Real Clash of 
Civilizations” by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris deftly illustrate, as does Steve Fish in his own work (2003). 
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the hijab was optional for female parliamentarians, in direct defiance to Islamist opposition in 
Parliament.27 In light of the aforementioned changes and the potential risks they entail to status 
quo politics, it is worth asking what has happened over the last twenty years to promote such a 
shift in parliamentary demographics and why so many Arab governments are openly 
encouraging it through granting women suffrage, adopting legislative gender quotas, and even 
generously subsidizing political parties’ fielding female political candidates (Bahrain and 
Morocco for example).  
Public sentiment, however, is certainly not responsible for galvanizing Arab 
government’s changing attitudes toward women. Survey data hints that most Arab public opinion 
sees women and women’s issues as secondary to the political process (Masri 2008, Shteiwi 2008, 
IFES 2010). Arab citizens of both genders see economic issues as more pressing to their day-to-
day livelihood. Unsurprisingly, women also tend to vote for men rather than representatives of 
their own gender. An anecdote presented in a New York Times28 profile of the Jordanian 
politician, Hayat Massimi, a female stalwart of the Islamic Action Front and a candidate during 
the 2007 parliamentary elections29, illustrates the concerns of many Arabs, in particular women, 
while showcasing the challenges female candidates face: “She [Hayat Massimi] faced a tough 
crowd. The veiled women sipped Pepsis and a syrupy sweet desert made of shredded wheat and 
cheese (kanafa), but they were anything but demure. What, they wanted to know, could the 
Islamic Action Front do in Parliament to affect the issues affecting them—rising prices for flour 
                                                
27 The two Parliamentarians are Aseel al Awadhi and Rola Dashti. 
28 Cambanis 2007 
29 Mrs. Massimi is a mother of five and the typical Islamic Action Front politician: professional, bilingual, a 
Palestinian refugee who came to Jordan from Nablus in 1967, with a doctorate in chemistry—she one a seat 
representing the Zarqa district in the 2003 elections through the quota, though many argued she had received 
sufficient votes to win without it.  
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and diesel fuel, stagnant salaries, spiking inflation and rampant unemployment? ‘You can’t 
provide us any services,’ said Asmaa Said al-Assi, 38, ‘Why should I vote for you?’”  
As showcased by Stephanie Nanes’ invocation of qarda wa-dayn, the ability to engage in 
“public service provision” is the gold standard of politics and political influence in many Arab 
countries. In my experience in Jordan, this talent was duly rewarded in women as well as men. 
Falaak Jamani, the first Jordanian woman directly elected to the Jordanian Lower House was 
particularly adept at taking care of her constituents, helping build a new school here, a hospital 
there, insuring someone’s education was paid for or unemployed status readily resolved. She 
won her first mandate for the district of Kerak in 2003 and was later re-elected in a landslide 
victory in 2007. Integral to her skill was her status as a General in the military’s health division 
and an ability to place people in jobs across both the military and health sector. She had the 
support of her tribe and was even invited to a sitting of the all-male tribal diwan as a full-fledged 
member and contributor. Yet, it is questionable whether Falaak would have gotten her foot in the 
door without King Abdullah of Jordan pushing for the adoption of a legislative quota for women 
in 2003. This measure was extremely unpopular at the time and was commonly seen as being 
foisted on the king from abroad. With this in mind, it becomes even more curious from where the 
incentives to politically integrate women arise since they represent a controversial issue for the 
restive Arab public. In an interview a female Islamist politician from Bahrain ventured, “The 
West is pushing this agenda [women’s empowerment], not the Arabs.”30 
The mechanisms through which women are integrated into political life in the Middle 
East are often distinct from those in much of West and hint at which factors could be important 
in explaining the rise in women’s legislative representation over the past two decades. As 
                                                
30 Interview with political from Al- Menbar Society, Manama, Bahrain, July 2008. 
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introduced in the first chapter, political incorporation can represent the result of successful grass-
roots political mobilization or a strategy for co-optation by political elites. Political opposition 
has been weak in most Arab countries, though growing with the increasing popularity of 
informal Islamic networks, but also with the ubiquity of women’s organizations and non-profits 
operating in the region often challenging local regimes’ notoriously fickle policies vis-à-vis their 
female population (Moha and Sadiqi 2010).31 Certainly, the toppling of the Ben Ali and Mubarak 
regimes showcase the newfound power of some secular movements in posing a credible 
opposition, as well (Koplow 2011). Still, institutional change is largely mandated from the top 
down in most Arab countries.  Consequently, exploring factors that influence the mindsets of 
Arab political leaders will likely reveal why encouraging women’s political participation has 
become a hallmark of Arab governments’ national strategies. One of the most important 
considerations and the least explored is the role of external finance in promoting change and 
creating credible incentives for Arab leaders. 
Foreign Capital Flows and their Impact on the Gendering of Arab Parliaments 
 
There has been a surprising lack of research linking foreign capital as an instrument of 
international pressure for conditioning gender-related outcomes (see Bush 2011; Nanes 2010 for 
recent work). Foreign direct investment and aid are often operationalized as indicators of 
interdependence and globalization, but not often conceptualized as coercive mechanisms for 
procuring domestic policy outcomes outside of the fiscal and monetary realms. Conditional aid 
has been known to have some effect on policy outcomes, specifically the amount of social 
expenditure in recipient countries across contexts such as security spending (Bienen and 
                                                
31 Refer to Yasmine Haddad’s The Islamic Revival Since 1988: A Critical Survey and Bibliography. New York: 
Greenwood Press (1997) and John Douglas Ruedy’s Islam and Secularism in North Africa, Palgrave Macmillan 
(1996) 
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Gersowitz 1985; Collier, Guillamont P., Guillamont S., and Gunning 1997; Marchesi and 
Thomas, 1999; Przeworski and Vreland, 2000; Williamson, 1983). This extensive literature 
chronicles the effect of external finance on promoting reforms in public expenditure and even 
legal code, and hints that the effectiveness of conditionality may extend to gender-related policy. 
Development Assistance 
  In more recent years, there has been a shift beyond the safeguarding of women’s rights 
within legal frameworks such as the Convention Against the Discrimination of Women to 
encouraging developing countries to factor for endemic gender discrimination within their 
national budgets and political institutions. The Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) 
which introduced the Beijing Platform for Action32, the 23rd special of the General Assembly 
(2000), the Millennium Summit (2000) and the 2005 World Summit, highlighted government 
and international organization’s commitments to the financing of gender equality and 
empowerment to promote economic as well as political interests. From 1999 until 2003 an 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) DAC (Development 
Assistance Committee) study revealed that almost $3.1 billion dollars in aid targeted gender-
sensitive programming.33 In particular, the World Bank openly touted the importance of 
women’s empowerment for economic development and thus popularized gender mainstreaming 
as a viable national strategy. As one of the largest sources of external finance for development, 
the World Bank plays a central role in promoting the norms and imagery associated with 
progressive economic and political outcomes to the developing world (Finnemore 1996; Myers 
                                                
32 The Beijing Platform called for direct government participation in diverting resources to and creating a supportive 
environment for the complete inclusion of women into public society with the aid of women’s NGOs, feminist 
groups, and the private sector—the first clear international promotion of gender mainstreaming. Report of the Fourth 
World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), 
chap. I, resolution 1, annex II. 
33 Williams, M. 2007. Gender and Trade: Impacts and Implications for Financial Resources for Gender. 
Equality, (Commonwealth Secretariat, Background Paper WAMM (07)10. 
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1996). More importantly, the World Bank’s increasing focus on building human capital benefits 
the promotion of women via the financial resources and professional training dedicated to this 
agenda (Finnemore 1996). A quick look at gender-specific projects coordinated by the World 
Bank shows a large majority implemented in Muslim countries—many of them in the Arab 
world. Even the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals explicitly highlight two 
gender-related issues: gender equality and maternal health; further bolstering the profile of 
gender initiatives worldwide. Finally, the United Nations Development Program recently stated 
“no society can achieve the desired state of well-being and human development, or compete in a 
globalizing world, if half its people remain marginalized and disempowered” (Inglehart and 
Norris 2003, 65). 
There has been a veritable wave of development programs focused on women’s political 
inclusion flooding the Arab world since the 1990s. These initiatives at least partially contribute 
to increasing the regional average for female legislative representation through their explicit 
promotion of women-friendly institutional change (such as encouraging gender quotas within 
political parties and legislatures) and their free training of female political candidates and social 
organizers, thereby building a substantial technocratic elite with a vested interested in women’s 
issues. In fact, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute 
(IRI) have been openly responsible for professionalizing elected female parliamentarians in both 
Jordan and Morocco, as well as consulting on the electoral campaigns of female candidates 
across the region. The United Nations Development Program purportedly dedicated 600,000 
Bahraini Dinar ($1.6 million) to sponsoring women’s political campaigns in the 2003 elections. 
Why is there such a push by international organizations for women’s empowerment in 
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majority-Muslim Arab countries specifically? The slew of recent scholarship identifying gender 
as the primary difference and potential point of contention between Muslim and Western 
societies has partially motivated this shift in policy (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 
2003b; Landes and Landes 2001; Lewis 2002). Preserving stability in the strategically important 
Middle East is increasingly framed in terms of democracy promotion in the region. 
Consequently, resolving the “gender gap” through women’s political inclusion has become more 
integral to the international community’s efforts to democratize the Arab world. Furthermore, 
Western donors are gambling that the political advent of women will have a “moderating” and 
“secularizing” influence on local politics. Therefore my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: A rise in the amount of development assistance received by a given Arab country will 
increase the number of women in its legislature over time. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
My interviews with government officials in Jordan, Bahrain, and Morocco revealed that 
many Arab leaders viewed gender empowerment as a way to improve their “image” abroad and 
thus attract more financial investment. They also believed resolving the “cosmetic” issues of 
women’s legislative representation was a quick way to conciliate donors requesting concrete 
signs of progress in democracy and development. Importantly, the incentive structure is different 
in Gulf countries such as Bahrain since they receive low levels of development assistance, but 
attract substantial foreign investment in comparison to other Arab countries so debt 
conditionality will not have as pronounced of an impact in this part of the Arab world. Yet, many 
Gulf countries still wish to portray themselves as investment-friendly and non-threatening 
nations and see women’s political inclusion as a ready message to the outside world of their 
“progressive” environment. Consequently, there is reason to believe FDI may exert un-
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intentional pressures to politically incorporate women, as well. Per my interview with an 
academic at the University of Bahrain: “I think most of the [gender-related] changes are 
galvanized by national reports.  They take international ratings very seriously. They [the 
government] use amendments to cover things; they try to make up positions for women; but 
many ministries that women belong to are of secondary importance. The ministry of interior, 
finance, etc. these will affect government decisions.”34  
Photos of women cloaked in black abayas are easily the first visual most people associate 
with the Gulf outside of looming oil rigs nestled in a sea of sand. Certainly, movies such as Sex 
and the City 2 have furthered this image. The latter is an unsettling visual and one, for all 
attempts to romanticize it, that the Gulf actively attempts to dispel for fear of alienating 
investors, tourists, and white-collar foreign labor. Today that image can be supplemented with 
images of women within almost every legislative assembly of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(Saudi Arabia is the notable exception). It may not be an accident that much of this “New 
Arabia” came into being with suffrage hastily implemented from 2002 onward in the wake of the 
9/11 bombings. In this respect, while conditional aid may directly mandate that Arab leaders 
show evidence of progress on gender and “democracy” indicators, foreign direct investment may 
possess an inadvertent power to create incentives for the political inclusion of women in 
countries where conditionality is moot by unofficially requiring that these states present 
themselves as politically stable and West-friendly investment environments. Women’s 
empowerment is increasingly part and parcel of that image. Thus my second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
                                                
34 Interview with female university professor at the University of Bahrain in Manama, June 2008. 
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H2: Rising levels of foreign direct investment will increase women’s legislative 
representation.  
 
Foreign direct investment can be seen as supporting gender-related goals through gender-
sensitive technological transfer and labor market access.  Has this been the case in the past? 
Previous work exploring the link between foreign direct investment and gender empowerment 
found mixed results and mostly explored the impact of foreign direct investment on women’s 
labor market participation (Boserup 1990; Enloe 1989; Elson 1995; McMichael 2004; Mies 
1986; Misra 2000; Ward an Pyle 1995; Ward 1993). Related work concludes the labor market 
access fostered through foreign investment can lead to political influence depending on the 
sector employing women (Moghadam 1999; Ross 2008; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999; 
Sapiro 1983). Moghadam (1999) tracked how women in low-wage manufacturing in countries 
such as Tunisia and Morocco formed organizations to protect their interests and lobby for 
women’s rights. Per Ross (2008), women’s labor force participation amplifies their political 
influence on three levels: the social level through an increase in the likelihood of women’s 
network formation by virtue of density of women in the labor market, the individual level 
through affecting their political views and identity, and ultimately on the economic level by 
highlighting their economic importance to the government giving them greater leverage over 
related policy. However, this labor momentum has to start somewhere and more often than not it 
is the byproduct of initially gender-blind foreign direct investment sweeping into these 
economies with a preference for cheaper female labor. Many multinational corporations seek the 
Middle East for location-specific advantages such as low-wages and a reliable workforce, which 
oftentimes happens to be female in the Arab world. This is especially important for export-
oriented multi-national corporations where wages constitute a higher portion of production costs. 
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In fact, the majority of hires in low wage export-oriented industries such as textiles, garments 
and the processing of agricultural goods are Arab women—similar to the rest of the world where 
women compose fully 80 percent of this sector (World Bank 2001). Women are favored for these 
positions because they do not require great physical strength, the jobs require minimal training, 
and provide women an opportunity to intermittently leave and take care of their families. Finally, 
this type of employment is often perceived as traditional women’s work (Ross 2007). For women 
to have access to the formal labor market requires considerable political will to reverse cultural 
preconceptions of their role in Arab societies. However, many regimes may be willing to 
formally change attitudes toward women in the interest of guaranteeing investors the cheaper and 
more reliable female labor they desire.  
Scholarship linking economic performance to political institutions also elaborates on 
another mechanism by which foreign direct investment could ultimately promote more 
opportunity for women largely through its effect on the policy environmental overall. The 
writings of Douglass North (1990; North and Weingast 1989) illustrate the Western conceit that 
democratic institutions (elections, parliaments and independent judiciaries) will constrain 
predatory politicians and foster conditions necessary for insuring the security of property and 
guarantee of contractual obligations—concepts linked to economic growth, credibility, and 
stability. Resolving tense gender relations within a given country through the co-optation of 
women into the political sphere can be seen as contributing toward the aforementioned goals by 
neutralizing yet another source of regime opposition and thus fostering stability. In a similar 
vein, Dani Rodrik’s (1996) research showed American foreign direct investment positively 
correlated with the Freedom House democracy index from 1982 and 1989, while Kucera (2001) 
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demonstrated that increases in foreign direct investment were associated with stronger civil 
liberties, political rights and democracy. The latter findings suggest a positive relationship 
between foreign direct investment and democratic institutions, potentially translating into 
promoting women’s political inclusion—a sign of a tolerant regime, as well.  According to the 
Monterey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), “Good governance is essential for 
sustainable development. Sound economic policies, solid democratic institutions responsive to 
the needs of the people and improved infrastructure are the basis for sustained economic growth, 
poverty eradication and employment creation. Freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, 
respect for human rights, including the right development, and the rule of law, gender equality, 
market-oriented policies, and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies are also 
essential and mutually reinforcing.”35 
In conclusion, while research exploring non-market factors affecting incentives for 
women’s political and economic incorporation is ubiquitous, the policy impact of market-related 
factors such as global finance does not generate as much inquiry.  A recent United Nation’s 
white paper by Isabella Bakker (2007, 10) emphasized the importance of “an ongoing analysis of 
market and non-market factors and how these influence the gender division of labor and income 
distribution” and much the same can be said for the continued evaluation of the 
institutionalization of measures to include women in politics. The following section tracks the 
impact of just such an array of economic and institutional factors on women’s legislative 
representation in the Arab world. 
A Quantitative Analysis of Arab Women’s Legislative Representation  
The Model 
                                                
35 Available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/. 
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To explore the two hypotheses introduced in the previous section, I analyze women’s 
political representation through a dependent variable encompassing percentages of women in 
legislative assemblies across 22 Arab League member states from 1990 until 2009. The data are 
collected from the Inter-parliamentary Union’s “Parline” and “Women in Parliaments” database, 
as well as supplemented with data from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. The 
statistical analysis in this chapter represents the first of three larger models testing the impact of 
global finance across three indicators of women’s political incorporation: legislative 
representation (chapter two), gender-related policy outcomes (chapter three), and women’s 
socio-political rights (chapter four). With this tri-partite testing, I hope to avoid the pitfalls of 
creating a list incorporating these three independent concepts as a monolithic measure of 
women’s political incorporation in the vein of the United Nation’s Gender Development Index 
(GMI) or Gender Empowerment Measures (GEM).36 Complete data across Arab countries is 
often missing for specific gender-related indicators, and analyzing the three measures above 
separately allows for a clearer understanding of the variation encountered across the region, 
while compensating for gaps in the data. Furthermore, these three indicators are structurally very 
different and combining them would mute that difference instead of explaining and interpreting 
it. The inability to insure content validity and the manipulation required to insure concept 
validity would pose significant specification issues, hence my decision to test these differing 
aspects of women’s political incorporation independently and thereby allow for more complete 
inference. Still, women’s descriptive representation and the adoption of gender quotas are both 
phenomena directly related to the institutional arena, yet the former represents an institutional 
                                                
36 I avoid using the GEM and GDI scores in this analysis because they have, in most cases, not been coded for the 
Middle East and North Africa or were not at the time of this research. Intriguingly, the disaggregated components of 
the GEM and GDI indices are available for the time period under investigation. 
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outcome, while the latter encapsulates a policy geared at increasing women’s representation. 
Since quite a few Arab countries hosted female parliamentarians before gender quotas became a 
trend in the 2000s (Krook 2006), considering descriptive representation separately from gender 
quotas allows me to examine whether women’s prior legislative representation increased the 
likelihood of quota adoption—effectively, testing whether incumbent women were instrumental 
in lobbying for gender-friendly policy change.37 In addition, the capacity of women to enjoy a 
host of civil rights transcends formal political institutions and so captures the socio-political 
environment Arab women operate in further outlining women’s access to power. Ultimately, the 
latter is a categorically different measure from the previous two concepts (legislative 
representation and quota adoption) and more directly reflect women’s capabilities to 
meaningfully participate in the public arena (see Amartya Sen 1999 for a discussion of the 
capabilities approach). 
The dependent variable is not normally distributed since many of values are low and 
trend toward zero. This is unsurprising considering even single digit percentages for women’s 
representation in Arab parliaments are a relatively new phenomenon. Consequently, I use a 
poisson and negative binomial regression estimators for my analysis. The poisson and negative 
binomial models are both used to estimate count data or count-like data where the distribution is 
zero-inflated and in the case of negative binomial regression, when it is also extra-dispersed 
(Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). In this case, the percentages of women in 
parliament would be considered as proportions of a fixed count. As stated before, both models 
                                                
37 While many would assume that female incumbents in Arab countries would jump at the chance to secure their 
seats through a quota system, most of the Jordanian female deputies I spoke to criticized the quota as being 
undemocratic and unfair, even though they had been elected to the through it and records show they did not 
explicitly support of lobby for the measure during sessions of Parliament. This further hints at a policy authored by 
the king and forced on the government. 
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are appropriate when estimating dependent variables trending toward zero—i.e. dependent 
variables measuring events that are rare and thus have a distribution with a mean closer to zero. 
Since the data range from 1990 until 2009, and quite a few Arab countries granted full suffrage 
to women only recently, many observations are coded as zero since there were no women present 
in the respective legislatures. 
As a secondary robustness test, I fit a population-averaged generalized estimating 
equation model (GEE) to insure the robust estimation of the cross-sectional time series panel 
data used for this analysis (Whitford 2003; Zorn 2006, 2001) (see Table 2.4 in the Appendix). 
GEE models elaborate on standard generalized linear models by allowing analysts to compensate 
for serial autocorrelation by specifying a within-unit correlation matrix and adjusting errors 
accordingly (Duncan et al 1995; Horton and Lipsitz 1999; Liang and Zeger 1986; Zeger and 
Liang 1986; Zeger, Liang and Albert 1988). The results presented here specify exchangeable, 
independent, and auto-regressive correlation matrices as robustness tests of the data. Since the 
data form a time series cross-sectional (TSCS) panel data set, there is a high likelihood of serial 
correlation over time and auto-correlation through repeated time points, which might inflate 
results. To control for this, I also estimate a limited model incorporating only the years during 
which a legislative change through election or appointment occurred (see Table 2.5 in the 
Appendix). As a final robustness check, I estimate the time series regression model using panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to control for any bias in the standard errors (Beck and Katz 
1995) (see Table 2.6 in the Appendix). The following equation tests my assumptions: 
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Women’s legislative representation    = α (constant) + β1Development Assistance (logged) 
+ β2  Foreign Direct Investment  
+ β3  Economic Development (logged) 
+ β4  Electoral System  
+ β5  Democracy  
+ β6 Fertility Rates  
+ β7 Gulf states (dummy) 
+ β8 Women’s Labor Participation  
+ β9 Women’s Economic Rights (CIRI) 
+ β10Women’s Social Rights (CIRI)  
+ β11Women’s Political Rights (CIRI) + e 
Factors Influencing Women’s Legislative Representation  
 The base model shown above incorporates multiple independent variables across both the 
institutional and structural spectrum that may affect the numbers of women present in Arab 
parliaments. The primary variables of interest are those reflecting the two types of external 
global finance: foreign direct investment and development assistance. Fertility rates and levels of 
economic development are included to control for structural factors that may influence the 
supply and demand for women in politics, while electoral systems represents the institutional 
rules that regulate their access to the political system. Finally, I also use a regional control for the 
states of the Persian Gulf due to their unique experiences as oil-wealthy nations in the proximity 
of Mecca and their conservative impact on attitudes vis-à-vis women.  
 The paucity of independent variables is partially in the interest of preserving degrees of 
freedom, but also a by-product of the limited information available for all of the time periods. 
The expanded models incorporate the independent variables in cursive in an attempt to control 
for grassroots factors affecting women’s legislative representation. Religiosity is not formally 
controlled for in the model since all the Arab League member states are majority Muslim 
countries and measures sensitive to variations in Islamic religious intensity have yet to be 
developed.  
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Variables of Interest: International Financial Incentives 
Billions of dollars flow annually into the Middle East affecting both the policy and 
ultimately the social environment of these countries. With the end of the Cold War donors have 
increasingly linked funding with improvements in social conditions, particularly for women in 
the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 1998; Carapico 2002; Coleman 2004; Moghadam 2003). In some 
cases, the inadvertent pressure exerted by the international multi-national community through its 
demands for stable, liberal, and ultimately “familiar” environments for investment may also play 
an integral role in pushing women into the public sphere as norms shift (Campa 1994; Miller 
1992). Consequently, there may be a direct connection between foreign interests and increases in 
women’s political representation by virtue of conditionality agreements and pressures to create 
“investment-friendly” environments. I use official development assistance and foreign direct 
investment as percentages of Gross Domestic Product as my measures for the effects of foreign 
capital. These ratios allow for an exploration of how much influence foreign direct investment or 
development assistance have in the overall national economy in terms of magnitude, thus giving 
more insight into how much is at stake if governments refuse to comply with formal and 
informal conditions introduced by the disbursers of the respective monies. These numbers are 
derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and I posit both types of external 
finance will positively correlate with women’s legislative representation. 
Control Variables: Supply and Demand-side Factors 
The control variables are inspired by Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes (2007) break down 
of the supply-side and demand-side factors impacting women’s political inclusion (Inglehart & 
Norris 2003; Paxton 1997, Paxton& Kunovich 2003; Norris 1997; Randall 1987). Supply-side 
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factors represent the pool of women available for candidacy and most closely approximate 
structural considerations such as women’s labor-force participation and access to income, which 
are conditioned by levels of economic development. The demand-side elements comprise 
electoral mechanisms, which control women’s access to the political arena, as well as the density 
of grassroots networks lobbying for and against women’s political representation. 
A. Demand-side or Institutional Factors  
Electoral System 
Institutional explanations suggest that political rules explain systematic differences in 
women’s representation among relatively similar societies. Unfavorable contextual conditions 
can be manipulated by alternate electoral systems to change women’s political situation. Wilma 
Rule (1981, 1987, 1994) and Pippa Norris (1985, 1997, 2001) demonstrate electoral 
arrangements for choosing legislatures (proportional versus majoritarian party lists) have an 
impact on the gender make-up of legislatures. Reynolds (1999) seconds this analysis showing 
women are more likely to be elected in systems with proportional representation and closed lists. 
I control for electoral systems’ influence by incorporating a dummy variable capturing whether a 
country uses a majoritarian electoral system. The data is derived from Pippa Norris’ Democracy 
Dataset and I expect the presence of majoritarian electoral system to be associated with a lower 
number of female representatives.  
Political Regime 
The substance of women’s representation in non-democratic contexts is questionable at 
best (Goetz & Hassim 2003). Yet some researchers argue that the position of the parliamentarian 
is visible and carries prestige in all contexts, providing women with symbolic power in 
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democracies and non-democracies alike (e.g. Paxton & Kunovich 2003). Ultimately, the nature 
of the regime will determine whether it’s institutions will be representative of the popular will or 
even the population itself. Democracies have more of an imperative to be representative, hence 
why gender quotas and initiatives to recognize a silent female majority may be more prevalent 
(and usually are) in countries with democratic regimes. I control for level of democracy through 
Ted Gurr’s POLITY IV democracy scores. I expect the more democratic a state, the more female 
representation there will be in the respective Parliament. 
B. Socio-economic factors 
Economic Development and Fertility Rates 
Economic development and the expected drop in fertility rates can be considered a proxy for 
the kind of ideological change that would allow the acceptance of women in politics within 
conservative Muslim societies. Modernization is seen as leading to a weakening of traditional 
values, decreasing fertility rates, and increased urbanization with greater educational and labor 
force participation by women, alongside attitudinal changes in perceptions of women’s roles 
within society (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Matland 1998). Decreasing fertility rates can also hint 
at women successfully wresting control of their private and public selves by establishing control 
over their reproductive rights. This is yet another harbinger of more progressive and women-
friendly values within a society, further allowing for the successful political advancement of 
women. I use standard indicators such as GDP per capita and fertility (total births per woman) 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicators as proxies for these concepts.38 I expect 
economic development as proxied through income to be positively associated with women’s 
                                                
38 Industrialization is operationalized with energy use per capita, economic growth with Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), nature of development with agriculture as a percentage of GDP, and urbanization with percentage of 
population living in urban settings.  
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legislative representation, while a rise in fertility rates should have a dampening effect. 
Women’s Labor Participation 
Globally, it seems there is little evidence that education or even labor participation drives 
female political incorporation (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2003, 2005; 
Paxton 1997). Yet, increased female labor force participation, especially in professional sectors, 
should also result in a larger pool of potential applicants for political positions since it can often 
be an indicator of women’s access to funds (Norris 1996a). Importantly, even where women do 
participate in the labor force, there is no guarantee that this gives them direct power over the 
money generated from their labor. I still expect this control to be positively associated with 
women’s legislative representation (Blumberg 1984; Chafetz 1984; Karam 1999; Staudt 1986). 
While the Middle East has made incredible strides in closing the gender gap across basic income 
and education over the last thirty years (Moghadam 1998)39, it hasn’t translated into levels of 
political engagement or even predicted levels of labor participation, a “development deficit” 
highlighted in the seminal Arab Human Development Report of 2002 (World Bank 2004b; 
UNDP 2002). Hence, why there is also the likelihood of non-significant findings. I include the 
percentage of the economically active population who are women effectively measuring the 
“supply” eligible for office and derive this information from the World Bank’s Development 
Indicators. Regrettably, there is a dearth of data over the time period under investigation for 
women’s education levels in the Arab world.  
Women’s Social, Political, Economic Rights (Cingranelli-Richards) 
Finally, in the expanded model I also incorporate Cingranelli and Richard’s (2004) or 
                                                
39 The ratio of male-to-female years of schooling fell from 2.5 in 1960 to 1.4 in 2000 (UNDP 2002). Female 
participation in the labor force has rise from 25 percent between 1960 and 1980, to 35 percent in the present.  
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CIRI measures capturing women’s social, political, and economic rights in a bid to channel the 
socio-political environment women face in the Arab world and the potential for grassroots 
mobilization. The CIRI Human Rights dataset is coded using US State Department Reports on 
Human Rights Practices and from Amnesty International’s Annual Reports. The three control 
variables are on a scale from zero to three, with zero representing minimal evidence of the rights 
in question, while three represents the maximum standard. The women’s political rights variable 
includes the right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and 
appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, and the right to petition 
government officials.40 The women’s economic rights also includes several rights such as equal 
pay for equal work, free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a 
husband or male relative's consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a 
husband or male relative's consent, equality in hiring and promotion practices, job security 
(maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs), nondiscrimination by 
employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right to work at 
night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, and the right to work in the 
military and the police force.41 The women’s social rights variable incorporates the right to equal 
inheritance, the right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men, the right to travel 
                                                
40 Women’s rights are coded on a scale of 0 to 3: 0 = women’s rights are not guaranteed by law or the legal system 
restricts women’s political participation; 1 = political participation is guaranteed by law, but women hold less than 5 
percent of high ranking government positions; 2 = political participation is guaranteed by law, but women hold more 
than 5 percent but less than 30 percent of high ranking government positions; 3 = political participation is 
guaranteed by law and in practice, and women hold more than 30 percent of high ranking government positions. 
There is no country in the Middle East that received a “3”. 
41 This variable is also coded from 0 to 3: 0 = economic rights are not guaranteed by law and the law reinforces sex 
discrimination and there is high tolerance by the government for discrimination; 1 = some economic rights for 
women are guaranteed by law, but the law enforcement is weak and the government tolerates a moderate level of 
discrimination; 2 = some economic rights for women are guaranteed by law, but the government does not enforce 
the laws effectively and the government tolerates a low level of discrimination and; 3 = all or almost all of women’s 
economic rights are guaranteed by law, and the government enforces the law and tolerates no discrimination. 
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abroad, the right to obtain a passport, the right to confer citizenship to children or a husband, the 
right to initiate a divorce, the right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into 
marriage, the right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities, the right to an 
education, the freedom to choose a residence/domicile, freedom from non-consensual female 
genital mutilation (FGM), and freedom from forced sterilization. I expect all of these measures to 
be positively correlated with women’s legislative representation. 
Findings  
The three hypotheses are tested through the estimation of a base model and an expanded 
model incorporating additional demand-side factors using poisson regression and negative 
binomial regression over a 19 year time period and across 22 cases (see Table 2.3). As an 
additional robustness check, I also run a poisson regression featuring only the years a legislative 
election took place, thus reducing the likelihood of inflated results due to repeated time samples. 
Finally, I use poisson regression to explore whether the results for the Gulf countries differ 
substantially from the rest of the Arab world, thereby testing for sub-regional specificities. The 
Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) location within Saudi Arabia’s conservative sphere of 
influence, proximity to Mecca, and reliance on oil production all conspire to create an 
environment less than conducive for the election of women (Gause 1994; Richards and 
Waterbury 2007; Ross 2008). The Appendix contains additional robustness tests using a 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) model (see Table 2.4 and 2.5) and prais-winston time-
series regression model (see Table 2.6) with panel-corrected standard errors. The latter results 
are suggestive of the findings gleaned from the poisson and negative binomial regression 
estimators.  
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Of the global finance indicators, foreign direct investment seems to be the only one with 
a consistent and positive impact, confirming the second hypothesis and disproving the first 
hypothesis (see Table 2.3 below). In both the poisson and negative binomial regressions, a 
standard deviation increase in foreign direct investment is associated with a one percent increase 
in the percentage of parliamentary seats occupied by women. This translates into a roughly five 
percent increase in foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP being equal to a one percent 
increase in the percentage of women in the legislative. In the model controlling for the election 
cycle a one-unit increase in foreign direct investment is associated with an eight percent increase 
in the percentage parliamentary seats occupied by women. Interestingly, in both the Gulf 
countries and the non-Gulf Arab world, foreign direct investment had a significant and positive 
effect on women’s legislative representation. In the Gulf, its presence increased women’s 
legislative representation by 15 percent, while in the rest of the Arab world it increased the 
expected percentage of women in Arab parliaments by five percent.  
Of the control variables, only fertility rates, levels of economic development and the Gulf 
region (dummy) had a consistently significant and negative impact on women’s legislative 
representation across all of the models utilized. While the negative correlation between economic 
development and women’s legislative representation may be surprising, it is likely an artifact of 
the specific characteristics of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The countries of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council technically have the highest GDP per capita in the Arab world 
with the kingdom of Qatar holding the title of the country with the highest per capita income in 
the world ($101, 827 adjusting for purchasing power parity in 2011 according to the IMF). Its 
Gulf neighbors all rank among the world’s most economically developed countries according to 
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this metric, yet their performance when it comes to women’s rights is notoriously bad as 
exemplified by their consistently significant negative association with women’s legislative 
representation. The countries of the Arab League with the most substantial female presence 
within their Parliaments have been in North Africa—essentially states with mid to low-level 
annual incomes, which range from $600 in Somalia to $9,488 in Tunisia (IMF 2010 estimates). 
In some respects, this relationship should not be surprising considering Sub-Saharan Africa has 
seen the single largest jump of any world region in the average number of female 
parliamentarians over the last two decades, yet it is also hosts the poorest populations of the 
globe (see Table 2.2 in this chapter). If anything, these findings showcase that income as a 
measure of economic development is too crude to encompass the ideological change associated 
with economic progress. It also implies that policy attitudes towards women can improve without 
a commensurate shift in national income.  
Incorporating a lagged version of the dependent variable—women’s legislative 
representation, does not erase the significance of the aforementioned indicators. Adding demand-
side controls for women’s social, political, and economic rights to an expanded version of the 
model reveals a significant positive association between the presence of political and economic 
rights and women’s legislative representation, yet the latter has a negative association with 
women’s social rights. The social rights variable with its focus on the right to inheritance and 
freedom of movement channels the effective cultural challenges faced by Arab women, which 
are difficult enforce even when enacted as policy, much less quantify. Political and economic 
rights as coded in the Cingranelli and Richards are more readily institutionalized. Thus, the 
negative association between social rights and a potentially cosmetic sign of women’s political 
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inclusion such as legislative representation may effectively channel the gap between 
institutionalizing women’s progress on paper and the realities of women’s status in the social 
arena. 
Finally, in comparing the Gulf countries to the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, 
we find the same patterns emerging in terms of which factors affect women’s legislative 
representation. However, the magnitude of the effect is more pronounced in the Gulf than in the 
rest of the Arab world and development assistance, when present, actually decreases the 
percentage of women in the respective legislatures by 66 percent. Perhaps this is a byproduct of 
the “aid” sent to the Gulf largely being of military nature and not as focused on fostering 
economic development. The enhanced magnitude likely reflects the sudden changes in the region 
since many Gulf countries have only recently, but very adamantly jumped on the gender 
empowerment bandwagon. 
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Table 2.3 Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Legislative 
Representation 
Coefficients   Poisson Regression 
Negative  
Binomial Regression 
During 
Election 
Cycle 
(poisson) 
Gulf 
Countries 
(poisson) 
Non-Gulf 
Countries 
(poisson) 
Official Development 
Assistance (log) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 -1.10** -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.46) (0.08) 
Foreign Direct 
 Investment (log) 0.01** 0.03** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.08*** 0.15** 0.05** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) 
Electoral System  
(Majoritarian) 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.25* -16.06*** -0.13 
 (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (1.29) (0.19) 
Democracy Score -0.00 -0.03* -0.00 -0.01 -0.10*** 3.81*** -0.05 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (1.20) (0.03) 
Level of Economic 
Development (log) -0.17* -0.81*** -0.18* -0.33*** -0.39 -12.03*** -0.86*** 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.30) (4.01) (0.24) 
Fertility Rate -0.10* -0.39*** -0.10** -0.15*** -0.30*** -1.04 -0.49*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.76) (0.10) 
Gulf Dummy -2.18*** -15.19*** -2.20** -15.62*** -15.80*** - - 
 (0.74) (0.38) (0.74) (0.27) (0.78) - - 
Women’s Legislative 
Representation (lagged) 0.54*** - 0.53*** 0.46*** - - - 
 (0.04) - (0.03) (0.05) - - - 
Women’s Labor  
Participation - -0.01* - -0.00 - -0.52* -0.01 
 - (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.34) (0.01) 
Women’s Economic  
Rights (CIRI) - 0.48*** - 0.17*** - - 0.49*** 
 - (0.11) - (0.06) - - (0.17) 
Women’s Political 
 Rights (CIRI) - 0.57*** - 0.20* - - 0.93*** 
 - (0.11) - (0.10) - - (0.18) 
Women’s Social  
Rights (CIRI) - -0.19** - -0.15** - - -0.30** 
 - (0.09) - (0.06) - - (0.14) 
Log Pseudo likelihood -244.63 -214.53 -245.72 -183.79 -56.01 -7.03 -419.20 
Pseudo R-squared 0.40 0.37 NA NA NA 0.41 0.31 
Observations 256 221 256 209 46 62 163 
ODA and FDI are coded as a percentage of GDP.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
*Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%. 
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Conclusion 
 “International pressure matters a lot in promoting change…” 42 
At the beginning of this chapter Secretary Clinton called women’s empowerment a “high-
yield investment resulting in stronger economies…and greater…stability.” Interestingly, foreign 
investment seems to have the greatest impact on levels of women’s legislative representation in 
the Arab world, though the mechanism behind it is still unclear. Is it the pressure from multi-
national corporations for these countries to provide stable, familiar environments that are gender-
friendly as in the West? Is it through ratings systems that inadvertently include gender measures 
in their assessment of level of democracy and political risk? Could it be the pressure to 
enfranchise and free up a cheap source of labor via political lobbying? It could be all and none of 
these factors, but in any case international economic pressure seems to matter a great deal in the 
Arab world when it comes to women’s legislative representation.  
Most of the policymakers I interviewed across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco emphasized 
the pressure to promote women’s representation was exerted by international organizations and 
Western donors. Yet, this research reveals its influence may increasingly become muted as many 
of these countries take aid for granted, especially when it is administered with ex-ante 
conditionality (Collier 2007). While development assistance may have a substantial effect on 
gender-related policy, it may not be as successful in creating the supply and interest necessary to 
galvanize women to go out and run for office. Aid certainly does not provide the funds for 
campaigns except in rare cases, and many of the Arab women who campaign for political office 
are privately funded due to the lack of strong political parties in their respective countries. In 
states where political parties do exist and can fund candidates, many parties consider fielding 
                                                
42 Interview with female professor at University of Bahrain, Manama, June 2008. 
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women risky—especially if there is no gender quota in place to guarantee their election. Much as 
Ross (2008) predicts, Arab women may be rising to the occasion with their pockets lined with 
monies earned from working for foreign companies. With women finally having access to formal 
jobs in the private sector (often through international companies), they may matter more as 
sources of state revenue. Thus economically enfranchised, women may also have more concerns 
regarding the services the state provides and whether the state can continue to attract foreign 
employers with current policies (Ross 2008). The power of foreign direct investment could 
ultimately lie in it directly placing money into the hands of women in the private sector. It thus 
allows females to mount formidable political campaigns in minimally open political regimes, 
akin to Reem Badran’s direct parliamentary win in the 2010 Jordanian elections. Badran’s 
background hints at her impressive ability to fundraise and organize, largely honed working for 
local and international banks. She was the second deputy to the president of the Amman 
Chamber of Commerce and previously held the position of Executive Director of the Jordan 
Investment Board (Malkawi 2010). Her connections to the Jordanian political establishment via 
her father, an ex-Prime Minister, certainly helped her bid for a seat in Amman’s rich third 
district, but the ability to bankroll her own campaign was also essential. In fact, a quick survey of 
Jordan’s female political glitterati at the online directory “Who-is-she-Jordan” demonstrates how 
many of the country’s politically prominent women have connections with the foreign 
community both in the business and policy arena.43Furthermore, this is not solely the province of 
Jordan—other countries exhibit similar patterns. One of Kuwait’s four female parliamentarians, 
Rola Dashti, had extensive ties with the international business community through work as an 
economist for both local and international banks as well as the international development 
                                                
43 Visit http://www.whoisshe-women.jo/ for more details. 
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community by virtue of working as a consultant to the World Bank. A quick look at Bahrain’s 
Shura Council (Upper House of Parliament) quickly demonstrates a majority of its eleven 
women have connections to international business networks, most prominently deputies Hala 
Ramzi Fayiz Qurisa and Dr. Aysha Salem Saif Mubarak. In conclusion, foreign direct investment 
may play a yet underexplored role in empowering women for political office by providing 
interested parties with the means and skills to fund and organize successful campaigns in 
political environments where formal financial support for women is lacking.  
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CHAPTER 3: EXPLORING THE ADOPTION OF GENDER QUOTAS IN THE ARAB WORLD 
 
Why is there more female political representation and gender-related policy reform in 
Morocco than in Lebanon? Lebanon has long boasted a cosmopolitan, educated culture and was 
hailed the “Paris of the Middle East” up until the civil war. Richards and Waterbury (2007) 
proclaimed it one of the few quasi-democracies in the Middle East and North Africa, alongside 
Israel and Turkey. Lebanese women won the right to vote and participated in national elections 
in 1952, two decades before that same right would be extended in Switzerland. Even public 
awareness of gender-related issues is substantially higher in Lebanon than in Morocco, however, 
only 17 women have ever served in Lebanon’s parliament.44 Morocco, conversely, is a 
constitutional monarchy with some of the world’s highest rates of illiteracy across both genders 
yet it has arguably experienced greater levels of women’s political representation. Currently, 
there are 34 female parliamentarians out of a total of 325 representatives; 30 of whom have been 
elected via a voluntary party gender quota adopted in 2002.1 Furthermore, Morocco’s 
Moudawana reforms have been hailed as a landmark example of gender policy reform because 
of their progressive content and the truly grassroots nature of the movement that successfully put 
the proposal on the government’s agenda.45  
Modernization theorists from Lipset (1959) to Inglehart and Norris (2003) would lead us 
to expect more “progressive” gender outcomes and policies in “cosmopolitan” Lebanon rather 
                                                
44 Abdul-Latif and Serpe, 2010.  
45 The Moudawana law is a revision of Morocco’s family code passed by the Moroccan Parliament in 2004 granting 
women substantial rights vis-à-vis their spouses. Women are now allowed to obtain and dispute a divorce on equal 
terms in civil courts, polygamy has been circumscribed, the legal age of marriage was raised to 18 from 15, sexual 
harassment is now an offense punishable by law, etc. More details are available a the Moroccan Ministry of Justice’s 
website: http://www.justice.gov.ma/MOUDAWANA/Codefamille.pdf  
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than Morocco, so what explains this discrepancy?46 One possible explanation may lie in the 
international pressure for “reform” exerted through the higher levels of conditional aid present in 
Morocco relative to Lebanon.47 Morocco received much greater levels of targeted development 
assistance from the multi-lateral community than Lebanon over the past 19 years (see Figure 3.1 
below). These aid disbursement patterns remained steady until 2004 when the allocation of 
foreign aid to both countries rises. Shortly thereafter, the idea of implementing a gender quota 
emerged as a central topic of Lebanese parliamentary and cabinet debate in 2005. That year a 
national commission drafted a new electoral law recommending a 20 percent gender quota for 
the legislative assembly, subsequently rejected by the legislative and executive offices. This 
chapter postulates that the renewed discussion of gender quota adoption in Lebanon and the 
decision to adopt a political party quota in Morocco were not accidental developments, but rather 
an indication of a broader pattern in the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, these 
constitutional shifts in election policy are motivated by the increasing financial pressures from 
abroad requiring credible commitments to democratization via gender empowerment (see Figure 
3.1 below).48 
 
                                                
46 Samuel Martin Lipset (1959) maintained that education specifically moderated men and women by broadening 
their social outlook and thus rendering them more tolerant of disenfranchised groups such as women, leading to the 
liberalization of the political system overall. Recently, Inglehart and Norris (2003) ventured modernization blurred 
gender roles, increasing equality across the workforce, the hearth, education, and representative government. 
47 These adopted strategies can also be seen as a by-product of Arab governments’ attempts to attain “democracy” 
benchmarks set by the World Bank, the United Nations, and other high-profile international organizations as well as 
donor governments rather than a bid to truly enfranchise women. 
48 Importantly, when considering official development assistance on a per capita basis these relationships reverse 
with Lebanon receiving substantially more aid per person than Morocco due to its smaller population.  However, the 
aid that is disbursed in Morocco goes a lot further when taking into account the relative per capita incomes adjusted 
for PPP in each country (Morocco’s ranges from an average of $3000-5000, while Lebanon’s from $11,000-$15,000 
according to the most recent data from the International Monetary Fund). Importantly,  Still, the overall rising 
patterns strategically convening around the 2000s when the global gender agenda comes into its own hints that these 
results are not accidental. 
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Figure 3.1 Aggregate Official Development Assistance and Aid to  
Lebanon vs. Morocco in U.S. Millions 
 
 Source: World Development Indicators 2010 
 
In this chapter, I examine whether official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and remittances have a significant impact on the types of gender-related 
institutional reforms chosen by Arab nations. I explore two questions: 1) Does the presence and 
growth in ODA, FDI, and remittances increase the likelihood of adopting a gender quota? 2) And 
if so, do these types of monies have an impact on the likelihood of adopting a particular type of 
gender quota? There are currently three types of gender quotas present in the region: (1) reserved 
seats, (2) legal candidate quotas, and (3) political party quotas. Reserved seats regulate the 
number of women elected to the legislative, while political party quotas and legal candidate 
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quotas set a minimum number for women on candidate lists. The three iterations represent 
different levels of formalized commitment to incorporating women into Arab legislatures. 
Forthcoming research has shown that international influence exerts a substantial impact on the 
likelihood of adopting quotas globally via foreign aid and specifically USAID operations (Bush 
2011). Stephanie Nanes (2010) outlined in detail how the multi-lateral community encouraged 
municipal level gender quota adoption in the case of Jordan, unpacking the quid pro quo 
bargaining between the Jordanian government and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. She 
claims a governance advisor at USAID confirmed that a municipal women’s quota was a 
“conditioned precedent” for Jordan to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Corporations 
Threshold program.  
This scholarship is a welcome addition to gender quota research, which tends to ignore the 
international economic factors facilitating quota adoption in favor of a focus on legalistic 
explanations. Few researchers have, however, explored whether foreign aid results in the 
adoption of specific types of gender quotas, much less explored this question in the challenging 
setting of the Middle East. Furthermore, alternative sources of external finance exist that may 
concurrently impact the social environment in Arab countries and either render it conducive to 
gender quota adoption (such as foreign direct investment) or potentially mute the effect of 
conditional foreign aid (such as remittances). I hypothesize international aid represents the most 
important financial incentives for gender quota adoption, especially in the case of reserved seats 
which represent the most formalized and explicitly guaranteed commitment to incorporating 
women into legislatures. 
In this analysis, I use data on gender quotas from the World Database on Women from the 
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University of Stockholm, supplemented with data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the 
work of Mona Lena Krook (2010). The chapter proceeds as follows. Initially, I review the 
background on the spread of gender quotas as an electoral policy worldwide, later focusing on 
patterns of adoption in the Arab world. I explore why financial incentives play a central role in 
determining the choice of quotas, highlighting the importance of the World Bank and the United 
Nation’s co-optation and re-framing of gender empowerment as an “economic good” as crucial 
to gender quotas widespread popularity in developing countries. This creates incentives for Arab 
countries dependent on foreign aid, as well as those concerned with their image abroad, to 
consider institutional affirmative action policies for women in a bid to enhance women’s 
political visibility, but not necessarily change the status quo.49 Finally, I present the data and 
model used to empirically test my hypotheses then discuss the results and findings in the 
conclusion.  
Gender Quota Adoption in the Arab World and Beyond  
Over the last two decades, there has been a significant diffusion of gender norms 
globally; first via the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979), then 
the Beijing Platform for Action (1995),50and newly the Millennium Development Goals (Krook 
2006). In the last decade, gender quotas emerged as the most widespread gender policy and 
electoral reform with over 100 countries implementing some type of gender quota (Krook 2009). 
The following section traces the diffusion of this particular policy trend across the world, while 
                                                
49 As will be argued in chapter four’s discussion of women’s rights and chapter five’s case analysis, the most hard-
hitting gender-related reforms that can be legislated would be revisions of Arab personal status laws, which restrict 
Muslim women’s public and private activity. 
50 The Beijing Platform called for direct government participation in diverting resources to and creating a supportive 
environment for the complete inclusion of women into public society with the aid of women’s NGOs, feminist 
groups, and the private sector—the first clear international promotion of gender mainstreaming. Report of the Fourth 
World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), 
chap. I, resolution 1, annex II. 
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discussing the possible dynamics underlying the choice to adopt gender quotas in the Middle 
East and North Africa.  
Krook and O’Brian (2010) venture that more than three quarters of proposals to adopt 
gender quotas have been introduced in the last 15 years, which directly follows the rise of gender 
mainstreaming from the U.N.’s 4th World Conference for Women in 1995 through to the 
Millennium Summit in 2000 (Hafner-Burtin and Pollack 2002; Krook and True 2008,). Dahlerup 
(2003) believes that a country’s international image has become more and more important across 
the international and national context, pushing countries to effectively market themselves as 
modern and innovative with women’s empowerment quickly becoming a popular and timely way 
to promote just such an image to the world. Furthermore, the goals of the Beijing Conference 
(1995) and the Millennium Development Goals (2000) explicitly promoted the idea of women’s 
importance for economic development. This new rhetoric rapidly created an economic incentive 
to institutionally incorporate women into the political systems of countries with oftentimes less-
than-stellar reputations for upholding women’s rights. The Economist pointed this out in 2008 
with the following tongue-in-cheek observation, “Around 110 countries have rules helping 
women get elected, joined in recent years by such feminist-friendly places as Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Sudan.”51 
In recent years, there has been an important shift within the multilateral community to go 
beyond the safeguarding of women’s rights within legal frameworks and strive to factor for 
endemic gender discrimination within national budgets, as well—what Kantola and Squires 
(2008) term market feminism. While earlier scholarship expected gender empowerment to be the 
by-product of development, a reverse view now contends that empowering women leads to 
                                                
51 The Economist, U.S. ed., 20 September 2008, 64. 
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development—a shift that happily coincides with the global promotion of gender quotas. The 
Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) which introduced the Beijing Platform for Action, 
the 23rd special of the General Assembly (2000), the Millennium Summit (2000) and the 2005 
World Summit, highlighted government and international organizations’ commitments to 
financing gender equality and empowerment to promote economic (via the term “development”), 
as well as political interests. The Beijing Platform for Action, in particular, served as a template 
for the allocation of resources across all sectors to help achieve this goal. In 2002 the parties to 
the International Conference on Financing for Development adopted the Monterrey Consensus,52 
which included gender-sensitive development and gender mainstreaming across all sectors as 
part of its prescriptions. Furthermore, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
incorporated consideration of gender equality into its suggestions for the harmonization of 
efficient and substantive funding practices across donor countries (Bakker 2007). Finally, even 
the Bretton Woods institutions recognized “the potential multiplier effect of gender equality…as 
key for realizing the Millennium Development Goal targets in 2015” and has openly claimed 
that, “investing in gender equality and empowerment of women is smart economics” (Bakker 
2007, 7). Thus, the possibility of funding opportunities via gender-related development 
assistance in exchange for appropriate institutional reforms gained import in the developing 
world. 
Overall the new framing of gender empowerment as important for economic development 
                                                
52 The Monterrey consensus specifically references the issue of gender in the following paragraphs: “These refer to a 
holistic and interconnected approach to financing for development that is gender sensitive (para. 8); good 
governance, sound economic policies and the importance of gender equality for realizing such goals (para. 11); 
empowering women in the context of appropriate national policy and regulatory frameworks (para. 12); investments 
in basic social and economic infrastructure that is gender-sensitive (para. 16); microfinance, particularly for women 
(para. 18); capacity building that includes gender budget policies (para. 19); business frameworks that are sensitive 
to the gender implications of their undertakings (para. 23); and, calls for governments to “Mainstream the gender 
perspective into development policies at all levels and in all sectors” (para. 64) (Bakker 2007, 7)  
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and the funds associated with it have received scant attention in the literature on gender quotas; 
yet this may, in fact, represent a powerful incentive for governments to adopt them. It may be the 
most powerful incentive for conservative Muslim Arab governments when considering such a 
controversial policy, since increases in women’s political representation are seen as a much-
lauded and oft rewarded sign of democratization and stability by donors and investors from the 
West (Bakker 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Eleven of the 22 Arab League member states 
have adopted gender quotas since 2000 despite the region’s abysmal track record in women’s 
political representation overall (see Table 3.1 below).53 In fact, the quota trend is largely 
responsible for the increase in the world average for women’s legislative representation from 
approximately 12 percent in 2000 to close to 20 percent today (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2010). 
The Arab world itself has seen an astonishing rise from a regional average of four to nine percent 
in women’s legislative representation since the turn of the millennium; a shift that coincided with 
the spread of gender quotas in the region as discussed in chapter two (see Figure 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
53 The Middle East ranked the lowest on the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s regional averages for women’s legislative 
representation with an average of 9.1 percent in 2010.  
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Table 3.1 Arab League Countries with Gender Quotas 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil society, the state, and international as well as transnational organizations, usually 
working in tandem, tend to be the primary actors conditioning gender quota adoption (Krook 
2009). Often grassroots women’s organizations see quotas as a mechanism to increase and 
institutionalize gender representation. Certainly, political elites recognize the strategic value of 
quotas usually for inter-party or coalition advantage (Tripp 2003). Quotas are also promulgated 
through international norms and through transnational sharing of ideas and information (True 
and Mintrom 2001). Similar factors influence quota adoption in the Arab world, yet with some 
important nuances. Islam, as well as conservative tribal culture has a role in conditioning the 
acceptance of women in the political arena and any associated institutional changes (Donno and 
Russett 2004; Fish 2002; Lewis 2002). Yet opposition to gender quotas comes from both secular 
feminists and Islamists alike; the first criticizing the cosmetic nature of the policy, while the 
 
Country 
 
Type 
 
 
Adoption 
Timeline 
 
Electoral 
System 
Latest 
Parliamentary 
Results 
Algeria Political party quotas  2002- List PR 8% 
Djibouti Reserved seats 2002- PBV 14% 
Egypt Reserved seats (1979-1986) 
2009- 
 
TRS 2% 
Iraq Legal Candidate quotas  2004- List PR 26% 
Jordan Reserved seats  2003- SNTV 12% 
Mauritania Legal Candidate quotas  2006- TRS 22% 
Morocco Political Party quotas 2002- List PR 10.8% 
Palestine Legal Candidate quotas 2005- Parallel 13% 
Somalia Reserved seats 2004- N.A. 8%  
Sudan Reserved seats 
 
(1973-1984) 
2005- 
FPTP 25% 
Tunisia Political Party quotas 2004- Parallel 28% 
*Both Sudan and Egypt have previously implemented quotas for the time periods indicated in 
parentheses.    Source: Global Database for Women (2010) 
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latter tend to attack the injustice of quotas privileging a specific group, especially when that 
group represents women. Finally, Gender quotas have often been inspired or at least sanctioned 
by “progressively-minded” Arab monarchs (such as King Abdullah of Jordan or King 
Mohammad VI of Morocco) or dictators (President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia) 
interested in currying favor with international donors and investors by showcasing their 
“progressive” values (Tamale 2003, Reyes 2002). Consequently, this policy usually represents a 
top-down decision brokered by the state (i.e. state feminism) rather than a response to legitimate 
social pressures (Brand 2002; Sabbagh 2007).  
Still, grass-roots promotion of gender quotas does exist. Local women’s organizations 
partnering with transnational women’s networks promoted legislative gender quotas in several 
countries, including:  Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, and even Yemen. 
Unsurprisingly, the aforementioned countries all receive significant levels of development 
assistance (Carapico 2003; Moghadam 2004;  Schwedler 2002), but also remittances (Singer 
2010; World Bank 2011). Quotas are often promoted by party elites to expand voter share in a 
bid for earmarked funding from international non-governmental organizations and national 
governments, to band-wagon with other parties once such reforms are implemented, or to 
revamp a stale image, as was the case in Morocco and Algeria. Where prominent left-wing 
parties exist (Algeria, Yemen, Morocco), they have promoted gender quotas as measures to 
attain social equality both within the party apparatus and beyond as in the West (Opello 2006).54 
In fact, women’s quotas are often used by regimes to sideline Islamist interests (Tripp and Kang 
                                                
54 The Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires of Morocco has five women on its 21-member central board via an 
internal quota; the Yemeni Socialist Party has an internal quota mandating 30 percent of candidates must be women. 
Front de Llibération Nationale of Algeria mandates two out of the first five names on a candidate list must be 
women. 
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2008). Despite initial opposition, once gender quotas are adopted, Islamic parties tend to be some 
of the most successful actors in parlaying them toward greater Islamist representation in 
legislative assemblies, as in the case of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front with their MP Hayat 
Massimi and the Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Développement and their most notorious 
MP, Bassima Hakaoui. In the case of Iraq we see gender quotas institutionally imposed by 
international actors, however women rose to the occasion and actively campaigned and one seats 
even beyond the quota in some districts during the 2010 parliamentary elections (IFES 2010; 
Norris 2007). 
A significant amount of scholarship delved into the nature and rapid diffusion of gender 
quotas, as well as the substance of their outcomes across Europe (Bergqvist et al 1999; Caul 
2001; Dahlerup & Friedenvall 2005; Kittilson 2006, Kunovich 2003) and Latin America (Araujo 
2003; Baldez 2004, Jones 2009, 2004). However, the regional experiences of Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia remain under-explored especially in empirical terms. As mentioned previously, 
while many Arab governments actively discuss adopting gender quotas, only 11 Arab nations 
currently observe the policy: Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, and newly Egypt. Still, these countries represent 
half of the Arab league country member states demonstrating the quota diffusion is a 
phenomenon worthy of further inspection. In the following section, I consider which factors 
contribute to the likelihood of adopting gender quotas across the 22 Arab League member states.  
A Quantitative Analysis of Gender Quota Adoption in the Arab World 
The Model 
I analyze the diffusion of gender quotas using standard event history analysis (see Bush 
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2011; Caul 2001; True and Mintrom 2001) and competing-risks survival regression (see Fine and 
Gray 1999, Lunn and McNeill 1995). Survival regression has previously been used to model the 
diffusion of gender quotas (Caul 2001) and gender mainstreaming (True and Mintrom 2001) in 
advanced industrial economies. Utilizing event history analysis represents a more efficient 
method to model quota adoption over time since once the event happens, the subsequent 
observations are taken out of the model and reduce the risk of inflating results. Here, I expand 
the application of event history analysis to modeling the likelihood of adopting competing types 
of gender quotas in a developing country setting. I choose competing-risks regression since it is 
the more appropriate method of modeling the exclusive choice between reserved seats, political 
party quotas, legal candidate quotas, and, of course, no quotas—all effectively competing events. 
The focus in this type of survival analysis is on “the cumulative incidence function, which 
indicates the probability of the event of interests happening before a given time.”55 Gender quota 
adoption is interpreted as the failure event, consequently sample countries drop out once they 
adopt a particular quota and thus mitigate the risk of inflating the significance of results. The 
data’s temporal scope ranges from 1990 until 2009 to increase reliability; therefore, the models 
utilized incorporate time varying covariates (year dummies) where possible to control for 
potential correlation over time.56 
As an additional robustness test, I also use two discrete-time event history models to 
estimate a binary dependent variable reflecting whether quotas, in general, were adopted: 
                                                
55 “Competing-risks regression is semi-parametric in that the baseline sub-hazard of the event of interest is left 
unspecified, and the effects of covariates are assumed to be proportional. Time-varying covariates and coefficients 
are allowed.” Accessed at http://www.stata.com/stata11/stcrreg.html. 
56 Importantly, if a country switched to a different type of gender quota at some point after initial quota adoption, 
this information would be lost in a discrete time event history analysis, thus necessitating the choice of the MLN 
estimator. Table 3.5 in the Appendix features a multi-nomial regression model estimating the likelihood of adopting 
one of the three quota options. The results mostly reflect the same findings as the subsequent survival regressions. 
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namely, a logistic regression incorporating time-varying covariates to control for potential 
correlation over time and a Cox proportional hazards model.57 The coefficients in both models 
are interpreted as hazard ratios reflecting the likelihood or “risk” of gender quota adoption. 
Effectively, these two models also focus on the survival time to quota adoption and which factors 
precipitate this event.58 
The Dependent Variable—Gender Quota Adoption 
The dependent variable—the adoption of a gender quota for the legislative assembly 
(usually lower house)—is originally a categorical indicator encompassing four values: (0) no 
quota; (1) political party quotas; (2) legal candidate quotas; (3) reserved seats.59 As mentioned 
before, reserved seats regulate the number of women elected to the legislative, while political 
party quotas and legal candidate quotas set a minimum number for women on candidate lists. 
The political parties themselves enforce party quotas internally, while legal candidate quotas and 
reserved seats are usually enforced through a formal legal requirement (the constitution or 
electoral law).60Thus, voluntary party quotas theoretically represent the lowest level of formal 
                                                
57 Discrete-time models are more appropriate for modeling quota adoption as opposed to continuous-time models 
(such as parametric event-history models) since we have the expectation of the chosen event happening within a 
specific time period—from 1990 until 2009. The data set-up for a discrete-time event history model treats each year 
as a separate observation for each individual case, thus allowing us to more accurately and rigorously model the 
respective event in a panel data environment (see Hoffman 2004, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). 
58 This version of the dependent variable is formulated as a binary (dummy) indicator representing time to quota 
adoption (the three different types of gender quotas are coded as “1”) with quota adoption interpreted as the failure 
or right-censoring event (Caul 2001). Sample members drop out once they experience the event (failure): quota 
adoption. I use two discrete-time event history models to estimate this iteration of the dependent variable: logistic 
regression incorporating time-varying covariates and the Cox proportional hazards model. Discrete-time models are 
more appropriate for modeling quota adoption as an event as opposed to continuous-time models (such as 
parametric event-history models) since we have the expectation of the chosen of event happening within a discrete 
time periods—in this case, years. The data set-up for a discrete-time event history model treats each year as a 
separate observation for each individual case, thus allowing us to more accurately and rigorously model the 
respective event in a panel data environment.  
59 No quota=82 percent of observations; political party quotas =5 percent of observations; legal candidate quotas =3 
percent of observations; reserved seats=9 percent of observations. Mean: 0.38; Standard deviation: 0.91. 
60 Reserved seats guarantee women a certain number of seats in the parliament, independent of the electoral result, 
whereas legal candidate quotas mandate a certain percentage of women on the candidate lists. In both cases, the 
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commitment to women’s representation, followed by legal candidate quotas, and finally reserved 
seats. For example, political parties implementing quotas that neglect to implement “placement 
mandates” tend to place women at the bottom of their party lists deliberately jeopardizing their 
election (Jones 2004)—a common issue in Morocco. Furthermore, the penalties for non-
compliance across the different quotas vary significantly (Dahlerup 2003). In a party quota 
system, while the participants will receive the opprobrium of the international community and 
local women’s organizations, there are really no other mechanisms to enforce compliance. 
Consequently, legal candidate quotas and reserved seats tend to have more binding provisions to 
insure compliance and that the quota has teeth (Bush 2011; Dahlerup 2003). Interestingly, Krook 
(2009) ventures these two quotas are most common in countries that are less powerful within the 
world system. Effectively, such countries are more vulnerable to international and transnational 
pressures to adopt quotas that force greater commitment (albeit cosmetic) to formalizing gender 
equality. Conversely, most of the “powerful” Western countries within the world system actually 
use the more lax political party quotas (see Towns 2004). 
The majority of observations for quota adoption in the period between 1990 and 2000 are 
coded zero, since most quotas were implemented in the new millennium with the exception of 
Sudan. Regionally, political party quotas tend to be favored in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia), possibly an artifact of French colonization since France and most of Europe utilized 
this type of quota (Krook 2009). Reserved seats are most common in the Levant and East Africa 
(Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan), mimicking trends for developing 
countries with initially low numbers of women in politics (Krook 2009). Finally, we find 
                                                
voters decide which of the women candidates are elected, but under the reserved seats system, women are 
guaranteed a certain number of seats. 
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legislative candidate quotas in Iraq and Mauritania.  
The data for the dependent variable are gathered from the University of Stockholm’s 
Global Database for Women61 with the model below illustrating the hypothesized factors 
affecting the likelihood of gender quota adoption. The independent variables in regular script 
represent the base model; supply-side variables (see Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007) in 
cursive are incorporated into an expansion of the original model. The conceptual dependent 
variable is the probability that country i will adopt a type of gender quota in year t assuming the 
country has not adopted a gender quota prior to this point. Observations up until the year of 
quota adoption are coded zero.  
ADOPT i,t  = Φ (constant) + β1 Development assistance i,t  
+ β2 Foreign direct investment i,t 
+ β3 Economic development i,t 
+ β4 Electoral system i,t 
+ β5 Democracy i,t 
+ β6 Fertility rates i,t 
+ β7 Remittances i,t 
+ β8 Women’s labor participation rates i,t 
+ β9 Women’s secondary education rates i,t 
+ β10Women’s legislative representation i,t+ e 
Factors Influencing the Adoption of Gender Quotas 
Variables of Interest: International Financial Incentives 
The literature on women’s global political participation often cites international influence 
and norms diffusion as salient alongside domestic factors to the rapid spread of gender quotas 
                                                
61 I use additional data from Pippa Norris’ 2010 Democracy Dataset’s Fast-track policy variable, the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and Krook and O’Brian (2010). In cases, 
where the descriptions of the quota type diverge between these sources, I opt for the Quota Project’s coding. In the 
case of Palestine, Krook and O’Brian claim there are legal candidate quotas in place, while Dahlerup claims they are 
reserved seats. There is also a discrepancy in the case of Djibouti where Krook and O’Brian claim the country uses 
reserved seats, while Dahlerup maintains legal candidate quotas are in place. Please refer to Table 1 in the Appendix 
for more details on the discrepancies in coding. Most of these authors are actually party to and moderate the 
QuotaProject, which renders the discrepancy in coding interesting. See http://www.quotaproject.org/ for more 
details and Table 1 in the Appendix for an overview of quotas implemented in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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worldwide (Dahlerup & Nordlund 2004; Krook 2006, 2004; Paxton et al 2006; Paxton & Hughes 
2007; Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007; True and Mintrom 2001). Krook (2006) highlights 
international organizations and the transnational connections they foster as one of the vehicles 
for the spread of quotas. She ventures a multiplicity of organizations such as the United Nations, 
the European Union, the African Union, the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe, the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, and the Organization of American States encourage members to strive for 
at least 30 percent female representation within their political institutions, which further 
contributes to the global acceptance of gender norms. Keck and Sikkink (1998) demonstrate 
international non-governmental organizations have occasionally been successful at holding 
nations accountable to such contracts. Most quota literature recognizes the roles played by 
international organizations via legal or reputational mechanisms; however, much of it ignores the 
importance of economic incentives wielded by multilateral organizations and bilateral donors. 
Official Development Assistance 
Since the end of the Cold War, many donors linked funding with improvements in social 
conditions, particularly women’s issues in the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 1998; Carapico 2002; 
Coleman 2004; Moghadam 2003). Even a cursory look at the development projects funded by 
the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Arab region 
reveals a heavy focus on gender (Arab Human Development Report 2005).  One of the least 
politically costly and most cosmetic ways to show a commitment to “democratic development” 
is by implementing a gender quota. The artificial increase in gender representation also happens 
to translate well into development and governance indicators and most Arab governments figure 
conservative norms will ensure no real change of the status quo. As Stephanie Nanes (2010) 
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states, aid marked for democracy promotion tends to concentrate on overhauling the legislative, 
judiciary, and civil society while executive power remains intact despite representing the source 
of authoritarian dysfunction. “External democratization efforts allowed, if not encouraged, states 
to pass reforms elevating women’s status in place of more hard-hitting reforms” (Nanes 2010, 3).  
During my interviews with public officials as well as leaders of state-sponsored non-profits and 
international organizations across Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, and Bahrain (from 2007-2009), my 
interlocutors universally hinted that the primary reason for gender reform lay in satisfying donor 
objections to current policies with the hope of attracting more funds. Consequently, my primary 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: An upsurge in development assistance will increase the likelihood of adopting a 
gender quota in a given Arab state. 
 
Importantly, foreign economic influence may also be manifested in the level of 
formalized institutional commitment to gender empowerment. The three different types of 
gender quotas used in the region can intuitively be ranked relative to their level of formalized 
commitment to gender representation.62 Both legal candidate quotas and reserved seats represent 
legally binding reforms mandating women’s presence at distinct stages in the election process. 
Thus, voluntary political party quotas represent minimally institutionalized guarantees for 
women in politics, while reserved seats encapsulate the most binding commitment to formalizing 
gender participation within legislative assemblies (Bush 2011; Dahlerup 2003). Krook’s (2009) 
                                                
62 Reserved seats guarantee women a certain number of seats in the parliament, independent of the electoral result, 
whereas legal candidate quotas mandate a certain percentage of women on the candidate lists. In both cases, the 
voters decide which of the women candidates are elected, but under the reserved seats system, women are 
guaranteed a certain number of seats. The political parties themselves enforce party quotas internally, while legal 
candidate quotas and reserved seats are usually enforced through a formal legal requirement (the constitution or 
electoral law). 
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analysis affirmed that reserved seats and legal candidate quotas tend to be utilized in developing 
countries particularly vulnerable to international pressures for policy reform on gender. The 
Western nations that “tie” their hands by implementing gender quotas, most prefer to limit their 
gender commitment to the less formally binding voluntary political party quota. In fact, countries 
implementing reserved seats tend to have a limited number of females in the legislative assembly 
prior to quota adoption (Krook 2009). The question arises why such countries would introduce 
policies that explicitly and controversially forced them to integrate women into their politics. 
Pressure from foreign donors arises as a plausible explanation for the adoption of such an 
unpopular measure.63Therefore, I also posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Rising levels of development assistance increase the likelihood of adopting more 
“binding” quotas such reserved seats.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Importantly, development assistance does not have as much sway in the petroleum-rich 
Arab countries, but the last decade has seen a multitude of gender policy reforms—specifically 
the extension of universal suffrage rights in Kuwait (2000), Qatar (1997), Bahrain (re-instated in 
2002), Oman (2003), and the United Arab Emirates (limited 2006). The case of Bahrain was 
particularly interesting since my Bahraini interview subjects openly stated the government was 
not as concerned with development assistance as it was with foreign direct investment and 
broadcasting an image of a progressive, stable, and ultimately investment-worthy nation. 
Empowering women was deemed an integral part of the struggle to revamp the country’s image. 
Previous work exploring the link between foreign direct investment and gender empowerment 
                                                
63 The Western nations that “tie” their hands by implementing gender quota prefer to limit their own gender 
commitment to the less formally binding voluntary political party quota. 
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found mixed results (Bakker 2007; Braunstein 2006). However, in the context of the region 
foreign direct investment should not be ignored since it may significantly increase the likelihood 
of adopting gender quotas as Arab governments struggle to rehabilitate their image in the wake 
of September 11th. Thus, my third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: Rising levels of foreign direct investment increase the likelihood of adopting a 
gender quota. 
 
What about the effects of foreign direct investment on more committed forms of gender 
integration? There is a subtle difference in the impact of the two types of foreign capital. 
Development assistance tends to have conditions associated with its disbursement and often 
requires metrics for assessing progress in attaining pre-specified goals. Consequently, devising 
ways of signaling credibility to the donor becomes an important skill for the recipient country 
since a de facto bargaining process underlies the allocation of aid. Foreign direct investment has 
no such strings attached. In fact, the importance of investment lies in Arab policymakers’ beliefs 
regarding what investor-friendly traits entail, rather than specific mandates from corporations. 
Certainly property rights and contract enforcement would rank highly on any list of desirable 
traits, but increasingly institutional reforms relating to democracy have become popular and 
within that framework women’s rights become increasingly important as an indicator of 
tolerance and the consistent enforcement of legal rights, overall. This is especially the case for 
Muslim countries where the gender gap is perceived as a sign of “backwardness” and even 
repression. I expect levels of foreign direct investment to correlate with the likelihood of 
adopting a gender quota, however, I do not expect investment to be associated with any 
particular level of commitment to women (or any specific gender quota) since there is no 
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underlying bargaining process that would necessitate such a guarantee.   
H4: Levels of foreign direct investment will be predictive of gender quota adoption.  
 
I use official development assistance and foreign direct investment as percentages of Gross 
Domestic Product to evince the aggregate impact of these capital flows on the overall economy. 
Both of these measures are derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Remittances  
The third type of global finance potentially affecting incentives to change gender policy at 
the national level are remittances. Remittances already overshadowed levels of both foreign 
direct investment (approximately $3 billion) and official development assistance (approximately 
$6 billion) flowing into the Arab world in 2001, and were estimated to be $15 billion (Kapur 
2003). Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco represent countries with the world’s largest influx 
of remittances from their citizens working abroad—usually in Western Europe or the Gulf States 
(World Bank 2011).64 These nations receive in excess of two billion dollars a year to supplement 
the government’s coffers—a number which significantly rivals most Arab countries receipt of 
foreign direct investment and development assistance (Singer 2010). Much as foreign direct 
investment from China was substituted for conditional aid in Sudan, there is reason to believe the 
sheer level of remittances flowing into the region might have a similar effect in the Arab world 
and allow governments to be less reliant on foreign aid and consequently less vulnerable to 
pressure for gender reform from the international community. The converse would show 
remittances as a bolster for development at the local level through its direct economic 
empowerment of individuals (an injection of monies that is not entangled in bureaucracy), which 
could potentially have a positive effect on the status of both men and women by affording them a 
                                                
64 Accessed from http://go.worldbank.org/9PTEM0P410 
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measure of economic independence from the government dole (Brown 2006; Kapur 2005).  
H5: An increase in the flow of remittances will significantly impact the likelihood of 
quota adoption, but the direction of their effect in uncertain. Remittances can either serve 
as substitutes for development assistance, dampening its effect or they may work 
concomitantly with development assistance, empowering women at the local level to 
appeal for gender policy change at the national level.65  
 
I operationalize remittances as percentages of Gross Domestic Product deriving the data from the 
World Bank Development Indicators.   
Control Variables 
The independent variables used reflect the same set of indicators presented in chapter 
two, serving as controls to the variables of interest, and reflecting alternative hypotheses. As with 
the previous chapter, the control variables encapsulate supply and demand side factors affecting 
the likelihood of gender-related reform. Demand-side or institutional factors play a particular 
role in conditioning the likelihood of quota adoption. Here, the type of electoral system and 
regime, as well as prior presence of women within governing bodies is of import and will be 
dealt with more extensively that the other controls featured in the model. Most distinctly, quota 
adoption is often determined by the electoral system in place—whether a country has a 
proportional system or a plurality-majority system. The system regulates how votes cast in 
elections translate into party or individual candidate seats. It also controls whether quotas can be 
seamlessly integrated into the political substructure. Abundant research has found that 
proportional systems tend to be more conducive to the election or appointment of women, as 
well as to gender quota adoption (Caul 1999; Matland and Studlar 1996). The conduciveness of 
proportional regimes to the election of women was theoretically established as far back as 
                                                
65 In any case, the sheer volume of remittances flowing into the region should have an effect on gender policy at the 
national level if other types of global finance have an effect.  
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Maurice Duverger (1955) and further corroborated by the research of Wilma Rule (1981) and 
Pippa Norris (1985), as well as a slew of other scholars (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; McAllister 
& Studlar 2002; Paxton 1997; Paxton et al. 2006; Reynolds 1999). Certainly, the presence of 
quotas in conjunction with a particular electoral system can prove beneficial or impede women’s 
participation. Dahlerup (2006a) furthers this contention claiming quota systems that do not 
match the electoral system in place tend to be only symbolic (Dahlerup 2006a). I expect 
countries with majoritarian systems to decrease the likelihood of adopting a gender quota and use 
a binary variable reflecting this electoral system is in place from Pippa Norris’ Democracy 
Dataset.  
It may be safe to assume that democracies have more of an imperative to be representative, 
hence why gender quotas are often more prevalent in countries with democratic or even 
“democratizing” regimes (Bauer and Britton 2006; Krook 2009). That said, many transitioning 
nations are using “gender quotas” to reify a progressive image so the association of quota 
adoption with particular regime type may be an unclear one. I use Ted Gurr’s POLITY IV scores 
to operationalize level of democracy. I formally expect higher democracy scores to increase the 
likelihood of adopting a gender quota. 
Women’s prior presence within the legislature likely bodes well for gender quotas since 
there are female incumbents who have a direct interest in lobbying for quotas to secure their 
seats. However, in my interviews with female parliamentarians in Jordan, Bahrain, and Morocco 
this was not always the case. A substantial number of these women criticized gender quotas for 
being anti-democratic, unfair to their male counterparts, and unnecessary to combat cultural 
obstacles preventing female political participation. Consequently, prior legislative representation 
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can either be a boon or detrimental to the adoption of quotas and the passage of other gender-
related reforms. This is particularly the case in Parliaments where Islamist parties have the 
largest number of female deputies and can impede the passage of women-friendly legislation as 
in Morocco.66 I use a lagged variable encompassing the percentages of women in legislative 
assemblies to measure this concept, collecting the data from the Inter-parliamentary Union, the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the World Bank’s Development Indicators. I 
expect higher numbers of women’s legislative representation prior to the onset of the quota to be 
predictive of the likelihood of gender quota adoption. 
Finally, a lagged variable for GDP per capita is included in the model to gauge whether 
improved levels of economic development and income, translate into more progressive policy for 
women. Fertility rates reflect whether women have the time or capacity to engage in activities 
within the public domain and can thus lobby for meaningful gender reform such as the adoption 
of quotas. Women’s labor force participation and education levels are incorporated to capture the 
“supply” of women likely to lobby for quota adoption. All of these data are derived from the 
World Bank’s 2010 World Development Indicators dataset. There is no control for the Gulf 
countries in this model since none of them have ever adopted a gender quota and consequently 
are dropped automatically from the analysis by the estimator. 
Findings 
The first results presented in Table 3.2 are generated with discrete-time event history 
analysis to estimate the likelihood of adopting any type of gender quota using a binary dependent 
                                                
66 Ironically, in Morocco the Islamist party’s candidates were elected to the Parliament via a very deliberate 
manipulation of the gender quota only to attempt to stall the passage of crucial reforms to the  personal status laws. 
 	  81 
variable through logistic regression (MNL) and a Cox proportional hazards model.67 The 
coefficients in both models can be interpreted as hazard ratios reflecting the likelihood or risk of 
a quota adoption.68 These broad results give the reader initial insight into the salient variables 
predicting the probability of adopting gender quotas overall.  The subsequent competing risk 
models (Table 3.3 and 3.4 respectively) disaggregate the dependent variable and estimate the 
likelihood of adopting a particular type of gender quota (i.e. a political party quota, a legal 
candidate quota, or reserved seats), revealing the variation in incentives informing the choice of 
gender empowerment strategies across the Middle East and North Africa.  
The Likelihood of Adopting Gender Quotas Overall 
The first observation is that development assistance alongside the presence of a 
majoritarian electoral regime is consistently predictive of quota adoption. In the base model in 
Table 3.2, each one unit increase in development assistance is associated with a 182 percent 
increase in the likelihood of adopting a gender quota in the MNL model and with a 33 percent 
increase in the Cox model. Foreign direct investment is insignificant in both iterations of the base 
model. The existence of a majoritarian electoral system reduces the likelihood of adopting a 
gender quota by 99 percent in the MNL model and by 85 percent in the Cox model. Finally, the 
level of economic development unexpectedly reduces the likelihood of gender quota adoption by 
89 percent in the MNL model and by 55 percent in the Cox model.  
                                                
67 Table 3.6 in the Appendix shows that the hazards were proportional for the independent variables, thus allowing 
the use of the Cox proportional hazards model. Here, the word “quota” represents all three iterations of this policy 
from political party quotas to reserved seats and is coded as a binary variable. 
68 Hazard ratios less than one decrease the likelihood of gender quota adoption, while ratios greater than one 
increase the likelihood of quota adoption. The hazard ratios in the Cox proportional hazards model are already 
exponentiated.   
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There are two additional “expanded” models in Table 3.2. The first incorporates 
remittances as a competing financial incentive vis-à-vis foreign direct investment and 
development assistance, while the second model includes supply-side variables such as prior 
women’s legislative participation, women’s secondary education enrollment levels and women’s 
labor participation. Overall, these expanded models generate similar results to the base model, 
although at the expense of a reduced number of observations.  
The first expanded model tests whether remittances compete with foreign direct investment 
and development assistance as an unconditional source of funding and consequently mute the 
possible impact of either on gender policy. Official development assistance and remittances have 
a positive effect on the likelihood of gender quota adoption with electoral regimes still exhibiting 
the expected dampening effect. Official development assistance increases the likelihood of 
adopting a gender quota in the MNL model by 285 percent, while remittances increase it 69 
percent. Conversely, level of economic development decreases the likelihood by 82 percent, 
while having a majoritarian electoral system decreases it by 99 percent. In the Cox proportional 
hazards model, official development assistance loses its significance, while majoritarian electoral 
system again decreases the likelihood of adopting a gender quota by 88 percent, with fertility 
rates increasing it by 64 percent and remittances by 35 percent. In conclusion, remittances act in 
congruence with development assistance when it comes to quota adoption. 
 In the second expanded model, we encounter slightly different results while testing for 
the impact of more social factors. Yet again, official development assistance and the type of 
electoral system in place remain significant predictors of quota adoption. For each unit increase 
in official development assistance, the likelihood of adopting a gender quota increases 259 
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percent in the MLN model and 47 percent in the Cox model. The presence of a majoritarian 
electoral system again decreases the likelihood of gender quota adoption by 98 percent in the 
MLN model and by 71 percent in the Cox model. In the expanded models, level of economic 
development loses its significance with women’s prior legislative representation gaining 
significance in the MLN model and increasing the likelihood of adopting a gender quota by 36 
percent. 
Overall, these results showcase the importance of structural (levels of development 
assistance, remittances, and economic development) and institutional factors (electoral systems) 
in conditioning gender quota adoption and commitment to more formalized iterations of gender 
representation in the legislature.69 Both estimation techniques and the expanded models confirm 
the first hypothesis positing that aid is predictive of gender quota adoption. The third and fourth 
hypotheses are however disconfirmed with foreign direct investment never appearing to have 
significant impact on the dependent variable.70 The results also confirm the fifth hypothesis 
demonstrating that remittances have a significant and in this case positive effect on the likelihood 
of quota adoption. However, are these same factors equally predictive across the individual 
quotas? The analysis in the following section demonstrates this is not entirely the case. 
 
 
                                                
69 Future research will incorporate more social indicators in the hope of capturing the effect of local women’s 
lobbying capacity and grassroots pressure. 
70 This article if part of a broader dissertation project in which a corollary chapter discussed the effects of foreign 
direct investment on women’s legislative representation and statistical analysis had significant positive results for 
FDI influence on gender representation over time. It seems the type of political incorporation is particularly salient 
for whether FDI is a significant predictor or not. Consequently, this comparison of the effects of aid vs. FDI across 
particular contexts and measures for promoting gender is a cornerstone of the dissertation analysis. 
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Table 3.2 Discrete-Time Event History Analysis in Two Iterations: Multi-Nomial 
Logistic Regression (MNL) /Cox Proportional Hazards Regression 
                                                                           
                                                Base Models             Expanded Models (1)      Expanded Models(2) 
Hazard Ratios MNL Cox MNL Cox MNL Cox 
Official Development 
Assistance (log) 1.04*** 1.33* 1.35*** 1.14 1.28*** 1.47* 
 (0.26) (0.22) (0.43) (0.24) (0.40) (0.32) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(log) -0.00 0.96 0.01 0.96 -0.04 0.95 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Remittances (log) - - 0.49** 1.35* - - 
 - - (0.17) (0.22)   
Democracy Score -0.00 1.00 -0.06 1.02 0.11 0.97 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) 
Level of Economic 
Development (log) -2.24*** 0.45*** -1.75*** 0.82 -0.83 0.53 
 (0.44) (0.10) (0.46) (0.29) (0.84) (0.21) 
Fertility Rate 0.01 1.20 0.57 1.64*** 0.51 1.03 
 (0.33) (0.16) (0.42) (0.27) (0.48) (0.18) 
Electoral System 
(Majoritarian) -5.14*** 0.15*** -6.79*** 0.12*** -4.22*** 0.29*** 
 (1.21) (0.06) (2.06) (0.04) (1.55) (0.10) 
Women’s Legislative 
Representation* - - - - 0.31*** 0.97 
 - - - - (0.08) (0.02) 
Women’s Secondary 
Education - - - - -0.02 1.00 
 - - -  (0.02) (0.01) 
Women’s Labor Participation - - - - -0.06 1.01 
 - - -  (0.06) (0.03) 
 Pseudo R2 0.54 NA 0.56 NA 0.52 NA 
Observations 269 256 218 209 107 132 
Log-likelihood -57.74 -168.03 -50.51 -164.86 -32.26 -108.51 
* Women’s legislative representation is lagged in the MLE model, but not in the Cox regression since the 
latter does not allow time series operators. Ratios significantly less (greater) than one indicate that a 
variable is estimated to reduce (increase) the likelihood of adopting a gender quota.  ODA, FDI, and 
remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.  Incorporates time-varying covariates. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Likelihood of Adopting a Specific Type of Gender Quota 
The previous analysis reflected a combination of development assistance and electoral 
regimes most consistently impacted the likelihood of adopting a gender quota in the Arab world. 
Yet, these same factors may have different effects when predicting the adoption of the three 
distinct types of gender quotas. The previous discussion noted that the level of formalized 
commitment to guaranteeing the presence of women in the legislature varied across each type of 
quota. I maintain this same variation stems from the level of pressure exerted by the dominant 
type of international financial flows coming into the country—specifically whether there is a 
conditional element associated with these monies both formally (development assistance) and 
informally (as foreign direct investment). Exploring the effects of foreign direct investment, 
development assistance, and remittances represents a unique way to proxy for such effects. As 
stated in hypothesis three and hypothesis four, my expectation is that the more “institutionalized” 
the choice of gender quota (i.e. whether it is mandated via constitutional or legal reforms as in 
the case of legal candidate quotas and reserved seats), the more likely conditional aid is to have a 
significant impact on this choice since adopting such a policy requires more drastic and 
potentially controversial institutional change. The results of the competing-risks regressions in 
Table 3.3 and 3.4, confirm these hypotheses in the case of reserved seats, but the story is 
nuanced when analyzing political party quotas. 
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71 Ratios lower than one reflect a decreasing likelihood of gender quota adoption, while ratios above on reflect an 
increasing likelihood of gender quota adoption. 
Table 3.3: Competing-Risks Survival Regression of Quota Adoption I (1990-2009) 
Sub-Hazard Ratios  Political Party Quotas Reserved Seats 
Official Development Assistance (log) 1.06 1.73** 
 (0.21) (0.39) 
Foreign Direct Investment (log) 0.76***(-) 0.99 
 (0.07) (0.02) 
Electoral System (Majoritarian) 0.00*** (-) (0.12)***(-) 
 (0.00) (0.06) 
Democracy Score 1.11** 0.94 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Level of Economic Development (log) 0.45 ** (-) (0.53)**(-) 
 (0.15) (0.15)  
Fertility Rate 0.20***(-) 3.12*** 
 (0.05) (0.57) 
   
Observations 256 256 
   
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.  Incorporates time-varying covariates.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Sub-hazard ratios have already been exponentiated.71 
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72 Ratios lower than one reflect a decreasing likelihood of gender quota adoption, while ratios above on reflect an 
increasing likelihood of gender quota adoption. 
Table 3.4: Competing Risks Survival Regression of Quota Adoption II 
Sub-Hazard Ratios  
Political Party 
Quotas 
Reserved 
Seats 
Political 
Party Quotas 
Reserved 
Seats 
Official Development Assistance (log) 0.22**(-) 1.80** 0.81 5.62** 
 (0.15) (0.48) (0.44) (3.92) 
Foreign Direct Investment (log) 0.83* (-) 1.01 0.80** (-) 0.99 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) 
Remittances (log) 5.97** 1.37** - - 
 (5.33) (0.21) - - 
Democracy Score 1.16*** 0.92 1.20 1.01 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.26) (0.04) 
Level of Economic Development (log) 6.23 0.74 0.22 0.96 
 (8.73) (0.29) (0.25) (0.41) 
Fertility Rate 0.62 3.48*** 0.25*** (-)    3.05***  
 (0.35) (0.66) (0.09) (0.81) 
Electoral System (Majoritarian) 0.00*** (-) 0.02 (-) 0.00*** (-) 0.09*** (-) 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) 
Women’s Legislative Representation - - 1.05 0.95* 
 - - (0.08) (0.02) 
Women’s Secondary Education - - 1.00 0.89** (-) 
 - - (0.38) (0.04) 
Women’s Labor Participation - - 0.85 0.85** (-) 
 - - (0.13) (0.06) 
Observations 209 209 132 132 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.  Incorporates time-varying covariates 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sub-hazard ratios have already been exponentiated. 72 
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Legal candidate quotas are not included in the results presented in Table 3.3 or 3.4 due to 
insufficient observations for substantive and accurate interpretation. Of the three different types 
of gender quotas in the Arab world, these quotas are the least represented time-wise and log only 
fifteen observations across the Palestinian Authority, Mauritania, and Iraq, hence the lack of 
results. Event history operators are particularly sensitive to the number of observations and were 
not able to converge to generate results. Table 3.5 in the Appendix, however, gives a taste of 
what those results might be, albeit inflated through the use of multi-nomial logit estimator.73 In 
Sarah Bush’s (2011) research on gender quotas worldwide, she chooses to combine legal 
candidate quotas and reserved seats maintaining they both represent similar instances of legally 
institutionalized gender quotas as averse to voluntary policies.  Perhaps the results for reserved 
seats can serve as an adequate proxy for possible outcomes in the case of legal candidate quotas.  
The most striking findings in Table 3.3 and 3.4 reveal that development assistance 
continues to be predictive of the adoption of reserved seats without any effect on political party 
quotas. However, foreign direct investment significantly decreases the likelihood of adopting 
political party quotas. Interestingly, an increase in the inflow of remittances raises the likelihood 
of adopting both types of gender quotas. As expected, the predominant type of the financial 
incentive flowing into the region has a distinct impact on the nature of adopted gender policies. 
In both reserved seats and political party quotas, the level of economic development reduced the 
likelihood of adoption, as did the presence of a majoritarian electoral system. Unusually, a rise in 
fertility rates increased the likelihood of adopting reserved seats, but decreased the likelihood of 
adopting political party quotas, which I will touch upon in the discussion section. 
                                                
73 Official development assistance, economic development, a majoritarian electoral regime, and fertility rates are all 
predictive of quota adoption, while foreign direct investment has a negative effect. The supply side indicators in the 
expanded model are positively predictive of quota adoption. 
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A. Reserved Seats 
 Reserved seats are found in a truly diverse array of countries: Djibouti, Jordan, Somalia, 
and Sudan with an equal array of differing electoral systems ranging from a proportional single 
transferable vote system in Jordan to majoritarian systems in Djibouti and Sudan. Reserved seats 
represent the most formalized iteration of gender quota adoption and usually require significant 
legislation and institutional change for implementation—a primary reason why they are often 
associated with pressure from abroad (see Bush 2011, Krook 2009). Most countries adopting 
reserved seats also tend to have conservative reputations vis-à-vis  women’s rights and the Arab 
countries choosing this measure are no exception (Krook 2009). Unsurprisingly, official 
development assistance has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of adopting reserved 
seats, increasing it by 73 percent in the base model. Fertility rates also have a significant impact 
increasing the likelihood of adoption by 212 percent. This result is likely conflated with official 
development assistance, which is oftentimes extended to countries with demographic problems 
since intergovernmental organizations will prescribe gender-related policy reforms to curb such 
issues. The presence of a majoritarian electoral system decreases the likelihood of adopting 
reserved seats by 88 percent while level of economic development decreases by 47 percent. In 
the first expanded model, we see the same relationships re-appear with remittances increasing the 
likelihood of adopting a gender quota by 37 percent.  
The final expanded model incorporating supply side factors reveals significant results in 
terms of the role of the prior legislative presence of women, levels of women’s secondary 
education, and women’s labor participation rates. The latter results are somewhat counter-
intuitive as prior women’s presence in the legislature unexpectedly reduces the likelihood of 
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adopting reserved seats by 5 percent, while increasing levels of women’s labor participation 
decrease the likelihood of quota adoption by 15 percent, and a rise in women’s secondary 
education levels dampen the likelihood of adoption by 11 percent. The case of Jordan gives some 
insight into the negative findings. Most of the women within the Jordanian lower house of 
Parliament obtained their seats either through reserved seats adopted in 2003 or through the 
quota for the Circassian and Christian minorities as with the Circassian female candidate, Toujan 
Faysal –the first women elected to the Jordanian Parliament. Most of these women were 
adamantly against expanding the very-same quota that allowed them to become MPs in the first 
place, explicitly lobbying against proposals to raise the number of reserved seats from 6% to 
12% in the lower house (Azzi 2007; Husseini 2010,).  Per Toujan Faysal: “I am totally against all 
forms of quotas, which is in itself against the law, because the law states clearly: A member of 
the lower house is a person who gains the highest points of votes. Hence it is against the law to 
include any member who has not secured a seat through the democratic process of election. How 
can one justify a person getting into the Lower House without being elected, while a candidate 
who might have secured a sizable backing by the electorate is deprived of the right to sit under 
the dome? I had tried my best as a legislature to affect change. I presented an interrelated 
election law with no quotas; 27 MPs signed the petition, but it did not get past the legal 
committee” (The Star 2004).    
In fact, the most strident supporters of the quota were local women’s non-governmental 
organizations, which consistently lamented the corruption of these self-same women in power 
and the fact that the quota attracted unqualified female candidates or “puppet parliamentarians” 
(Abou Zeid 2006; Husseini 2010, 2007).  Despite significant increases in educational attainment 
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on the part of women and slight increases in their presence within the formal labor sector, this 
progress has largely been confined to elites, whose members both male and female had a 
concerted interest in conserving the status quo (Moghadam 2003; Sabbagh 2007,). Hence, why 
the results counter the expectations of modernization theory. Finally, in the full model official 
development assistance increases the likelihood of adopting reserved seats a substantial 462 
percent, clearly outpacing the influence of other factors and highlighting the connection between 
this “binding” method of gender empowerment and external pressure for reform. 
B. Political Party Quotas 
 Political party quotas are largely present in North African countries with a French 
colonial legacy—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. France also implements a political party quota 
to redress gender disparity within its own legislature and has served as a ready template for its 
former colonies. This quota is theoretically the most lax and least legally formalized since its 
adoption is contingent on each party independently deciding to incorporate it into its party 
statutes. In Morocco, this choice was made by collective decision in 2002 where all of the parties 
came to a consensus that 10% of their candidate lists should composed of women, adding this 
provision to their party statutes. In Algeria, conversely, only two parties mandate female 
electoral candidates: the National Liberation Front (FNL- Front de Libération Nationale) 
requires that in every province two out of the first five candidates have to be women, while the 
Movement of Society for Peace (HMS-Harakat Moudjtamaa As-Silm / Mouvement de la Société 
pour la Paix) requires that one-fifth of all candidates at the regional level be women. In effect, 
the statistical analysis in this case is de facto exploring why political parties individually choose 
to amend their statutes to reform candidate selection vs. why national governments choose to 
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entertain institutional reforms geared at increasing representation. While reserved seats reflect 
national interest and are the by-product of top-down agency, political party quotas echo local 
interests at the electoral recruitment stage since they are adopted often within limited and 
specific group of political parties representing discrete issues and demographics.  
Many of the countries adopting political party quotas have exhibited some of the greatest 
gains for women within their legislatures and beyond despite their “voluntary” nature (28% of 
Tunisia’s legislature is female), hinting that gender quotas and foreign pressure slightly 
contributes to ensuring women’s substantive political participation. Considering all of these 
countries have flirted with “socialism” in their respective pasts with Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Algeria hosting strong socialist parties, this ethos and its usual mandate of gender equality likely 
contributed to women’s mobilization in these societies (Richards and Waterbury 2007).  
 In the case of political party quotas four factors have the most consistent statistical impact: 
foreign direct investment, type of electoral system, level of economic development, and fertility 
rates. Official development assistance is not consistently significant. In the base model, foreign 
direct investment reduces the likelihood of adopting political party quotas by 24 percent. The 
level of economic development also decreases the likelihood of adopting these quotas by 55 
percent, while rising fertility rates reduce the likelihood of quota adoption by 80 percent. The 
presence of a majoritarian electoral system decreases the likelihood of political parties adopting 
quotas by 100 percent. The latter is unsurprising since all three countries have proportional 
electoral systems mimicking their French colonial master. Level of democracy has the lone 
positive effect, increasing the likelihood of political parties adopting a gender quota by 11 
percent. In the first expanded model controlling for the competing influence of other financial 
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sources, we see the same relationships re-appear except now remittances arise as the largest 
predictor for political party quotas, increasing the likelihood of their adoption by 497 percent! 
Unsurprisingly, in the four listed countries the level of remittances significantly outpaces 
development assistance and levels of foreign direct investment. The final expanded model 
incorporates supply side factors as controls and shows the same relationships as before with none 
of the supply-side variables appearing to be significant.  
Discussion 
The significant results for development assistance in the case of reserved seats hint at the 
bargaining mechanism underlying the incentives behind gender quota adoption. Broadly, 
international pressures can sway countries to modify their legal infrastructure to promote gender 
outcomes espoused by the West when financial rewards are dolled out. Foreign direct investment 
seems to have limited impact across countries adopting reserved seats, though this may be 
unsurprising considering the countries implementing this measure (Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, 
and Jordan) do not attract as much as investment as they receive foreign aid and remittances, 
with the exception of Sudan. Furthermore, in Sudan foreign investment is largely geared at the 
oil industry with heaviest investors (China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Gulf states), preferring 
the status quo of Omar Bashar’s Islamic government. The majority adopts a “strictly business” 
policy of noninterference in domestic affairs, which would not favor institutional change at the 
national level (Council on Foreign Relations 2007; Goodman 2004). Political party quotas reflect 
a different array of interests, partially because the decision to adopt a gender quota is made at a 
more discrete, party-based level rather than imposed on a larger, national scale. In fact, foreign 
direct investment dampens incentives for political parties to adopt quotas. Perhaps, this 
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relationship reflects the status quo bias of the sources of foreign direct investment in North 
Africa since many of the European and Gulf states (The North Africa Journal 2009; World Bank 
2010a,) that typically invest in the region are critical of even marginal political changes.  Nor are 
investors from these countries as prone to associating “stability” and “security of investments” 
with democratization (see Nesbit 1998). Finally, remittances are associated with gender quota 
adoption across both political party quotas and reserved seats—a fascinating outcome that hints 
at the power of the Diaspora in potentially providing “grassroots” funding for politically and 
socially controversial gender reforms when international aid and political will are lacking 
(Brown 2006; Kapur 2005; Kapur and McHale 2003). This finding is especially interesting since 
remittances represent a pure injection of foreign exchange into the receiving economies—void of 
the bureaucratic entanglements of development assistance and insulated from the vicissitudes of 
private investors and money managers that characterize foreign direct investment.  
In the case of fertility, the persistent yet counter-intuitive relationship where increases in 
fertility are associated with the greater likelihood of adopting a gender quota are likely an artifact 
of the chronically high rates of population growth in the Middle East, only exceeded by sub-
Saharan Africa (Richards and Waterbury 2007, 71). Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Palestine, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Somalia are all countries with 
population growth rates above two percent (United Nations 2005). High fertility rates attract 
development assistance aimed at curbing problematic demographic outcomes—an issue squarely 
within the realm of gender-related policy. According to this logic, gender quotas arise as a salient 
policy response to pressure from the outside world to find coping strategies for women-specific 
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demographic issues such as infant or maternal mortality that are contingent on women gaining 
more control over their fertility and overall livelihood.  
The question remains whether the significant and positive relationship between 
development assistance and the adoption of reserved seats is endogenous—i.e. did the adoption 
of progressive gender policies attract development assistance as a reward for undertaking 
suggested reforms and not vice versa. Anecdotal historical data illustrates that most Arab 
countries adopted gender quotas in the new millennium (see Table 3.1), yet foreign aid has been 
flowing into the region for the entirety of the past two decades (see Figure 3.2). Furthermore, the 
important shift in framing development as a gendered economic process spearheaded by the 
Beijing Conference and later the Millennium Development Goals, explains why previous 
financial inputs did not result in similar levels of gender quota diffusion across the Middle East 
and North Africa. Implementing gender policies has become a lucrative endeavor in the new 
millennium due to the Bretton Woods' institutions, as well as bilateral donors, increasingly 
conflating progress on gender issues with “development” and rewarding countries that do the 
same. Broadly, these findings also hint that development assistance is less fungible in the context 
of gender programming efforts, although it is likely extended under a broad “democratization” 
rubric where gender empowerment appears among the most “innocuous” reforms Arab 
policymakers envision.74 Ultimately, all of these empirical results reflect the increasing impact 
global finances have on shifts in Arab national policy, specifically in the case of gender-related 
political reforms.  
 
                                                
74 Consider how loathe Arab “reformers” are to touch media laws or even religious freedom, yet gender is quite 
often used as a tool to “democratize”, as well as a vessel through which governments address other controversial 
topics such as religion (as in the case of family laws). 
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Figure 3.2 Sub-regional Patterns of Development Assistance  
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2010* 
 
 
Conclusion 
The previous analysis explored factors influencing the adoption of gender quotas across 
the Arab world, focusing on a neglected element—external financing in the guise of foreign 
direct investment, development assistance, and remittances. A majority of scholarship 
concentrates on the influence exerted through international legal frameworks promoting gender 
empowerment, consequently research exploring the economic incentives informing such 
controversial policy choices for Muslim and Arab majority countries is severely lacking. The 
                                                
* This chart excludes Iraq and Egypt in the interest of showcasing regional averages in more detail. The substantial 
level of development assistance allocated to these two countries disallows a closer examination of regional trends 
when grouped with the rest of the Middle East. The four regional subgroups contain the following countries: 
Maghreb=Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Morocco; Gulf=Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman; the 
Levant=Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority; Africa=Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and the Comoros.   
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strategic calculus behind quota adoption becomes especially important when considering the 
shift in framing gender empowerment from a political to an economic good by many 
international and transnational organizations. This change in rhetoric turns women into a 
valuable commodity for countries pursuing economic development and seeking financial 
validation from the West for their chosen development strategies. Foreign aid, in particular, is 
consistently predictive of gender quota adoption overall, but reserved seats in particular. To 
reiterate, it is no accident that foreign donors influence the adoption of an often constitutionally 
mandated policy reform, which can have unpredictable, substantive, and long-lasting impacts on 
existing institutions. The fact that women in Djibouti, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Iraq 
still win legislative seats outright even with the existence of gender quotas implies there may yet 
be unintended substance to this policy.75 Chapter five illustrates this in more detail by describing 
the precipitous increase in women running for office since the adoption of quotas in Jordan and 
Morocco. Remittances also appear as a potentially homegrown source for women’s campaign 
finance at the local level, hinting at their possible role in the grassroots mobilization of 
disempowered groups for policy change. 
Evidence from other transitioning countries may prove prescient in the Arab case—
especially as the world looks to the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the current proto-
revolutionary events in Egypt as potentially harkening the Arab world’s 1989 or, at least, a new 
round of institutional reform. Olga Shvetsova’s (2003) article on the consequences of the 
strategic choice of electoral rules in transitioning post-Communist Eastern Europe illustrates how 
new institutions once in place can become embedded within the political system in ways 
                                                
75 Figures published by the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior show that percentage of female candidates on 
supplemental lists had risen from 4.8% in 2003 to 15.7% in 2009. In Jordan, the number of women campaigning for 
the six reserved seats within parliament rose from 54 in 2003 to 199 in 2007.  
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unanticipated by their original progenitors. She describes how the electoral reforms promulgated 
by the formerly Communist “brokers” of democratic transition in Poland, Russia, and Hungary 
often resulted in those selfsame individuals voted out of power. Yet, their original intent was to 
conserve incumbency through revised threshold requirements for national parliamentary 
elections or manipulating the size of electoral districts.76 Thus, a degree of institutional inertia 
and incomplete information resulted in “unintended consequences”. Per Shvetsova, “the 
connection between the strategic choice of institutions and the consequences of these institutions 
is anything but direct when information is incomplete.”77  
An Arab parallel for these “unintended” consequences of institutional choice played out in 
Jordan during the 2003 parliamentary elections. The 2003 election laws reserved six seats for 
women across the nation who received the highest percentage of votes in their districts regardless 
of their ranking vis-à-vis  other candidates. Since districts are drawn according to geographic 
criteria instead of population, women who run in less populated, rural areas improve their 
chances of securing a higher percentage of votes relative to their urban counterparts. Many tribes 
decided to nominate women because it increases their chances of representation in the 
government (Azzi 2007). A case in point: a small local tribe in the conservative second district of 
Tafilah overwhelmed the dominant district tribe’s male candidates by unexpectedly and 
pragmatically using the gender quota to elect the female parliamentarian, Insaf Khawalde, 
thereby guaranteeing the community access to parliamentary rents through a woman’s legislative 
mandate. Such a development may not seem controversial on the surface, but knowing the rigid 
tribal hierarchies of Jordan (see the work of Linda Layne or Andrew Shryock), much less how 
                                                
76 See Shvetsova’s(2003) descriptions of parliamentary elections in Poland, Russian, and Hungary in the 1990s for 
more information (pp. 201-203).  
77 Shvetsova 2003, 201. 
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staunchly conservative the Tafilah district is, highlights the novelty of such an event. A woman 
elected to represent the primary source of income for a small, conservative town in the Jordanian 
desert is not a trivial development. It was certainly not an intended consequence of the gender 
quota “sanctioned” by a Jordanian parliament dominated by larger tribes who had no expectation 
of smaller tribes using it to become more electorally competitive. The countries of the Gulf are 
wary enough of the transformative power of gender quotas in that they refuse to consider 
implementing such a measure. The continuing diffusion of such “hazardous policies” may yet 
bode well for Arab women—as the proverbial saying goes, “where there is smoke, there is 
fire”—and we can only hope quotas are the hint of broader gender empowerment measures to 
come.  
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CHAPTER 4: CAN PUBLIC SPACE BE DEMOCRATIZED? EXPLORING WOMEN’S POLITICAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS  
 
“The problem was before that the law did not allow it [women’s political participation], 
now it’s the society itself that does not allow it.” 
       Interview with female member of the Shura Council 
       Manama, Bahrain, July 2009. 
 
This chapter attempts to empirically explore women’s capacity to fully participate in 
Arab political life through an examination of existing women’s rights and their legal 
enforcement within Arab society. The analysis here transcends the legislative and institutional 
focus of the previous two chapters and considers the impact of global finance on women’s 
political, economic, and social rights, which more directly channel the overall socio-political 
environment. Furthermore, examining women’s rights nuances the measurement political 
inclusion and accesses a rich literature investigating the effects of foreign capital on human 
rights (Burkhart 1998; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; Hafner-Burton 2005; Henderson 
1996; McLaren 1998; Meyer, 1996, 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001).	   Scholarship 
exploring the impact of foreign capital (or “economic globalization”) on human rights is often 
grouped into two camps: those reflecting the “liberal neoclassical” school and the “dependency” 
school. Women’s rights are similarly bifurcated into the Gender and Development (GAD) and 
Women in Development (WID) paradigms (see Akhter 2006; Richards and Gelleny 2007; Ward 
1984). GAD theorists posit a Wallerstein-ian view of this relationship, maintaining economic 
globalization exacerbates women’s vulnerabilities in an already unequal gender playing field 
(Clark et al 1991; Pyle and Ward 2003; Ward 1984). Conversely, the WID perspective promotes 
a heady vision of women’s status improving alongside rising levels of economic development in 
line with the expectations of classical modernization theory (Braunstein 2006; Ingelhart and 
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Norris 2003b; Lerner 1958). In this chapter, I hope to illustrate the complexity underlying the 
question of women’s rights vs. capabilities in the Middle East as well as demonstrate that 
treating the effects of foreign capital as a unitary concept in the vein of the GAD and WID 
paradigms represents a disservice to both the globalization and gender literatures. This approach 
essentially trivializes the important differences between assorted types of foreign capital and 
impedes scholars’ ability to penetrate their varying effects as well as practitioners’ ability to craft 
informed policy relative to capital flows and their potential effects on societal change. 
I posit the following question: How do different types of global capital affect progress on 
three forms of women’s rights in the Arab world from 1990 until 2009? Disaggregating these 
rights is an important step since political, economic, and social rights enjoy differing levels of 
institutionalization and enforcement in the Arab world. Surprisingly, women’s political rights are 
the most commonly institutionalized and standardized in the region, usually through 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing women’s’ right to vote, stand as political candidates, and 
be members of political parties. Women’s economic rights are also more readily formalized 
through legal guarantees of women’s right to work, to rightful compensation, to private property, 
and various provisions for maternity leave and childcare. Social rights, however, represent more 
complex phenomena, as they tend to be more diffuse and often fall under the purview of both 
civil and Islamic courts. In particular “personal status codes,” or Islamic laws regulating 
women’s personhood in the private and public realm, often contradict women’s constitutional 
rights to equality—especially when it comes to personal autonomy—thereby impeding women’s 
enjoyment of their often constitutionally guaranteed political and economic rights. Therefore, a 
disaggregated conceptualization of women’s rights allows for a more complete picture of the 
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realms in which gender disparity may be institutionalized, as well as its level of 
institutionalization (see Bradley and Khor 1993). I use measures for women’s rights gleaned 
from the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights dataset (2010). These indicators operationalize 
women’s capacity for political inclusion by encompassing (a) whether laws guarantee women an 
array of important economic, social, or political rights and (b) the level of their enforcement. 
Conceptualizing rights as a means to inclusion gives more insight into Arab women’s access to 
the public sphere and, ultimately, their capacity to function in the political arena. This is an 
important consideration for the Arab world when accounting for Muslim women’s traditionally 
circumspect roles in public life and the discriminatory informal and formal rules that govern their 
personhood.  
The Spectrum of Women’s Rights in the Arab World 
The introductory quote emphasized the rift between granting women the right to equality 
in the political arena versus allowing them the opportunity to meaningfully participate and 
legislate—in a broader sense, the right to full citizenship. Marshall (1965, 92) defines citizenship 
as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community,” implying the concept of 
citizenship encompassed the ability to fully participate in public life, as well as “the notion of 
autonomous personhood in a legal and bureaucratic sense” (Berkowitz 1999; Steenbergen 1994; 
Volde and Moran 1991). However, the majority of Arab women fall under the jurisdiction of 
“personal status laws” which specifically regulate the boundaries of female personhood within 
Arab society allowing men to treat women as only partially autonomous persons. Per the Arab 
Human Development Report (2005, 184), “Arab personal status laws, with regard to Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike, are witness to legally sanctioned gender bias.” These laws are often not 
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codified, but arbitrarily enforced by local shari’ah courts institutionalizing male privilege via 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and in some cases countermanding women’s constitutional rights to 
equality across the political, economic, and social spheres. Furthermore, shari’ah courts tend to 
wield more respect in their communities than Arab governments, which weakens existing legal 
guarantees protecting women’s rights. The following section elaborates on these concepts further 
detailing the specificities of the individual types of rights and how they interact with one another 
to foster or impede women’s mobility in and access to the public sphere. 
Political Rights: Voting and Representation 
While the Middle East has made incredible strides in closing the gender gap across basic 
income and education over the last thirty years, it hasn’t translated into levels of political 
engagement or even predicted levels of labor participation—a “development deficit” highlighted 
in the Arab Human Development Report of 2002. The previous chapters focused women’s 
representation within political institutions, but what role do basic legal rights play in facilitating 
women’s capacity in entering and functioning in the Arab public sphere? The Beijing Platform 
for Action called for women’s human rights to be recognized and for women to be empowered 
across the economic, political and cultural domains (United Nations1996). Mandating 
institutional mechanisms for the political incorporation of women represented one of the 12 
critical areas of concern within the Platform. Yet, in many respects, the majority of Arab nations 
have already made significant progress in these particular provisions for increasing women’s 
political inclusion. National legislation in most Arab states guarantees the equality of men and 
women before the law, and women’s basic political rights such as the right to participate in the 
electoral process and to stand for public office. In most Arab states these rights are 
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constitutionally mandated, while the countries that officially limit women’s political 
participation tend to limit suffrage overall (namely, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates).78 While allowing women access to political institutions guarantees some legal rights 
in terms of political opportunity, the limited nature of these reforms hints that these rights are 
largely extended so long as the “participating” women reinforce the regime in power (Brand 
1998). Thus, exploring a broader set of rights might be more reflective of how much opportunity 
and capacity women have to actually partake in and have credible access to politics. As 
Moghadam and Sentova (2005) state, women’s empowerment is a multi-dimensional process 
reflecting women’s enjoyment of their rights and the capacity for participation, a notion 
reminiscent of Amartya Sen’s (1999) thesis on enhancing citizens’ “capabilities,” which can in 
turn foster democratic development. Such capabilities are facilitated by factors within the 
economic and social arena, not solely those formalized in the political realm.  
Importantly, many Arab women do not even view formal participation in the legislative 
process as a viable strategy for their own empowerment vis-à-vis men. In fact, 80 percent of 
Arab women active in the public domain maintained having a female presence within the formal 
state apparatus made no contribution to achieving gender-related goals.79 This may partially be a 
byproduct of the disingenuous reasons for including women in the political process as evidenced 
by the comments of an employee in the Bahraini Supreme Council for Women, “There is no true 
belief within party [in women]; there is a belief women’s participation stops at membership.”  
                                                
78 From the Arab Human Development Report 2005: “See, for example, Article 21 of the Lebanese constitution, 
Article 8 of the Moroccan constitution, Articles 34,35,42 of the Qatari constitution, Article 1 of the Egyptian Law 
for the Exercise of Political Rights, Article 2 of the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies Law, Article 2 of the Tunisian 
Electoral Code, and Article 1 of the Bahraini Law for the Exercise of Political Rights. 
79 IDEA: http://www.idea.int/women/parl/studies1a.htm 
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In terms of cultural barriers to women’s entry into the political sphere, Arab women face 
the most discriminatory public opinion attitudes on gender equality in the world with both men 
and women preferring male political leaders and entitling men to jobs when employment is 
scarce (Jamal and Tessler 2008). Amaney Jamal’s (2010a) research further demonstrated that 
these attitudes directly harm objective indicators of women’s status. Furthermore, the 
authoritarian nature of the political environments Arab women operate in serves as an additional 
barrier for their participation, as well as the credible participation of their male counterparts. 
Elections are not about representation, but rather tools for elite management—a method for Arab 
regimes to distribute favors and rents (Blaydes 2010; Lust-Okar 2006). Per Amaney Jamal 
(2010b, 12), “even women who do access political power must participate in this system of 
patrimony, which privileges existing patriarchal networks.” Therefore, only referring to legal 
guarantees of political rights may be insufficient to actually gage women’s substantive ability to 
politically participate in Arab society. Importantly, including women in the political life of even 
an authoritarian nation at least opens up the system to the chance of women’s equal participation 
in public life, if not exactly transformative of the regime.  Even such a small political opening 
may set precedents for other disenfranchised groups to lobby for representation (Krook O’Brien 
2010). 
Economic Rights: Labor Participation and Mobility 
 If the political inclusion of Arab women is low relative to global counterparts, their levels 
of labor participation are abysmal (see Table 4.1 below). Yet, within Islamic history there are 
precedents for supporting women’s economic rights—especially when considering the wives of 
the Prophet Mohammed. Most notably, his first wife Sayeda Khadija was a successful 
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independent businesswoman (Freedom House 2009). Female labor participation has historically 
been deemed an important component of women’s political empowerment with theories to this 
effect dating back to the work of Friedrich Engels (1884). Pippa Norris’ (1996a) research 
showed increased female labor force participation, especially in professional sectors, created a 
larger pool of potential applicants for political positions. Further research revealed the more 
access women had to outside income, the more influence they wielded within their families 
(Iverson and Rosenbluth 2006) and the more politically active they became (Schlozman, Burns, 
and Verba 1999).  
Table 4.1 A Comparison of Male and Female Employment and Unemployment Rates 
Source: ILO (2007), Global Employment Trends Model (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Female  
Employment-to-
population ratio 
(%) 
 
Male 
Employment-to-
population ratio 
(%) 
 
Female 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
 
Male  
Unemployment rate  
(%) 
YEAR 1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 
 
World 
 
49.6 
 
48.9 
 
75.7 
 
74 
 
6.3 
 
6.6 
 
5.9 
 
6.1 
Developed 
Economies and 
European Union 
46.6 49.2 65.8 64.7 8.4 6.6 7.3 5.9 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) and 
CIS 
46.4 44.9 64.2 62.2 9.6 9.1 9.7 9.5 
 
East Asia 
68.8 64.9 81.1 78.1 3.1 3 4.2 4.1 
South East Asia 
and the Pacific 
55.3 55 80 77.4 4 6.6 3.6 6.5 
 
South Asia 
34.9 33.8 80.6 78.3 4.9 6.2 4.2 4.9 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
41.5 47 76.2 74.3 10.2 10.4 6.5 6.4 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
58.7 56.8 79.2 77.4 9 9.6 9.3 9.9 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
20.4 24.5 68.3 69.3 18.1 17 11.5 10.4 
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Levels of women’s economic participation are partially related to their direct access to 
the labor market and the legal infrastructure facilitating this access.  Interestingly, many Arab 
states have passed labor legislation explicitly protecting the rights of working women. Article 69 
of the Jordanian constitution and Article 11 of the Egyptian constitution explicitly guarantee a 
women’s right to work. Article 5 of the Tunisian Labor Law goes as far as prohibiting gender 
discrimination in the workplace (Arab Human Development Report 2005). The Moudawana80 
reforms of Morocco have also brought the issue of sex discrimination in the workplace to the 
forefront. A number of Arab states have laws guaranteeing rights to maternity leave (see Article 
91 of the Egyptian Labor Law, Article 61 of the Bahraini Labor Law, Article 25 of the Kuwaiti 
Labor Law, Article 37 of the Moroccan Labor Law and Article 64 of the Tunisian Labor Law) 
(Arab Human Development Report 2005).81 Even with these progressive provisions, many 
opportunities for women are curtailed through personal status laws that penalize women for 
leaving their matrimonial homes or curtail their opportunity to work without a husband or other 
male guardian’s (muhram’s) consent. Many countries legally forbid women working in 
unsuitable professions: “Libyan labor law prohibits the employment of women in work that does 
not suit their nature” (Arab Human Development Report 2005, 185). Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all explicitly outlaw women working at night (Arab Human 
Development Report 2005, 185).  
Outside of the legal arena, there are considerable informal barriers to women’s ability to 
work. According to Amaney Jamal (2010b), low levels of economic participation are largely due 
                                                
80 The Moudawana laws refer to the personal status code or family law for Morocco. 
81 Among other laws, Egypt prohibits the dismissal of working women during maternity leave (Article 92 of 
Egyptian Labor Law) or pregnancy and guarantees women the right to child care leave (Article 94 of the Egyptian 
Law of the Child), as well as a period for nursing infants (Article 71 of the Egyptian Law of the Child). 
 	  108 
to three inter-related factors: the patriarchal order privileging domestic labor and child rearing as 
the only appropriate venues for women’s labor and in many countries even requiring a husband 
or father’s consent to allow women to work. Secondly, the high rates of unemployment coupled 
with a very conservative culture disadvantage women’s entry into the labor force. Finally, some 
of the highest rates of fertility (an average of 3.8 live births for each women between 2000-2005 
according to the World Health Organization) in the world keep women away from the 
workforce, occupying them with child rearing (Arab Human Development Report 2005). 
Furthermore, the gap between women and men’s labor participation persists because the laws 
governing women’s economic rights are either not enforced or discriminatory behavior carries no 
legal ramifications.  
However, an exploration of political and economic rights will not give a complete 
illustration of the conditions for women in the region. The enforcement of legal provisions in 
Arab countries is highly contingent on cultural mores—an arena where personal status codes and 
shari’ah laws encapsulated under the broader rubric of “social rights” fall. A more thorough 
consideration of social rights might give further insight into which cultural institutions beyond 
the legal purview bar women’s access to the public sphere. The existence of strict personal status 
laws can limit women’s political and economic participation by circumscribing their overall 
mobility.  
Social Rights: Personal Status Laws and the Public/Private Space Dichotomy 
For Arab women, especially those who are Muslim, personal status laws govern 
important aspects of their lives within the private and public realm pertaining to domestic 
relations and partnerships.  This system of laws arose in the Arab Ottoman past and is often 
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adjudicated by the national judiciary or local shari’ah courts heavily relying on classical Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh). Personal status laws govern all aspects of marriage (from inheritance to 
spousal abuse, adoption, and surrogacy), as well as its termination (divorce, annulment, property 
settlements, alimony and parental responsibility). In many Arab countries they also determine 
whether women have a right to private property and citizenship, as well as the granting of 
nationality to children—usually, the sole purview of the father. The latter two legal provisions 
can effectively curtail women’s economic and political capacity challenging their personal 
autonomy and social value. Generally, the nature in which personal status laws are codified 
preserves the primacy of men as legal caretakers of the family, while simultaneously relegating 
women to the hearth and often to the status of a permanent minor (Jamal and Nooruddin 2010; 
Joseph 1999; Moghadam 2007; UNDP 2005).  
In terms of personal mobility, Moroccan scholar Fatima Sadiqi (1997) connects personal 
status laws to the gendering of space that arises from Arab custom. She describes how public 
space (“the state and the market”) was traditionally considered the masculine domain, while 
private space was the domain of women and children (“the powerless”). She maintains, “The two 
spaces are strictly dichotomized and interact in a dynamic way in the sense that one does not 
exist without the other. It is true that women can be in some public spaces--for example, on the 
street--but cannot stay there as men are encouraged to. Rather, women must do their business 
and move on. Also, men generally do not spend any time in the kitchen, for example, so the 
taboo applies to them, too, though with very different consequences.”82 
Personal status laws formalize this spatial dichotomy, hence they can have such a 
crippling effect on women’s ability to access and navigate the public sphere. Sadiqi claims this 
                                                
82 Sadiqi, F. and M. Ennaji, 2006. 
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pattern of behavior was disrupted when women began to seek employment outside of the home 
in the Morocco of the 1960s. Moroccan women entered the workforce as a byproduct of the 
increasing poverty facing the kingdom at the time, with poorer women seeking work as 
domestics and in low-wage industries. Simultaneously, rising education levels among females 
allowed literate women openly pursuing jobs available to skilled labor for the first time.83 Sadiqi 
cites Fatima Mernissi’s (1994) observation of the time of workingwomen being unanimously 
vilified as the wives of low-income, ill-bred men who allowed their spouses to sully family 
reputations. Yet these initial forays into the labor market ultimately resulted in pressures to 
reform personal status laws in a bid to give women sufficient freedom to work (Charrad 2001; 
Moghadam 2003; Ross 2008). It is no accident that the countries that have seen the largest 
entrance of women into the labor market over time—namely, the Arab countries of North and 
East Africa, also have some of the most progressive personal status laws (see Table 4.2 below). 
According to the Arab Human Development Report (2005), personal status law in North Africa 
tend to be much more progressive than those of their counterparts in the Arab East precisely 
because of the necessity for women’s work to shore up household income in this impoverished 
region. Furthermore, the Report maintains Islamic religiosity is often not the primary reason for 
the imposition of restrictive personal status codes or family laws. It claims, “Family laws in the 
Maghreb show that it is possible for shari’ah to coexist harmoniously with the principle of 
equality between husbands and wives. Thus, gender equality in Arab legal systems is more the 
product of history, customs, and conventions than of authentic religious precepts” (Arab Human 
Development Report 2005, 195).” 
                                                
83 An acute labor shortage allowed for this to be possible in the first part of the 20th century when Morocco actually 
hosted migrant labor from Spain. 
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Table 4.2 Mean of Women’s Labor Participation as % of Total Labor Force (1990-2009) 
 
        Source: World Bank Indicators 2010 
The Moroccan case is illustrative of how shari’ah based personal status laws and the 
principle of equality can co-exist in an Arab setting.  Recent Moudawana reforms are now a 
model for the rest of the Arab world. Prior to the passage of these reforms, the notion of 
guardianship regulated all aspects of women’s public mobility. Women required approval from 
male guardians to legally work, travel, or attend university. Yet, with the passage of the 
Moudawana laws most of these restrictions were formally lifted, even though enforcement still 
leaves much to be desired. Still, codification itself allows the laws to be standardized and 
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therefore more easily accessible and contested by women.  
 Tunisian women have long-enjoyed the most political and economic opportunity in the 
Middle East owing to codified family laws that were reformed shortly after independence in 
1956, but more importantly enforced as former president Bourgiba looked to women as a 
bulwark again rising Islamism (Brand 1998). His government drafted a personal status code that 
gave women almost full equality in marriage, which allowed for their advancement in terms of 
employment and education (Charrad 2001; White 2001). It is likely no accident that the far-
reaching Moudawana reforms of Morocco were passed in the wake of the Casablanca terrorist 
bombing of 2003. Many scholars have openly argued the young King hoped that by empowering 
women he could moderate Islamist factions within his society and secularize Morocco (Sadiqi 
2010).  
Importantly, not all legal reforms are equally empowering for women in the Arab world.  
In fact, many Arab regimes gamble that extending political rights to women is moot and usually 
results in the maintenance of the status quo than an evolution in politics—often because women 
vote according to what their tribes and families dictate (Freedom House 2009, Arabarrometer 
2006). Furthermore, women much less men often do not bother to exercise their political rights 
in authoritarian regimes fearing government retribution or public acrimony. However, economic 
and social rights directly affect women’s welfare, independence, and mobility in ways that are 
tangible to Arab women. Revisions in personal status laws can afford women significantly 
greater mobility and autonomy outside the hearth, as well as opportunity in the case of divorce or 
death of a spouse. Changes to labor policy incorporating mandatory maternal leave or the 
sanctioning sexual harassment create incentives for women to work and provide safe 
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environments therein. In fact, the ultimate importance of political rights lies in their ability to 
give women the opportunity to meaningfully legislate for improved economic and social rights—
no more, no less.  
Amaney Jamal (2010) credits the successful push for the Moudawana laws in Morocco to 
three inter-related dynamics: women’s grassroots activism, international influence, and the 
commitment of the monarchy. The success of grassroots activism and the effect of benevolent 
leadership on the promotion of progressive women’s rights policy are difficult to gage 
statistically due to limited data and questions of content and concept validity in coding the data 
that is available. Furthermore, they lend themselves more to an in-depth case analysis, which I 
will provide in chapter five. However, the impact of international influence on women’s rights 
can be statistically evaluated and will be in the methodology section. The following section 
describes the relationship between international economic influence and women’s rights. 
International Economic Influence 
 The previous two chapters discussed the impact of international economic factors on 
women’s legislative representation and related policy change (gender quotas), but did not 
attempt to encapsulate a more holistic measure of women’s political capacity through a human 
rights approach (Burkhart 1998; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; Hafner-Burton 2005; 
Henderson 1996; Meyer, 1996, 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; McLaren 1998). As 
stated previously, the study of the effects of the flow of foreign capital on women’s status in 
developing countries can be viewed through two paradigms: GAD and WID. Gender and 
Development (GAD) theorists adopt a Wallerstein-ian world-system view of the role of foreign 
capital in disempowering women (Clark et al 1991; Pyle and Ward 2003; Ward 1984). 
Investment friendly environments are deemed to limit budgetary spending, shrink taxes, and 
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privatize government services (Maxfield 1998), while the conditionality associated with foreign 
aid (especially of the multilateral variety) often promotes neoliberal economic policies curtailing 
social programs that benefit and employ women (Acker 2004; Bergeron 2001). Women tend to 
be among the most vulnerable populations in developing societies and when public spending is 
cut, evidence shows they suffer disproportionately (Bergeron 2001; Hemmati and Gardiner 2002; 
Rao and Kelleher 2005).  
Conversely, the Women in Development perspective (WID) theorists visualize an 
outcome akin to the predictions of conventional modernization theory in line with liberal 
neoclassical beliefs in the power of foreign capital and economic growth to promote 
development (Bakker 2007; Braunstein 2006; Ingelhart and Norris 2003b; Lerner 1958; World 
Bank 2001,). Foreign investment accelerates economic development benefitting women through 
its spillover effects on education, local incomes, and in some cases norms-diffusion (Acker 2004; 
Bhagwati 2004; Deo 2006; Gray et al. 2006; Hafner-Burton 2004). It shifts women’s economic 
and labor rights from a national to an international jurisdiction, a transition that tends to view 
women’s participation in the public sphere more favorably (Deo 2006). The United Nations’ 
(1999) furthers this view stating, “Economic development is closely related to the advancement 
of women. Where women have advanced, economic growth has usually been steady; where 
women have been restricted, there has been stagnation.”  
Certainly, foreign companies have an interest in lobbying for labor laws that give workers 
regardless of gender more mobility, thus we can expect to see a positive impact on women’s 
economic rights. In fact, Morocco and Tunisia enjoy the highest rates of female labor force 
participation due to both foreign and local export-oriented industries preferring unmarried, 
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mobile who could be paid lower wages in the interest of keeping labor costs low and competing 
on the global market. According to Joekes (1982), by 1980 Morocco’s textile workforce in 
foreign-owned, export-oriented companies was 75 percent female and accounted for 75 percent 
of growth in female employment in the 1990s (Assaad 2004).  Development assistance is 
allocated with the expectation of seeing progressive social reforms enforced and would thereby 
improve the spectrum of women’s rights. Finally, remittances could either financially empower 
women to agitate for their rights through cash inputs or are perhaps filtered into a country with 
the express purpose for funding similarly disempowered groups with political agendas that favor 
women.  
In both of the GAD and WID scholarly agendas, foreign capital is treated as a mechanism 
for economic globalization or “international economic penetration”, yet the many iterations of 
external finance might have a decidedly different effect when disaggregated and decoupled from 
these concepts. Increasingly, multi-dimensional models of foreign capital incorporating foreign 
direct investment, portfolio investment, foreign debt, and development assistance are used to 
evaluate whether foreign economic penetration improves or deteriorates a developing countries’ 
human right record (Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). I further expand on this line of research 
by incorporating a new iteration of foreign capital—remittances—into my analysis.84 This 
                                                
84 Remittances nuance the examination of the sway global finance in developing countries, as they increasingly 
represent one of the largest sources of external money, but elicit very different socio-economic outcomes from 
foreign direct investment or official development assistance. Remittances have no associated conditionality as with 
foreign aid and they do not engender income volatility as with FDI or portfolio investment due to their being 
“unrequited” (Singer 2010, Ahlquist 2006, Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Finally, remittances tend to be counter-
cyclical, serving as de facto insurance policies for developing countries in times of economic crisis (Kapur 2005). 
They can effectively serve as injections of cash into desperate communities and shore up defunct attempts at 
economic development (Kapur and McHale 2003). However, they may also be used to fund controversial social 
causes such as women’s or minority rights. In my discussions with a Moroccan women activist, she and other 
Amazigh interlocutors mentioned how the Amazigh movement had been funded from remittances coming from 
Europe and had successfully managed to overturn legislation mandating all Moroccan names be arabized. It is 
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research uses foreign direct investment, development assistance, and remittances as percentages 
of Gross Domestic Product to operationalize a more multi-dimensional view of foreign capital 
and its specific effects on an array of women’s rights. My expectations are formalized in the 
following hypotheses based on results from previous chapters showcasing the positive impact of 
foreign capital on women’s legislative presence: 
 
H1: Rising levels of development assistance and foreign direct investment will have a 
positive effect on women’s political rights. The effect of remittances will be negligible. 
 
H2: Rising levels of development assistance and foreign direct investment will have a 
positive effect on women’s economic rights. The effect of remittances will be negligible. 
 
H3: Rising levels of development assistance will have a positive effect on women’s social 
rights, while the effects of foreign direct investment and remittances will be negligible.  
 
In chapters two and three, development assistance was shown to positively affect the 
number of women representatives in Arab legislatures over time, as well as increase the 
likelihood of adopting a gender quota. Thus, I expect it to have the most significant impact on 
women’s political rights.  Foreign direct investment also had a similarly positive impact on 
women’s legislative presence, often by funding the campaigns of prominent Arab women 
connected to foreign investors, hence my expectation of its positive effect on political rights. In 
terms of economic rights, all three types of foreign capital represent opportunities for women to 
independently obtain funds, which could increase their autonomy within the household—
whether through micro-financing sponsored by international aid organizations or through multi-
national corporations willing to hire women. Finally, development assistance will be the sole 
financial indicator with an effect on Arab women’s social rights since it explicitly targets the 
                                                
possible that these monies are being used to fund other attempts at policy change and avoiding detection from the 
central government.  
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controversial reform of restrictive personal status laws and family codes in the region. Since 
remittances can serve as rival source of foreign exchange in the Middle East, they may dampen 
the effects of conditional aid and should be controlled for in this analysis (Kapur 2003; Richards 
and Waterbury 2007). Much as with foreign direct investment, remittances can also bolster 
household incomes to the point where dis-incentivize women from entering the workforce—
especially in conservative tribal cultures (Ross 2008). Without opportunity or pressure to work, 
women face little prospect of gaining financial autonomy and have limited incentives to lobby 
for greater rights. 
A Quantitative Analysis of Women’s Rights 
The Model 
 In previous chapters, I demonstrated that international financial incentives impacted the 
likelihood of Arab women’s political inclusion into the legislative arena in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Could official development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances 
exert similar power across a broader array of women’s rights? I test this assumption using data 
from the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights (CIRI) dataset to code three dependent variables 
encapsulating women’s political, economic, and social rights. Cingranelli and Richards’ coding 
draws on the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and on 
Amnesty International’s Amnesty International Report, with both reports extensively surveying 
human rights practices and conditions among 195 world countries annually. The women’s rights 
variables are coded on an ordinal scale ranging from 0-3. CIRI represents one of the few 
databases incorporating gender indicators that have no missing data for the Middle East and 
North Africa. The United Nation’s Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender 
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Empowerment Measure (GEM) have limited observations for the Arab world and are therefore 
not utilized in this analysis. The three dependent variables are described in detail below.  
Women’s Political Rights 
 This dependent variable includes the following rights: the right to vote and run for office, 
the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, 
and the right to petition government officials. It is coded from 0 to 3 on the following scale85: 
0=Women’s rights are not guaranteed by law and laws completely restrict the political 
participation of women (ex: Saudi Arabia) 
1=Women’s political participation is guaranteed by law, but women hold less than 5 
percent of high ranking government positions (ex: Libya) 
2=Women’s political participation is guaranteed by law, and women hold more than 5 
percent but less than 30 percent of high ranking government positions (ex: Tunisia) 
3=Women’s political participation is guaranteed by law, and women hold more than 30 
percent of high ranking government positions  
(Ex: Iraq during the 2005 election cycle) 
 
Women’s Economic Rights 
 This dependent variable includes the following rights: the right to equal pay for work, the 
free choice of profession or employment (no requirement for male chaperone’s consent), the 
right to gainful employment without obtaining male chaperone’s consent, equality in hiring and 
promotion, job security (guaranteed maternity leave, unemployment benefits, etc.), 
nondiscrimination by employers, the right to be free of sexual harassment in the workplace, the 
right to work at night, in occupations classified as dangerous and to work in the military or police 
force. This variable ranges from 0 to 3 (Tunisia) on the following scale86:  
0=Women’s economic rights are not guaranteed by law, the law reinforces sex 
discrimination, and there is a high tolerance for gender discrimination in the workplace 
exhibited by the government (ex: Saudi Arabia) 
                                                
85 Observations 308; Mean 1.11; Standard Deviation: 0.75. 
86 Observation 311; Mean 0.98; Standard Deviation 0.55. 
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1=A portion of women’s economic rights are guaranteed by the law, but enforcement is 
weak with the government tolerating moderate levels of gender discrimination in the 
workplace (ex: Algeria) 
2=A portion of women’s economic rights is guaranteed by law, but enforcement is weak 
with the government tolerating low levels of gender discrimination in the workplace 
(ex: Mauritania) 
3=All women’s economic rights are guaranteed by law with the government enforcing 
labor laws and has a no-tolerance policy vis-à-vis gender discrimination in the 
workplace (ex: Tunisia in 2003) 
 
Women’s Social Rights 
This dependent variable includes the following rights: the right to equal inheritance, the 
right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men, the right to travel abroad, the right to 
obtain a passport, the right to confer citizenship to children or a husband, the right to initiate a 
divorce, the right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage, the right to 
participate in social, cultural, and community activities, the right to an education, the freedom to 
choose a residence/domicile, and freedom from forced sterilization. It is coded from 0 to 3 on the 
following scale87:  
0= Women’s social rights are not guaranteed by law and the law reinforces gender 
discrimination with the government having a high tolerance for discrimination in the 
social realm (ex: Saudi Arabia) 
1= Women’s social rights are partially guaranteed by law, but the government does not 
enforce the laws effectively and tolerates a moderate level of gender discrimination 
(ex: Syria) 
2= Women’s social rights are partially guaranteed by law, but the government does not 
enforce the laws effectively and tolerates a low level of gender discrimination (ex: 
Tunisia) 
3= All of women’s social rights are guaranteed by law, and the government enforces the 
law and tolerates no gender discrimination.  
(None of the Arab countries scored “3” on this indicator) 
 
The independent variables reflect the same set of indicators presented in chapters two and 
three. Development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances are channeling 
                                                
87 Observations 269; Mean 0.44; Standard Deviation 0.58 
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Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko’s (2001) multi-dimensional notion of “foreign economic 
penetration,” but here they each have an independent importance (all three are derived from the 
World Bank). The remaining indicators channel alternative hypotheses. Prior research 
demonstrated democracy was related to enhanced government respect for women’s rights, hence 
the inclusion of the Polity IV scores as a measure for level of democratization.  GDP per capita is 
also included in this model since levels of economic development can improve citizen’s income 
and possibly empower women by putting more funds directly under their control. Fertility rates 
reflect whether women have the time or capacity to engage in activities within the public domain 
(Amaney Jamal 2010), while labor participation and education showcase women’s ability to 
exercise and benefit from mobility. All of these data are derived from the World Bank’s 2010 
World Development Indicators dataset. A lagged variable reflecting women’s prior legislative 
representation hopes to capture if female politicians are lobbying for improvements in women’s 
rights. The electoral system is only utilized as a control in the case of women’s political rights 
since it can plausibly affect the likelihood of their political recruitment and therefore creating a 
female presence within governing institutions with a potential interest in conserving incumbency. 
Ultimately, the type of electoral system would most likely only have an indirect effect on 
women’s economic rights or social rights, and is not featured in those models as a control. 
Finally, I control for the unique situation of the Gulf countries using a Gulf dummy variable.  
Women’s social/economic/political rights= α (constant) + β1Development Assistance (logged) 
+ β2  Foreign Direct Investment (logged) 
+ β3  Remittances (logged) 
+ β4  Economic Development (logged) 
+ β5  Electoral System  
+ β6  Democracy  
+ β7 Fertility Rates  
+ β8 Gulf states (dummy) 
+ β9 Women’s Legislative Representation  
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+ β10 Women’s Labor Participation  
+ β11 Women’s Secondary Education 
+ e 
 
Linear regression is inappropriate for the prediction of ordinal outcomes when the 
distribution of the dependent variable is not normal as in the case of the three dependent 
variables capturing women’s rights (Hoffman 2004). Ordinal data is usually estimated using an 
ordered logistic or an ordered probit model.  However, both of these estimators are highly 
sensitive to violations of the proportional odds assumption—the supposition that the relationship 
between each pair of outcome groups (categories) is the same. Violations of the proportional 
odds assumption are more likely as datasets become more complex, yet have fewer observations 
as in the case of data on the Middle East and North Africa. An alternative to these estimators is 
generalized ordinal logistic regression (gologit), an unconstrained model yielding the same 
goodness of fit as running a multinomial logistic regression, while being less restrictive in its 
assumptions (Long and Freese 2006; Williams 2006).88 Yet, Clogg and Shihadeh (1994) argue 
that the generalized ordinal logistic regression model does not represent an ordinal model since it 
is completely unconstrained and thus equal to the results of a multinomial regression model.89 
 Ultimately, I use ordinal generalized linear regression (oglm) since it retains the ordinal 
structure of the data without being too restrictive in its assumptions and still has the ability to 
estimate partial proportional odds (Williams 2009, 2010).90Heterogenous choice models such as 
generalized ordinal logistic regression are more apt for correcting for the variance in the error 
                                                
88 Ordinal logistic regression assumes the relationship between the independent variables and the logits (outcome 
groups) are the same for all of the logits, as well as assuming the error variance is the same across groups/categories 
and across cases.  
89 The “gologit” estimator is also capable of producing negative probabilities and is especially susceptible when the 
sample size is small as with my data. This is usually a more trivial occurrence unless a substantial proportion of the 
independent variables yield negative probabilities, in which case the model may be mis-specified. 
90 In fact, Keel and Park (2006) venture it is effectively an example of a class of generalized nonlinear models and 
that the oglm moniker is a misnomer. 
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terms across individual cases and may therefore be more reliable at controlling for 
heteroskedasticity (Keele and Park 2006; Williams 2009). Importantly, Keele and Park (2006) 
maintain these models may contain unusual nonlinearities (due to their unconstrained form), 
which could be sensitive to variance misspecification and generate biased estimates. An 
additional problem with using discrete-choice models is that country-fixed effects lead to biased 
coefficients and standard errors (Stata 2003). Since the dependent variables approximate normal 
distributions despite their ordinal nature, I conduct an additional robustness test in OLS using 
fixed-effects (see Table 4.10 in the Appendix). Finally, I incorporate time varying covariates 
since the data reflects women’s rights from 1990 until 2009 across the 22 Arab League member 
states. 
Findings 
Table 4.3 below reveals the diverse effects of three indicators of global capital across the 
indicators of women’s political, economic, and social rights. The subsequent tables (4.5, 4.6, 4.7) 
highlight the statistical results with the ensuing commentary explaining their importance and 
their relationship to the hypotheses. 
 Table 4.3 The Effects of Global Finance on Three Forms of Women’s Rights 
 
 
  
Official Development 
Assistance 
 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 
Remittances 
Women’s Political 
Rights 
 
No effect 
 
Negative effect (-) 
 
No effect 
Women’s Economic 
Rights 
 
Positive effect (+) 
 
Positive effect (+) 
 
Negative effect (-) 
Women’s Social Rights  
Positive effect (+) 
 
No effect 
 
Negative effect (-) 
 	  123 
Political Rights 
Previous analysis by Richards and Gelleny (2007) found only a weak positive 
relationship between debt conditionality and women’s global political rights in the pre-
globalization era (i.e. prior to the 1990s) with all other foreign capital indicators insignificant. 
Interestingly, Arab women’s political rights also seem to be the least influenced by external 
financial capital when compared to economic and social rights. These results are especially 
surprising considering the significance of foreign capital for women’s legislative representation 
and the adoption of gender quotas in previous chapters. Yet, there is a ready explanation for such 
findings. The women’s political rights indicator as coded by Richards and Cingranelli focuses on 
the right to suffrage, to run for office, as well as to join political parties, which had been granted 
in many of the Arab countries prior to the 1990s (the time period under observation) so the 
presence of non-significant findings for foreign capital is not unexpected (see Table 4.8 in the 
Appendix).  
Across four models in Table 4.4 using Arab women’s political rights as a dependent 
variable, only foreign direct investment had a significant and negative relationship from the 
indicators expressing external finance disconfirming hypothesis one on the importance of aid. In 
the base model, every one unit increase in foreign direct investment was associated with a 47 
percent decrease in the odds of having more extensive political rights for women. Additionally, a 
one-unit rise in fertility rates resulted in a 60 percent decrease in the odds of having more 
extensive political rights. Upon the inclusion of women’s prior legislative representation into the 
model, the effect of foreign direct investment rose to 53 percent, while fertility’s effect dropped 
to 54 percent. For each percentage increase in female legislators within Arab assemblies, the 
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odds of progress on women’s political rights increased by 30 percent. These same relationships 
maintained their significance with the inclusion of supply-side variables channeling women’s 
education and labor participation. The final model restricts the sample to non-Gulf countries.91 
Again, foreign direct investment and women’s legislative representation exhibited the most 
pronounced effects, while fertility lost its significance. Each one-unit increase in foreign direct 
investment decreased the odds of progress on political rights by 58 percent in non-Gulf 
countries, while a one-unit increase in women’s legislative representation raised the odds by 40 
percent. Removing these states from the sample dampened fertility’s effect on women’s political 
rights in other Arab countries.92  
Foreign direct investment’s negative impact on women’s political rights is likely an 
artifact of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) attracting a majority of the foreign investment 
flowing into the region, yet arguably making the least progress in terms of women’s legislative 
and executive presence.93 However, controlling for non-GCC countries demonstrated that foreign 
direct investment also had a negative impact on political rights in the Levant and North Africa. 
In prior chapters, foreign direct investment increased the numbers of women within Arab 
legislatures, possibly serving as an alternative source of campaign money for credible 
parliamentary candidates since in my experience many of these women had jobs tied to foreign 
investments. Even though successful female candidates may actively use money derived from 
jobs working for foreign companies to sponsor their campaigns, that money does not necessarily 
promote agendas that favor women’s political participation. Consequently, foreign direct 
                                                
91 Unfortunately, there are too few observations to make the same comparison across the states of the Persian Gulf. 
92 The Gulf countries have notoriously high fertility rates and many women are afforded the luxury to remain in the 
hearth due to generous government subsidies, while their counterparts in the rest of the Middle East cannot afford to 
remain at home yet must simultaneously lobby for officially granted mobility.  
93 In the case of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, full suffrage has not even been extended. 
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investment may ultimately operate as a supply-side factor—i.e. it promotes female candidates by 
empowering women financially in environments where political parties may not be willing to 
risk their funds on a questionable candidate. Yet, it decreases the likelihood of progress on 
women’s political rights because it favors status quo politics. The interests underlying foreign 
investments do not have much to gain from women’s political empowerment, but have quite a bit 
to gain from women having more economic opportunities as they represent a cheap workforce 
and a network of new, independent consumers—hence, the positive impact of foreign direct 
investment on economic rights. 
Finally, high average fertility rates dampen political rights likely by restricting the supply 
politicized women since the associated domestic responsibilities take women out of the public 
sphere directly decreasing their influence in advocating for improved political rights.94 Women’s 
prior legislative representation significantly increased the odds of improved political rights, 
hinting at this indicator’s simultaneous effect on the demand and supply of female political 
candidates. With women already filling seats in Parliament, there is a population potentially 
demanding or serving as beacons for enhanced political rights (demand-side), though there are 
often women who actively lobby against those self-same rights especially among Islamist 
candidates (see current MP Bassima Hakkaoui of Morocco or former MP Hayat Massimi of 
Jordan). By virtue of women’s presence in political institutions, they are also a likely pool for 
future government positions (supply-side via incumbency) and still serve as role models for other 
women looking to enter the political arena regardless of their political affiliations. Related 
                                                
94 In my observations from interviews with female political candidates and parliamentarians in Morocco, Jordan, and 
Bahrain, it seems that these women generally mimic the fertility rates of their respective countries and do not have 
fewer children than the norm. Importantly, many of these interview subjects stated that they waited until their 
children were adults to become politically active. According to this logic, the more childbearing is spaced out over 
time, the longer a woman would have to wait for the opportunity to engage in politics.  
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research conducted in Western Europe (Childs 2001; Dahelerup 1988; Mckay 1996; Sainsbury) 
and Sub-sahran Africa (Devlin and Elgie 2008) has found mixed results regarding whether 
female parliamentarians help the passage of women-friendly legislation. In most cases, they have 
raised these agendas, but have not been successful in promulgating them into legal reforms. 
Economic Rights95 
 All of the indicators representing global finance were significant in the model 
incorporating women’s economic rights presented in Table 4.5. In the base model, each unit 
increase in official development assistance raised the odds of progressive economic rights by 87 
percent, while foreign direct investment increased them by 118 percent, thus confirming 
hypothesis two. Contrarily, each unit increase in remittances decreased those odds by 47 percent. 
Magnitude-wise, levels of economic development had the most substantial impact, increasing the 
odds of progressive economic rights by 330 percent. These same relationships were repeated 
across the expanded models with even the model incorporating the non-Gulf countries revealing 
similar patterns and approximately similar magnitudes. These results are not surprising since 
recent development-related research has shown that foreign aid may yield the best outcomes 
when fostering entrepreneurship among women in disadvantaged communities through micro-
lending and related economic initiatives (Kabeer 2009; Moghadam 2003). Foreign direct 
investment is also positively related to women’s economic rights, which is unsurprising 
considering foreign companies tend to be more open to hiring women and may even push to 
                                                
95 In the next two analyses, I remove majoritarian electoral systems from the control variables, as I do not believe 
this indicator is relevant in determining whether we see improvements in women’s economic and social rights. 
Technically, women’s presence in Arab legislatures will channel the extension of these rights more effectively than 
the type of electoral system and whether it curtails women’s access into the political arena. This indicator is far more 
important for analyzing what contributes to women’s legislative presence as I do in chapter two. Finally, robustness 
tests showed it had a non-significant effect in all iterations. 
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liberalize labor laws limiting their mobility (Braunstein 2007; Coleman 2010). Surprisingly, 
remittances have a negative effect on women’s economic rights. The extensive amount sent back 
to Arab countries from males working abroad may render the need for women entering the labor 
force—often to compensate for the shortfall in domestic income—unnecessary and thus cripple 
efforts to grant women more access to the workplace.96According to Mernissi’s claim, women’s 
entering the labor market was considered a necessary evil in the past and newer statistics show 
that these attitudes may still be pervasive (see Table 4.4 below).  
Table 4.4 Arab Public Opinion on Women’s Economic Rights 
 
World Values Survey 2005-2008 
 
 Egypt Morocco Jordan  Iraq 
Agree 89.1% 50.8% 88.2% 83.9% 
Disagree 4.3% 33.2% 7.9% 16.1% 
When jobs are 
scarce men 
should have 
more right to a 
job than 
women. 
Neither  6.6% 16.0% 3.9% - 
 
Arab Barometer 200697 
 
  Algeria Morocco Jordan Kuwait 
Strongly 
Agree 
24.6% 36.7% 21.6% 38.9% 
Agree 35.8% 38.1% 43.3% 43.3% 
Disagree 22% 17.2% 25.9% 13.2% 
Men and 
women should 
have equal job 
opportunities 
and wages Strongly 
Disagree 
9.6% 6.8% 6.9% 3.1% 
        Source: World Values Survey 2010, Arabbarometer 2010 
Social Rights 
 Finally, women’s social rights exemplify the most pressing set of rights in terms of 
women’s public and private mobility as coded by Cingranelli and Richards, and in many 
respects, the most difficult liberties to standardize and institutionalize in the Arab world. Social 
                                                
96 If the remittances from Arab males working abroad compensate for this short fall, there would be no need for 
families to encourage their women to work—hence, the negative effect of remittances on women’s economic rights.  
97 Available at http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/comparisonresutls06.html 
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rights are singularly important for Arab women since they are closely linked to female roles 
within the family unit or private sphere. This is especially the case since most of the social rights 
captured by this indicator tend to fall under family or personal status codes in the Middle East 
and North Africa, and translate most reliably to the degree of access women have to the public 
sphere.98 Here, two indicators encompassing global finance were also consistently significant—
namely, official development assistance and remittances. Official development assistance 
increased the odds of more progressive social rights by 245 percent for each unit increase—an 
expected outcome considering the extensive lobbying by foreign non-governmental 
organizations to reform family codes across the Arab world. This was the case of Morocco with 
the passage of the revolutionary Moudawana laws and to some extent in the recent revisions of 
the Sunni family code in Bahrain.99 Remittances had a negative effect on women’s social rights 
reducing the odds of progress by 44 percent.  By propping up the domestic status quo favoring 
the patriarch’s control of the household, remittances neutralize the importance of women in the 
private and public sphere, which gives women less leverage to bargain for other rights. Level of 
economic development similarly reduced the odds of progressive social rights by 98 percent, 
while each unit increase in average fertility reduced them by 96 percent. These same 
relationships persist in direction and magnitude, but running the analysis on a non-Gulf subset of 
the Arab world, increased the significance of foreign direct investment, which decreased the 
odds of progress on social rights by 66 percent.  
 
 
                                                
98 Personal status codes are further complicated by the fact that Sunnis and Shiites conceptualize them differently 
(see Welchman 2009). 
99 This will be discussed in more depth in chapter five. 
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Table 4.5 Ordinal Generalized Linear Model of Women’s Political Rights 
Coefficients/Robust Standard Errors Base Model 
Expanded  
Model 1 
Expanded  
Model 2 
Non-Gulf  
Arab Countries 
Official Development Assistance 
(log)* 0.32 0.25 0.67* 0.05 
 (0.24) (0.32) (0.39) (0.27) 
Foreign Direct Investment (log)* -0.64* -0.77* -0.91* -0.87*** 
 (0.39) (0.50) (0.47) (0.33) 
Remittances (log)* -0.17 -0.14 -0.29 -0.21 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19) 
Democracy Score 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) 
Level of Economic Development (log) -1.35** -0.94 -0.73 -0.93 
 (0.60) (0.65) (0.87) (0.73) 
Fertility Rate -0.93*** -0.78** -1.13** -0.56 
 (0.34) (0.37) (0.48) (0.40) 
Electoral System (Majoritarian) -0.53 0.47 0.49 0.79 
 (0.44) (0.66) (0.80) (0.67) 
Women’s Legislative Representation 
(lagged) - 0.27*** 0.27** 0.34*** 
 - (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) 
Women’s Secondary Education - - -0.00 - 
 - - (0.02) - 
Women’s Labor Participation - - -0.01 - 
 - - (0.06) - 
Gulf Dummy -1.74 -0.92 2.19 - 
 (2.67) (2.48) (2.27) - 
     
 Pseudo R2 0.30 0.39 0.40 0.32 
Observations 151 151 89 138 
Log-likelihood -89.67 -78.033 -42.59 -64.46 
** Too few observations in Gulf countries to run regional comparison model. 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Incorporates time-varying covariates Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6 Ordinal Generalized Linear Model of Women’s Economic Rights 
 Base Model 
Expanded  
Model 1 
Expanded 
Model 2 
Non-Gulf 
Arab World 
Official Development Assistance (log)* 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.90*** 0.62*** 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.34) (0.19) 
Foreign Direct Investment (log)* 0.78** 0.81*** 0.26 0.22 
 (0.32) (0.30) (0.38) (0.19) 
Remittances (log)* -0.64*** -0.60*** -0.77*** -0.59*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.14) 
Democracy Score 0.00 0.01 0.03** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Level of Economic Development (log) 1.46** 1.58** 1.22* 1.27** 
 (0.64) (0.63) (0.73) (0.63) 
Fertility Rate -0.57* -0.41 -1.31*** -0.43 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.45) (0.30) 
Women’s Legislative Representation 
(lagged) - 0.08* 0.03 0.02 
 - (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) 
Women’s Secondary Education - - 0.00 - 
 - - (0.06) - 
Women’s Labor Participation - - -0.01  - 
 - - (0.02) - 
Gulf Dummy -3.32 -3.06 1.04 - 
 (2.47) (2.30) (1.77) - 
     
 Pseudo R2 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.20 
Observations 152 152 89 139 
Log-likelihood -77.177 -75.56 -44.40 -71.77 
** Too few observations to run a regional comparison model for the Gulf countries 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Incorporates time-varying covariates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7 Ordinal Generalized Linear Model of Women’s Social Rights 
 Base Model  
Expanded  
Model 1 
Expanded  
Model 2 
Non-Gulf  
Arab World 
Official Development Assistance 
(log)* 1.24*** 1.25*** 0.44 1.21*** 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.40) (0.33) 
Foreign Direct Investment (log)* -0.34 -0.34 -0.23 -1.08*** 
 (0.50) (0.51) (0.65) (0.33) 
Remittances (log)* -0.44* -0.44** -0.41 -0.47** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.45) (0.19) 
Democracy Score -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Level of Economic Development 
(log) -4.04*** -3.97*** -3.90** -2.29** 
 (1.18) (1.29) (1.94) (0.94) 
Fertility Rate -3.35*** -3.31*** -3.15*** -2.18*** 
 (0.65) (0.71) (0.75) (0.52) 
Women’s Legislative Representation 
(lagged) - 0.01 - 0.02 
 - (0.06) - (0.07) 
Women’s Secondary Education - - 0.05 - 
 - - (0.08) - 
Women’s Labor Participation - - -0.00 - 
 - - (0.01) - 
Gulf Dummy 9.39*** 9.38*** 8.68** - 
 (3.40) (3.38) (4.30) - 
     
 Pseudo R2 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.23 
Observations 125 125 68 116 
Log-likelihood -70.67 -70.64 -35.78 -77.31 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Incorporates time-varying covariates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusion 
Overall, I find that all three kinds of global finance (official development assistance, 
foreign direct investment, and remittances) have significant effects on women’s economic and 
social rights, but often have negligible impact on their political rights.100 Most intriguingly, 
official development assistance positively impacts both women’s economic and social rights, 
challenging existing literature on the minimal effect of aid on human rights, in general (Richards 
and Gelleny 2007; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001). The immediate implication of this 
finding is that foreign aid may not have the same effect across all regional contexts. Most 
scholarship considering the consequences of an influx of foreign capital (usually conceived as 
“economic globalization”) on human rights overall or women’s rights specifically has been 
macro in scope. My findings imply that more micro-level regional inspection may yield 
decidedly different outcomes than large-scale cross-national analysis. The previous two chapters 
demonstrated conditionality has been effective in the case of gender-related policy change in the 
Arab world. It is possible the strategic interests and pressures underlying the allocation of 
development assistance to the Middle East and North Africa (as well as the sheer amounts 
pumped into the region) are more likely to “yield” progress on women’s rights indicators than in 
less targeted regions of the world. Such a result demonstrates the potential fallacy of approaching 
development policymaking and aid allocation from a one-size-fits-all perspective and highlights 
the importance of recognizing the unique qualities of aid recipient countries.  
  
                                                
100 I believe the latter result is the byproduct of the political rights’ indicators focus on extending suffrage to women. 
The majority of Arab League member states extended the right to vote to women before the 1990s (the period under 
investigation dates from 1990 until 2009) with only a few exceptions among the Gulf states (see Table 4.7 for a 
timeline of suffrage in the Arab League). 
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 The legacy of foreign direct investment is more challenging to interpret since in past 
chapters it has had a positive effect on women’s legislative representation, yet has also decreased 
the likelihood of adopting political party quotas. Here, it negatively impacts the extension of 
women’s political rights, but empowers women in terms of economic rights. Considering there 
are only four countries that extended the right to vote in the period under observation (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) from 1990-2009, we can safely assume foreign 
direct investment had the greatest impact on these four Gulf Cooperation Council members. The 
four countries have a mixed record in terms of women’s political inclusion, but all four primarily 
attract investment geared at oil production—an industry promoting “atypically patriarchal norms, 
laws, and political institutions” (Ross 2008, 1). Ross (2008) and Moghadam’s (2003) research 
revealed an empirical link between lagging female political representation and oil wealth since 
oil production reduces incentives to incorporate women into the labor force, which tangentially 
curbs their political influence. Oil-wealthy countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Oman had the fewest women in their workforce and political institutions, and 
were also reluctant to grant female suffrage. Conversely, Arab countries that had little to no oil 
wealth (Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Djibouti) were some of the first to grant female suffrage 
and performed better on the aforementioned indicators. It is no accident that Algeria, the only 
North Africa net oil exporter, also has some of the lower rates of female representation for the 
Maghreb. 
 Interestingly, the perverse incentives engendered via a dominant petroleum sector also 
explain why remittances negatively impact women’s social and economic rights. Countries such 
as Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan have never been never oil-rich, yet they performed more poorly on 
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gender indicators than their North African counterparts. Importantly, these states are the largest 
exporters of labor to the oil-wealthy countries of the Persian Gulf. Both remittances and oil bring 
in foreign exchange to Arab nations raising the real exchange rate bolstering household income 
(Ross 2008). As discussed previously in this chapter, a boost in household income decreases the 
need for women to seek work outside of the hearth.  Moreover, a strong currency penalizes low-
wage, export-oriented manufacturing jobs that tend to employ women further reducing 
opportunities for women to find employment. 
Ultimately, my findings clearly demonstrate that Arab women’s social and economic 
status (and political rights to a limited extent) is associated with the international financial 
capital, while highlighting the disparate effects of development assistance, foreign direct 
investment, and remittances. Furthermore, they re-affirm the importance of development 
assistance in improving conditions for women whether by forcing the hands of policymakers or 
through programs that place cash and opportunity into the hands of women. While other research 
has shown that this is not universally the case, development assistance seems to have a particular 
import for improving women’s social and economic rights in the Middle East and North Africa.  
Finally, the results also corroborate Michael Ross’ (2008) conclusions regarding the potentially 
corrosive effects of the “resource curse” on women’s empowerment in the Arab world in terms 
of foreign direct investment and remittances.  
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CHAPTER 5: BEYOND NUMBERS? EXPLORING THE SUBSTANCE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL 
INCLUSION  
 
 “…talking about feminism is like academia…when you go outside it doesn’t matter.” 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Interview with employee of the Subul Assalam Center 
           Fes, Morocco 2008 
 
The quote above came from a women’s activist I interviewed in Morocco in the summer 
of 2008. She was one of my first interview subjects and I was prone to believe her take on the 
futility of feminist advocacy in the Arab context. Over time, I realized her skepticism was 
misplaced and that the open discussion of women-specific objectives and the activism of local 
feminist networks was key in fostering policy changes that directly benefited Moroccan women 
in the new millennium. Development assistance and foreign aid were particularly instrumental in 
keeping feminist voices alive over the last two decades, and both were inextricably linked to the 
visibility and prominence of Moroccan feminists and their appeals to revise the kingdom’s 
antiquated family code—the Moudawana. 101 This political dynamic is by no means indicative of 
the rest of the Arab world even though many Arab nations both host a substantial number of 
women’s NGOs and receive development assistance. The influence of grassroots mobilization is 
more difficult to evaluate empirically since such interest group activity is not as readily 
quantifiable as the flow of development assistance.  
Previous chapters explored state incentives to politically incorporate Arab women 
through the prism of descriptive representation and socio-political rights, and ultimately revealed 
the growing effect of international capital flows. In this chapter, I use country-case studies of 
three kingdoms representing Arab sub-regions: Bahrain (the Gulf), Jordan (the Middle East), and 
                                                
101 The Moudawana code is a system of laws based in shares’ that regulate women’s roles within the family unit in 
terms of marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, polygamy, etc. In Morocco it is based on Maliki School of 
Islamic jurisprudence.  
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Morocco (North Africa) to consider alternative non-quantifiable mechanisms to explain variation 
in women’s political incorporation. The Arab world tends to be viewed in monolithic terms by 
the Western press and, in many respects, the three cases chosen for this study do not disabuse 
these assumptions as they all represent Muslim-majority monarchies with mid-range ratings in 
terms of women’s political rights and freedoms (see Table 5.1 below). Importantly, the chosen 
countries’ regime-specific and socio-cultural similarities allow for a most-similar systems102 
comparison. While they are superficially similar, the respective monarchies still exhibit varying 
approaches to politically empowering women, which may be partially influenced by the different 
types of foreign capital flowing into each alongside the interaction between elite and grassroots 
actors (see Lijphart 1971, 1975; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Skocpol and Somers 1980 for 
seminal examples of the most-similar systems approach)(see Table 5.3 in the Appendix for a 
breakdown of the types of capital flowing into the three kingdoms).103  
Table 5.1 Freedom House’s Scores for Women’s Rights and Freedoms  
in the Middle East and North Africa 
Bahrain Jordan Morocco  
SCORES 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 
Political Rights and 
Civic Voice 
2.1 2.3 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 
Nondiscrimination 
and Access to Justice 
2.2 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.1 
Autonomy, Security, 
and Freedom of the 
Person 
2.3 2.6 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 
Economic Rights and 
Equal Opportunity 
2.9 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.8 
Social and Cultural 
Rights 
2.8 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.9 
*On a scale of 1-5, with 1 representing the least rights and 5 representing the most rights available.  
                                                                                                  Source: Freedom House (2009, 2010) 
 
                                                
102 Theoretically, the chosen cases are similar on all measured independent variables except for the independent 
variable of interest, which thus generates differing outcomes, as well. 
103 Morocco has a French colonial legacy, while Bahrain and Jordan were both under the British.  
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Political incorporation is a complex concept that is challenging to model quantitatively 
and/or qualitatively. While previous chapters quantitatively alluded to the structural and 
institutional factors that affected the choice to incorporate women, this chapter qualitatively 
considers the interest group dynamics informing these decisions. Scholars have explored this 
complexity in myriad ways when surveying the choice to include “out-groups” into the political 
processes of Europe and North America. These same observations are surprisingly applicable to 
an analysis of the incentives behind women’s political inclusion in the Middle East and North 
Africa. In Christina Wolbrecht and Rodney Hero’s (2005) seminal text on the politics of 
democratic inclusion, Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate combined the elite model with the 
societal-change model to aid in interpreting the incentives behind minority inclusion into the 
political parties of the United States and the United Kingdom. Here, the elite model represented 
rational actors altering the party environment through top-down agency, while the societal-
change model offered an explanation where social movements and citizens groups lobbied for 
inclusion and change via a bottom-up process (Wohbrecht and Hero 2005, 164).104 In fact, 
Kittilson’s research found support for this notion in the patterns of women’s integration into 
European political parties. Within the political party microcosm she observed, “From the 
societal-perspective—in a more permeable party structure—rising support from women and 
women’s groups pressure the party from below to promote women candidates for office. From 
the elite-led perspective—in a more centralized party organization—women in top party 
leadership posts encourage greater numerical representation in national legislatures. These two 
                                                
104 For further reference, see examples of the societal change model in the work of Ronald Inglehart 1997 and 
Christine Wolbrecht 2000. The origins of the elite model lie in the work of Anthony Downs 1957 and William Riker 
1965. Ellen Lust-Okar’s 2003 book entitled “Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and 
Institutions” applies an elite interest-based framework to the problem of political inclusion in the Middle East. 
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models differ in terms of how they represent the sequence of change but are not necessarily rival 
theories” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 165). Combining the elite-led and societal-change models 
to analyze patterns of women’s political inclusion in the Arab world would naturally lead to an 
examination of state-led gender reforms in conjunction with an exploration of the presence and 
activism of diverse women’s networks. Amaney Jamal (2010) further points out the dynamic 
interaction between women’s grassroots mobilization and the commitment of Arab leaders to 
gender reform (alongside international influence) prompted the adoption of progressive family 
code laws in choice Arab countries and, specifically, in the case of the Moudawana reforms in 
Morocco. Per Amaney Jamal’s analysis, I can assume the Kittilson and Tate’s framework can be 
readily applied to other Arab states and should reveal the interests operating behind specific 
gender-related policy outcomes.  
Importantly, Kittilson and Tate (2005) expand their framework beyond top-down vs. 
bottom-up mechanisms to also include political opportunity structures, which can ultimately aid 
and abet policy change. Examples would include shifts in the political environment or group 
strategies among relevant actors. The political opportunity structure model describes the 
institutional environment elite and mass-level actors operate in—in many ways akin to the 
strategic choice approach introduced by David Lake and Robert Powell (1999) or the “issues, 
agents, context” framework of Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon (2007). These structures, while 
lacking agency, act as “intervening variables that make it more likely for groups or leaders to 
take strategic action” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 175). Here, international economic influence 
plays an important role in the Arab world. Foreign capital flows and conditional aid in particular, 
can change the institutional “rules of the game” by either directly providing financial incentives 
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to Arab leaders for improving the status of women or by specifically funding feminist networks 
to promote progressive, secularizing policies. Indirectly, these monies can also encourage 
women to independently engage in politics by financially empowering them through work 
opportunities and skill transfers that would not occur in oftentimes deeply misogynistic societies. 
Thus, foreign aid and investment changes the incentive structures for both in-groups and out-
groups vis-à-vis the question of women’s empowerment. Alongside aid, the politically charged 
international environment since September 11th and Western fears of an Islamist threat have also 
shaped how women are viewed by Arab leaders, as well as how local feminist organizations 
choose to market themselves to local and global elites (i.e. as a “modernizing and secularizing” 
influence). 
I use Kittilson and Tate’s (2005) analytical trifecta of the societal-led model, the elite-led 
model, and political opportunity structure model to compare the outcomes of women’s political 
inclusion across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. I anecdotally examine the nature of women’s 
networks in each country, as well as the commitment of the country’s leadership to gender 
empowerment, and ultimately consider how inflows of foreign capital condition both actors’ 
approach to gender empowerment. How these three factors converge determines how women 
fare politically. The utility of this framework for comparison lies in its ability to illuminate 
characteristics in approaches to enfranchising women across the three countries, while exposing 
interest groups and institutional features unique to each state. Incorporating the perspective of the 
societal change model provides a framework for understanding how Arab elites respond to 
public pressures for change and whether it is the byproduct of shifting demographics, values, or 
the demands of grassroots activists (see Inglehart 1997; Wolbrecht 2000). The elite-led model 
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demonstrates how particular politicians—here Arab monarchs—drive political change in a bid to 
market themselves to domestic electorates and foreign donors and investors (see Downs 1957; 
Riker 1965).  
These two interest groups dominate the Arab political landscape when it comes to 
gender-related policy alongside the Muslim clergy (Mahmood 2005) and tribes (Charrad 2001). 
However, without a consideration for how the international arena penetrates and shapes the 
domestic political environment, there is no ready explanation for the recent changes seen in the 
region—from the political popularity of gender quotas to the highly controversial attempts at 
reforming shari’ah-based personal status codes. The presence of international monies promotes a 
gender agenda that creates the opportunity to activate one of these two interest groups or both in 
occasionally unexpected ways. It provides incentives for Arab politicians to create political 
institutions pandering to the idea of women’s inclusion, but also encourages women and 
women’s NGOs to participate in the political process and compensates for their lack of monetary 
means or public visibility. More importantly, external funds can also change the strategies of 
grassroots organizations allowing them a measure of financial and political autonomy from the 
government, thereby affecting the types of policies they formulate and promote. In Doug 
McAdam’s (1999) analysis of the decline and rise of the black civil rights movements, he views 
political opportunity structures as decreasing “the power disparity between the group seeking 
power and the majority in power” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 175). Foreign capital can 
effectively help in breaching this gulf as will be shown in the Moroccan case. 
 Table 5.2 below illustrates the primary actors affecting incentives to incorporate women 
across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. All three kingdoms have elites ostensibly showing 
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commitment and interest in the issue of gender empowerment, but encouraging very different 
strategies to manage women’s political inclusion. Both Bahrain and Jordan created overbearing 
government-sponsored non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) to completely regulate the 
process of women’s political participation possibly due to a fear of restive portions of their 
populations (Shiite in the case of Bahrain and Palestinians in the case of Jordan). Conversely, 
Morocco has a Ministry of Social Development that facilitates women’s public activities, but has 
no tangible role in controlling them, nor does it actively recruit women for appointments to token 
political positions as Bahrain’s Supreme Council for Women (BSCW) and the Jordanian 
National Commission for Women (JNCW) do. Thus, Morocco’s institutional infrastructure for 
women is more autonomous from the state, if not completely independent from elite interests.  
Table 5.2 Two Models Explaining Women’s Political Inclusion 
 Bahrain  Jordan Morocco 
Grassroots Feminist 
Political Mobilization 
(Societal-led Model) 
No 
*Women active, but not 
focused on women’s 
rights rather on human 
rights (Shiite) 
 
Partial 
*Women active, 
movement feminist in 
nature but not 
independent of the state 
Yes 
*Women active, 
movement independent 
of the state and overtly 
feminist 
 
Leader/State 
Commitment to 
Women 
(Elite-led Model) 
Yes 
*Actively promoting 
women though 
initiatives focusing 
mostly on Sunni women  
*Presence of 
government-sponsored 
women’s umbrella 
organization (SCW) 
Yes 
*Actively promoting 
women as a response to 
foreign pressure and 
some grassroots 
mobilization 
*Presence of 
government-sponsored 
women’s umbrella 
organization (JNCW) 
Yes 
*Actively promoting 
women as a response to 
foreign pressure and 
grassroots mobilization 
*The Ministry of Social 
Development fosters 
women’s activity, but 
does not have 
oversight105 
SCW=Supreme Council for Women (Bahrain) 
JNCW=Jordanian National Commission for Women 
 
The types of affirmative action policies adopted in the three kingdoms also reveal the 
                                                
105 This may be the by-product of current Minister Nouzha Skalli’s feminist past and active collaboration with 
ADFM (she is one of the founders of the organization). 
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level of autonomy women’s issues and their proponents wrested from state elites. Bahrain 
explicitly opted out of implementing any gender quotas under pressure from the GCC, but Jordan 
and Morocco both adopted quotas in the last decade. But the similarities end there with 
Morocco’s legislative quota regulated and enforced by its political parties through mutual 
agreement, while the Jordanian quota was largely forced on the parliament through a royal 
decree.  Finally, while all three countries have the vestiges of a grassroots women’s movement, 
Morocco is the only country where the movement is truly autonomous from the monarch and is 
able to formulate independent policy recommendations, as well as be explicitly feminist in its 
demands. External funds allowed Morocco’s feminist networks to sustain and popularize their 
agenda domestically and abroad, leading to groundbreaking legislation in the case of the 
Moudawana reforms and women-friendly changes to labor law.  
I derive the following analysis from 102 elite interviews conducted across government 
officials, NGO representatives, journalists, and scholars in Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco from 
2008-2009 using the respondent-driven snowball sampling method (see Atkinson and Flint 2001; 
Heckathorn 1997, 2002) (see Table 5.4 in the Appendix for sample interview questions). The 
responses to these interview questions drove the subsequent quantitative exploration of the 
impact of foreign capital on indicators of women’s political empowerment. The previous 
chapters showed foreign capital flows had a statistically significant impact on institutional 
measures of women’s political incorporation. The consistently positive impact of development 
assistance was particularly striking, especially for adopting gender quotas and the improvement 
of women’s rights. Furthermore, foreign direct investment was also associated with higher 
numbers of women in Arab parliaments hinting at its ability to empower through offering a 
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steady stream of revenues to fund burgeoning female politicians. Yet, foreign capital does not 
“cause” women’s political inclusion as much as it facilitates it. This chapter nuances my 
empirical results by going beyond the numbers and illuminating how dominant local interest 
groups directed the process of women’s political incorporation across three country contexts. 
The conclusion reveals the importance of sequence as initial and explicitly feminist grassroots 
mobilization with subsequent state acceptance of the women’s agenda yielded the most 
substantive political outcomes for women as illustrated by the case of Morocco. Importantly, 
external funding was instrumental in sustaining Morocco’s women’s movement in the first 
decades of its existence and allowed it to become the formidable veto-player it is today, 
brokering significant reforms in family code policy, labor law, and beyond. 
Bahrain—State-Sponsored Feminism in the Gulf 
“I think changes in women’s roles are both substantive and cosmetic. You can definitely see a 
big contribution in government. You now see women in senior, higher positions in 
government.”106 
 
The Kingdom of Bahrain represents an intriguing case for examination since it is under-
studied, yet often considered the most “progressive” and “liberal” kingdom in the Persian Gulf 
(Fakhro 2009). Both Bahrain and Kuwait host “directly elected” female representatives and offer 
desegregated education and work environments.107 In 2002 Bahrain was the first Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) member to grant women’s suffrage as well as ratify the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) with reservations. Bahrain is 
also the first GCC member to have a female representative to the United Nations. Much like the 
rest of the GCC, however, the kingdom’s track record in standardizing family code policy, 
                                                
106 Interview with Bahraini academic at the University of Bahrain, June 2009. 
107 Bahrain’s reputation is partially fueled by its serving as a heady stopover for Westerners and Gulfis alike to 
partake of booze and women. The webportal AskMen even ranked it as one of the top ten “Sin Cities” in the 
worldhttp://www.askmen.com/top_10/travel/top-10-sin-cities_8.html 
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curbing domestic violence and women trafficking, and enforcing constitutionally guaranteed 
women’s rights leaves much to be desired. 
Still, over the last ten years Bahraini women have featured heavily in the country’s 
political arena. In the new millennium multiple women were appointed as heads of high-profile 
ministries.108 The Shura Council (Upper House or Majlis Al-Shura) currently hosts 11 women 
appointed in 2006, roughly composing 27 percent of the Senators.109 Bahrain even has a quasi-
Ministry for Women’s Affairs in the government-sponsored Supreme Council for Women 
(SCW) headed by King Hamad Isa Al-Khalifa’s wife, Sheikha Sabika bint Ibrahim Al Khalifa. 
However, the kingdom has yet to see a woman directly elected to the Council of Representatives 
(Lower House or Majlis Al-Nuwab). While the year 2006 witnessed the election of the first 
woman to the Council of Representatives—Latifa al-Gaoud, the circumstances of her election 
were dubious considering she ran unopposed in an island district rumored to be uninhabited and 
set aside by the King specifically for her. 
In 2002 six women candidates ran unsuccessfully in the first elections since the 
Parliament was suspended in 1974.110 In total some 22 female candidates have run in 
parliamentary elections since 2002, most of them independents with only one party, The 
National Democratic Action Society (Al-Wa’ad, Bahrain’s largest secular-left political 
association) fielding a female candidate—the prominent university professor, Munira Fakhro. 
None of the female candidates have been members of the two major Islamist parties (Al-Wefaq 
                                                
108 In 2004, Nada Haffadh became the first female minister of health; in 2005 Fatima al-Baloshi was appointed the 
minister of social affairs; and,  finally, in 2008 Sheikha May bint Mohammed al-Khalifa was appointed to the 
ministry of culture and information. 
109 The Shura Council is appointed by the King while the Council of Representatives is directly. Elected. 
110 Martial law was declared in response to rising unrest between the Sunni and the Shiite and the Parliament, as well 
as all political activity and dissent, was suspended. 
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National Islamic Society which is Shiite and Al-Menbar National Islamic Society which is 
Sunni), which won the plurality of available seats both in 2002 and 2006. In fact, official female 
membership across Bahraini political associations does not exceed 16 percent.111 
Bahraini women have had a long history of political mobilization dating back to the 
1950s and 1960s (Fakhro 1990; Seikaly 1994, 1998). This can partially be ascribed to a British 
colonial legacy in building the momentum for an independent Bahrain, but also due to the British 
introducing schooling for both men and women in the early 1930s (Pandya 2010; Seikaly 1994). 
A Bahraini UNDP official working in their gender empowerment division stated: “The British 
were an active component even though they did not restructure the society as in other places. The 
mushrooming of NGOs occurred initially during British occupation. Women were a symbol of 
resistance and a by-product of pan-Arabism. However, the government had no institutions to 
absorb women, so only the NGO developed with this capacity. The British actively used women 
politics to promote their position.” Bahraini women have enjoyed the Gulf’s longest tradition of 
female schooling to which many ascribe their relatively high labor participation rates and 
political activism (20 percent according to the World Bank in 2007).112 Much of this activism 
stems from the majority indigenous Shiite population and their attempts to obtain more rights 
and political recognition from the dominant minority Sunni population (Gause 1994; Pandya 
2010; Seikaly 1994, 1998). Interestingly, most Shiite women are not actively appealing to 
                                                
111 Mohammad Moussawi and Batoul Assiri, “The situation of women on the political landscape in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain” (in Arabic), a study submitted to the first congress of the Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, January 21-
23, 2003.  
112 Mona Al Moayyed 2002, Freedom House 2009. Approximately, 38 percent of women work with 40 percent of 
the public sector workforce composed of women. 
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enhance women’s rights, often perceiving such agendas as Western impositions. Rather, they are 
mobilizing for greater Shiite political representation and the adoption of broader human rights.113  
Top-Down Empowerment 
In much of the Arab world, women’s political inclusion is a top-down affair and this is 
especially the case in the Persian Gulf—a region that has only recently joined the “women’s 
empowerment” bandwagon. Culturally-speaking, Bahrain shares the same conservative-tribal 
orientation of the rest of the GCC, while occasionally harboring a more lax attitude toward 
certain Islamic proscriptions—for one, the kingdom allows the consumption of alcohol and 
prostitution within its folds (Fakhro 2009; Gause 1994). Much of this conservatism is the result 
of Bahrain’s proximity to Saudi Arabia—the seat of Islam and, currently, the incubator of 
particularly restrictive brand of the Islamic faith, Wahhabism. According to Mounira Fakhro  
(2008), “Saudi Arabia is holding back the whole region. Because it is a country with weight, and 
the largest in terms of population and area, it affects the progress of the other Gulf countries. The 
late King Faisal imposed women’s education by force. He was a reformer and powerful, but now 
the rulers do not want to educate their peoples nor do they want reform.”114 Bahrain’s recent 
progress on women’s issues rests squarely at the feet of the King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa’s 
initial reformist tendencies (Wright 2008). His ascendance to the throne in 1999 broke with his 
father’s modus operendi; specifically King Hamad explicitly attempted to engage both the Shiite 
and Sunni in a national dialogue. This culminated in the drafting of the National Action Charter 
(NAC), which transformed the country into a constitutional monarchy. The national referendum 
                                                
113Interviews conducted in Bahrain in 2009 spanning the four major political associations (Al-Waad-Secular Liberal, 
Al-Wefaq-Shiite Islamist, Al-Menbar-Sunni Islamist, Al-Islah-Sunni Salafist) further impressed this upon me. I 
interviewed more than 30 subjects from political associations (parties), the Shura Council, the Council of 
Representatives, the local and international women’s NGO community, the Supreme Council for Women, and the 
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
114 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/12/women-s-political-participation-in-gulf-conversation-with-
activists-fatin-bundagji-saudi-arabia-rola-dashti-kuwait-munira-fakhro-bahrain/jq5 
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of 2001 and subsequent ratification of the new constitution in 2002 granted women full suffrage, 
as well as the right to stand as political candidates. In fact, the passage of the new constitution 
represented the first opportunity for women to vote on national legislation as well as a second 
opportunity for the Shiite population to reconcile with the Sunni monarchy after the tensions of 
the 1970s. Even with these new guarantees of women’s political equality many of the most 
important laws affecting women’s political capacity still remained under the conservative 
jurisdiction of shari’ah law.115The majority of my interview subjects claimed that the political 
access granted to women, as well as initial appointments of women to the newly re-constituted 
Shura Council, was largely at the behest of King Hamad’s need to be perceived as a reformer. 
Per Mounira Fakhro (2008),“They [women] are placed in leadership positions simply to preserve 
the state’s reputation before the West, not out of a belief in women’s participation.”   
The Supreme Council for Women (SCW) 
Continuing with the top-down strategy for managing women’s political activity, the King 
created the quasi-governmental Supreme Council for Women (SCW) by royal decree in 2001. 
The official management of women’s political activity and participation reverted to this 
institution as well as the Women’s Union umbrella group. Officially, the SCW was created to 
serve as a resource to the government in crafting gender-related policy with the head of SCW 
equivalent to a minister without a portfolio (Fakhro 2009). The organization has actively 
promulgated an array of pro-women legislation from a unified family law code to monitoring the 
unfair application of Shari’ah law to women, and asserting women’s rights to equal 
                                                
115 Islamic law represents the main source of legislation for family law courts, and determines the rights, duties and 
gender roles of Bahraini women. 
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citizenship.116 However, many female citizens of both Sunni and Shiite origin rail against it 
perceiving it as a “Big Brother” entity aimed at controlling rather than fostering women’s 
political participation as well as being a “foreign” imposition. An academic from the University 
of Bahrain proclaimed: “The Supreme Council of Women is a “Western” idea; “part of the 
[regime’s] control! Most women’s unions oppose the council.” A local official from the United 
Nation’s Development Programmer’s (UNDP) gender unit confirmed: “The global influence has 
informed the charter and creation of the SCW. These institutions identify a role for women as 
well as identify individual women…They are instrumental in recent changes.” Importantly, the 
SCW is the primary allocation mechanism for the majority of gender-related aid coming into 
Bahrain and successfully brokered a close relationship with the UNDP receiving 1.5 million 
dollars from the organization. Many argue it has deliberately diminished the role of other 
prominent and independent women’s rights organizations—in particular those of Islamist 
persuasion. In my interviews with other employees from the Bahraini UNDP’s gender unit, one 
of them noted the local women’s NGO community often refused to work with the government or 
the SCW, a strategy in stark contrast from their experience with NGOs in Lebanon and Jordan 
where women’s networks actively collaborated with the government.  
Political Societies/Parties  
Alongside the dominance of the SCW in coordinating government-sanctioned modes of 
women’s political participation, Bahraini women face unique obstacles when campaigning for 
political office. They have fewer opportunities to address mixed-gender groups than men due to 
their inability to campaign in mosques.117 Furthermore, they receive limited support from 
                                                
116 A family code for the Sunni population was recently passed much to the consternation of the Shiite population, 
which opposes any government regulation of the family.  
117 In general, the women of Bahrain enjoy a fairly high level of mobility with married women permitted to apply for 
 	  149 
Bahrain’s political societies (effectively political parties) for oftentimes strategic, as well as 
religious reasons (Bahraini Women’s Union 2007). 118 An official from the UNDP ventured, 
“Women have been successful in convincing boards and societies to field women… Now Al-
Asalah, Al-Wefaq, Al-Wa’ad, all wanted women but are worried about winning the districts… 
The Islamic parties confirmed in a survey by UNDP that they would field women candidates if 
they felt they had a shot at winning the district.” The Bahrain Women’s Union funded an 
independent study confirming this assessment and documented that some political associations 
had shown a willingness to back female candidates in districts they suspected they would not 
win, essentially engaging in “a public relations exercise, rather than being genuinely politically 
motivated” (Bahrain Women’s Union 2007, 77).  
In an illustration of the pragmatism of Bahrain’s political societies, the Islamist Al-Wefaq 
(Shiite) supported the secular and Sunni Al-Wa’ad candidate, Mounira Fakhro, in the fourth 
constituency of the Central Governorate knowing their chances were slim to win in this pro-
government Sunni enclave. They gambled the political society would stand to benefit from this 
alliance if she won—especially since Fakhro’s husband is Shiite (albeit secular). Al-Wefaq itself 
is known for having several high-ranking and politically competent women and 13 percent of its 
membership is female. In addition, it has a highly active women’s branch in the offshoot 
                                                
passports without permission from their husbands and women in general not being required to seek permission from 
their guardians to travel abroad. Younger unmarried have more culturally imposed barriers to their freedom of 
mobility (Freedom House 2009). Freedom of assembly in Bahrain is equally restricted for both men and women.  
118 Political parties are actually illegal in Bahrain after the Kingdom’s experience with Hezbollah and several 
militant pro-Iranian groups. However, political societies are allowed. The distinction is somewhat moot since the 
largest political society/associations effectively function as parties, but just cannot be called political parties. 
Furthermore, additional legislation was passed in 2005 to regulate the nature of associations stipulating they cannot 
be based on class, profession or religion, as well as raises the minimum age to join society ranks from 18 to 21. The 
King also imposed restrictions on foreign funding and mandated that all societies re-register with the Ministry of 
Justice. 
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organization, the Future Society (Al-Mustaqbal).119 Yet, Al-Wefaq has openly stated it is wary of 
supporting female candidates in districts where it already fields male candidates. Since it 
represents the primary opposition within Bahrain these choices are not negligible. In my 
interview with a prominent and long-time female member of Al-Wefaq, she stated she had been 
encouraged multiple times to run for office by both men and women within the association, but 
relinquished the candidacy to her husband even though she technically had a higher rank and 
better connections within the organization. Another prominent female member of the society 
faced a similar conundrum. She unsuccessfully campaigned in the previous two elections and 
was wary of hitting the campaign trail again since she would also likely be running against her 
husband—a problem often faced by “political families” in Bahrain.120These scenarios are 
especially problematic since Al-Wefaq legitimately fears that fielding multiple candidates in the 
same district will split the vote and inadvertently allow for rival candidates to win the district due 
to Bahrain’s first-past-the-post electoral system. In most cases, the male spouses have already 
successfully secured a parliamentary position so fielding a female candidate is deemed an 
unnecessary risk or a duplication of the candidate pool.121The Islamist political association Al-
Menbar (Sunni) supported a female candidate, Fazio Zainel, in the 8th constituency of the Central 
                                                
119 My interviews with members of this movement were highly informative. They exhibited a surprising level of 
organization and media-savvy and can easily be said to be at the forefront of coordinating virtual and physical 
protests featuring Shiite women for greater rights. 
120 Obviously, this is a not uncommon phenomenon in the West, as well. The Clinton and Kennedy dynasties come 
to mind. 
121 An interview subject from the Awal Women’s Society had the following to say about the political parties: “The 
political associations are a bigger problem than the recent constitutional changes. The constitution itself still has 
value. However, the problem with political associations is that none of them have clear strategies. I have lost faith in 
them because of this, especially the democratic ones. They have no strategies and they do not help women. The 
National Democratic Association (Waad) does less to help women than the conservative parties such as Weal. In 
fact, their women’s unit/office is competitive with us. They duplicate our activities, hold conferences and workshops 
on the same themes. All the other parties utilize pre-existing organizations or societies (such as Weal using the Al-
Mutable movement), yet Wad does not utilize what already exists—instead they duplicate it. Honestly, this policy 
has weakened us, has affected our membership.” 
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Governorate, despite already fielding a male candidate with more experience in the district, 
which again many believed was a public relations stunt.122 Menbar’s membership is strikingly 24 
percent female. In my discussions with one of their prominent female members, she readily 
revealed women were largely responsible for candidate drives, as well as the coordinating of 
political campaigns during election season. These statistics are in stark contrast with the secular 
opposition’s contention that Islamist parties have no willpower to integrate women into their 
ranks. “Shiite parties tend to have more women but focus their women on more social rather than 
political activities. In Sunni parties women are not as prevalent. Women are used as a tool to 
enforce votes,” claimed a professor at the University of Bahrain.123  
Arguably, this tentative embrace of women within the political ranks of Bahrain’s 
political associations has not led to meaningful change in terms of legislating for more women-
friendly policies beyond the king’s initial decision to extend of suffrage, possibly because 
women have never been directly elected to any of Bahrain’s legislative bodies. Those who are 
appointed to the Shura Council usually reflect elite interests and draw the reigning dynasty’s 
party line. Still, the fact that political associations feel the need to use women in their public 
relations stunts is a relatively new development. It intimates either the growing importance of 
women as an interest group, or the monarchy’s rising pressure on civil society institutions to 
demonstrate their “progressive” values to foreign interests. 
                                                
122 Al-Menbar is effectively an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain, using the same political strategies 
and rhetoric. In many respects, its politics are similar to the Islamic Action Front in Jordan. 
123 Even within the Shiite community there are diverging attitudes towards the scope of female political 
mobilization. Al-Mustqbal is geared at women reaching decision-making positions and has even been promoted by 
Sheikh Issa Qassem—the spiritual leader behind Al-Weal (Mershed 2010). While the Women’s Committee of Al-
Weal, merely promotes an Islamic education for women and children.123The two organizations even target separate 
demographics with Al-Must bal recruiting predominantly younger, educated, working women focusing on 
developing their competences and political acumen, while Al-Weal’s Women’s Committee targets housewives and 
focuses on their religious activity and awareness-raising.  
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      Women’s Grassroots Mobilization 
With the new King’s constitutional reforms and the creation of SCW there has been a limited 
attempt to create space for women’s political participation, but is there a real interest on the part 
of women to be politically active? A few of the female political candidates I interviewed claimed 
most of the women within their political societies were more interested in the service aspects of 
their respective organizations or the pursuit of charitable activity. This was particularly the case 
in the religious societies such Al-Wefaq, Al-Menbar, and Al-Aslah. The culture of service has 
always been present in Bahrain whether through charitable organizations or NGOs. According to 
a survey conducted by the Bahrain Women’s Union (2007), women’s participation in NGOs 
directly related to their success in local and national elections because female candidates often 
depended on financial and voter support from their group’s members.  
The first women’s society in Bahrain (and in the entire Gulf), the Bahraini Women’s 
Awakening (Jam’iyat Nahdat Fatat al-Bahrayn), was formed in 1955 (Peterson 1989). It 
represented an opportunity for educated women from well-established merchant families to 
engage in volunteer activities assisting poorer families. In the early 1970s, the group began to 
promote women’s suffrage for the existing constitutional and national assemblies. The next 
oldest and probably most active women’s society is the Motherhood and Children’s Welfare 
Center (Jam’iyat Ri’ayat al-Tafala wal-Umuma), founded in 1960 by the female members of the 
ruling Al-Khalifa dynasty. It catered to civil servants and middle-class women interested in 
philanthropy and focused on providing nursery school facilities to the impoverished, but never 
asserting a political role (Peterson 1989. In 1969, the Awal Women’s Society (Jam’iyat Awal al-
Nisa’iya)—probably the most prominent and still the most active of the women’s groups—was 
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geared at young, unmarried women, and openly promoted women’s rights and engaged in 
strident political activism.124 Currently, more than 4000 women work for or are active members 
in local and international NGOs, and most of them participate while holding down full-time jobs, 
as well as tending for extended families.125 126 
As stated previously, most women’s organizations are primary charity-based. However, 
this interest in charitable work and social service seems to be morphing into a more politicized 
activism certainly among the Shiite population, as my conversations with the women of Al-
Wefaq and their sister organization Al-Mustaqbal attested to.  Beyond the government-sanctioned 
NGO community exists the extensive political activity of Shiite women’s organizations and, 
newly, a more politicized activism within the religious mata’im (Pandya 2010).127 Mata’im are 
known as venues for the veneration and eulogizing of Shiite martyrs, familiars of the Prophet, 
and contemporary religious leaders. These institutions serve as rallying points for the Shiite 
community alongside mosques and are increasingly politicized. In particular, with the 
marginalization of the Shiite within the public sphere and strict laws preventing public assembly 
that in their enforcement tend to penalize the Shiite more heavily, the mata’iam have become the 
central source of the political education of men and now women. 128“During the uprising [of the 
                                                
124 Their current chair, Sabeeka Najjar has stood for political office three times and used the society as her primary 
campaigning tool. 
125Women comprise over 60 percent of total membership in the 456 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Social 
Development, yet only 19 organizations concentrate on women’s issues (Freedom House 2009). 
126 The Bahrain Women’s Union coordinate the activities of 12 NGOs specifically dedicated to women’s issues and 
despite its ties to local elites had a difficult time in obtaining licensing (was blocked by the Ministry of Social 
Development) without the direct support of SCW who sees it as a rival organization. In fact, women’s presence and 
benefit from the NGO community is so ubiquitous that they now compose 73 percent of the beneficiaries of 
microcredit in the country (through a joint project between the UNDP and the Bahrain Development Bank). 
127 My interviews with female representatives from Al-Wefaq and Al-Mustaqbal confirmed this.  
128 It is regulated by Law No. 32 of 2006, which requires persons organizing a public meeting to notify the 
Department of Public Security. In recent years, women have freely participated in a number of demonstrations and 
political and social gatherings. However, in a December 2007 demonstration by families of detained political 
activists, both the Special Security Force and the Women’s Police, Bahrain’s all-female police force, were accused 
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1990s] no one could speak about politics, except for in the mata'am. This was the only place we 
could speak the truth,” maintained a female Shiite politician (Pandya 2010, 39). The Bahrain 
Scholar, Sophia Pandya, claims that Shiite women have begun to use religious space in ways 
akin to what was seen in the Shiite Islamic resurgences of Iraq and Iran, reflecting a broader 
trend in the Middle East of women using religious space for political means (Boyle 2004; Clark 
2004; Mahmood 2005). Increasingly, this has manifested itself in very organized protests against 
state attempts to standardize the family code and other platforms during the parliamentary 
elections. Pandya and my interlocutors emphasized the role of the mata’im in the first 
parliamentary elections in Bahrain in 2002 where all candidates used them as places to 
campaign.129 Finally, she makes the case that the evolution of the role of the women’s mata’im is 
directly related to women’s educational development (the majority of the Bahrain’s university 
graduates and students are female) and their participation in the greater Shiite resistance 
movement.130  
International Influence 
Ultimately, there is abundant evidence that the royal family has made overtures to women 
in the past and the present, and, as in most Arab countries of late, has actively promoted 
legislation to aid women’s political participation. Despite the lacking presence of women in 
                                                
of dispersing the crowd in a violent and humiliating manner. 
129 Since Shiite women are granted access to the women’s mata’im within the Shiite community, they potentially 
have an additional religious venue for campaigning that their Sunni counterparts do not similarly enjoy. 
130 May Seikaly (91994) contends that only through their gradual integration into the economy did women’s social 
roles become more salient—especially as they became ever more present in the public sector and expanded their 
activities beyond charity to education programs. More importantly, alongside the fact that many women had been 
educated, they had to work side-by-side with men in what many claim is the “poorest country of the GCC” and 
certainly one with most rapidly diminishing oil reserves. Upward spiraling consumer habits, the high consumer 
prices of a country suffering from Dutch Disease and raised expectations of living standard created incentives for the 
advance of a two-household income—especially within the more impoverished Shiite community (Seikaly 1994). 
This phenomenon largely explains the rise in numbers of women entering the workforce in Bahrain from 6.5 in 1991 
to 38 percent by 2007. These are the women responsible for running and participating in the political societies and 
the charitable organizations of the country. 
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institutions of direct representation, Bahrain also has a very active and politicized grassroots 
women’s community—in particular, among the Shiite population—though this activism has not 
been geared toward attaining explicitly feminist goals, as much as promoting greater respect of 
human rights overall. Furthermore, the fact that the Shiite represent a “dangerous” out-group 
backed by rival Iran in the mind of the Al-Khalifa dynasty stifles the community’s potential for 
re-framing their any of their demands in terms that are acceptable to the dominant Sunni elites. 
Certainly, the 2011 crackdown on peaceful protesters in Pearl Circle and Bahrain’s invitation for 
the Saudi military to enter the kingdom and forcefully put an end to nation-wide protests attests 
to the singularity of this fear.131The question remains, why the state chose to expand women’s 
political participation with the onset of the new millennium—especially considering grassroots 
lobbying for the enhancement of women’s rights was not as robust as lobbying for increased 
Shiite political inclusion. Here, the role of the international community becomes salient.  
Bahrain hosts the United States’ 5th Fleet and is thus immediately within the U.S.’s 
sphere of influence, but also directly connected to broader geo-political events. The kingdom’s 
reliance on oil exports as a primary source of foreign exchange, as well as a means to keep its 
expansive public sector afloat, integrates it even more into the global economic community 
(Gause 1994; Wright 2008). In fact, as seen with the reticence of the Obama administration to 
intervene in the Bahraini government’s crack down on reform-oriented protests in March 2011, 
the West is quite willing to tolerate the GCC’s traditionalism and authoritarian–orientation in the 
interest of maintaining stability in the Gulf. Yet, the U.S. also promotes a broad democratization 
agenda in the kingdom through the Middle East Peace Initiative program, and, previously, 
                                                
131 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12802945 and 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html?pagewanted=all  for more details. 
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through development contractors working at the behest of USAID such as the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI).132 The promotion of women’s political empowerment goes hand in 
hand with this agenda.133 Since the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have 
limited dependence on foreign aid due to extensive oil wealth, linking the image of gender 
empowerment to “stability via democratization” has been the most effective, yet inadvertent way 
to push for gender-related change in Bahrain and the Gulf. Namely, convincing Gulf monarchs 
that financial risk assessments rely on guarantees of stability, which are contingent on political 
progress and economic development, which in turn are correlated to numerical indicators of the 
status of women. According to an academic I interviewed at the University of Bahrain, “I think 
most of the changes [related to women] are galvanized by national reports. They [the 
government] take international ratings very seriously. They [the government] use amendments to 
cover things; they try to make up positions for women; but many ministries that women belong 
to are of secondary importance. The ministry of interior, finance, etc. these will affect 
government decisions.” 134 
Importantly, the spread of international norms furthers the profile of women’s issues—
especially through the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG), as well as the 
Convention of the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). All of my 
interview subjects were well acquainted with and keenly aware of both of these institutions (see 
Hafner-Burton and Pollak 2002). In response to my questions regarding these international 
compacts, a male member of the Al-Menbar political association asserted to me, “The West is 
                                                
132 The Bahraini government kicked the organization out in 2006 accusing it of violating laws pertaining to funding 
political associations. It is illegal for local NGOs or political associations to obtain funding from foreign donors or 
external networks. See http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=209434 
133 Interview with MEPI Coordinator at U.S. Embassy, Manama, June 2009. 
134 Interview with scholar at University of Bahrain, Manama, June 2009. 
 	  157 
pushing this agenda [women’s empowerment], not the Arabs.” Considering his sentiment, it is no 
accident that full suffrage was extended to women in Bahrain after the Millennium Development 
Goals were ratified in 2000. Yet, even King Hamad is willing to go only so far in promoting 
women to high political office and has largely limited women’s incorporation to universal 
suffrage and appointments to the Shura Council.135 For instance, the adoption of a gender quota 
is completely out of the realm of possibility I was assured by members of the SCW. Most future 
attempts at promoting women’s issues will likely continue through the strategy of the SCW 
hand-picking women for appointments to various low profile ministries. 136 Even local women’s 
NGOs did not see much hope in adopting a gender quota—certainly not one run through the 
government. Mounira Fakhro (2008) articulated the popular sentiment well, “It should be 
political parties…who implement quotas, as in France, where women make up 50 percent of the 
candidate slates. The quota by this means is better and fairer… The problem is that the decision 
to implement a quota is a government one, and the government will try to exploit the women 
representatives who owe their positions to it. Unfortunately there are women, for example female 
ministers, who carry out government decisions against women.” The key to women’s political 
inclusion in Bahrain seems to be creating incentives and institutions for the political associations 
themselves to incorporate women into their folds.  As in the case of Jordan, Bahrain’s 
majoritarian electoral system plays a key role in reducing incentives among political parties to 
field female candidates (usually in addition to their preferred male candidates) for fear of 
unnecessarily compromising a district win. The empirical results in chapter two highlight this 
                                                
135 Pressures contingent on financial incentives can only get you so far in countries that can export their way out of 
dependence via oil. 
136 My interlocutors at SCW told me that the GCC had collectively decided to remove gender quotas as a policy 
consideration from the table. 
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issue and consistently demonstrated that the presence of a majoritarian electoral system had a 
significant negative relationship with levels of women’s legislative representation. Finally, an 
additional obstacle for substantive women’s empowerment in Bahrain may be the lack of an 
explicitly feminist women’s movement actively lobbying for the evolution of women’s social 
and political rights that is not split down denominational lines. 
Jordan—State Sponsored Feminism in the Levant 
 “[In Jordan] you have political liberalization without social liberalization”.137  
 
Much as in Bahrain, the formal inclusion of women into the political process was largely 
led by the state and occurred at the behest of King Abdullah of the Hashemite dynasty—Jordan’s 
reigning monarch. That said, Jordan has had an active women’s movement among its Christian 
and Muslim elites dating back to the early 1940s, which has always played a role in informing, if 
not spearheading, an explicitly feminist agenda. As discussed previously, in Bahrain women’s 
grassroots mobilization was largely situated among the Shiite population and focused on 
enhancing human rights overall, while Jordan’s women’s movement promoted female 
empowerment specifically, which perhaps explains the more progressive gender-related policy 
outcomes. Yet, women’s political inclusion is still very much a top-down process in Jordan with 
the King as the primary architect and the quasi-governmental women’s NGO the Jordanian 
National Commission for Women (JNCW) functioning in a consulting capacity, while the 
women’s directorates across select ministries and pro-government women’s organizations serve 
as enforcers of reforms dictated from above. The relationship between the monarchy and 
women’s networks is thus more collaborative than encountered in Bahrain. According to many 
of my interview subjects from these women’s organizations and the foreign development 
                                                
137 Laurie Brand 1998, 173. 
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agencies that fund them, there is a significant amount of jockeying for royal favor and general 
squabbling between the NGOs as to how gender-related policies should be formulated.  
Constitutionally, Jordan has guaranteed male-female equality since 1952 (Article 6(1)). 
In fact, Article 6(2) mandates the government insure this equality across the public and private 
sphere, but does not actively proscribe discrimination based on gender.  However, Jordan’s 
three-tier judiciary system composed of civic courts upholding the constitution, shari’ah courts 
upholding Islamic law, and special or supreme courts adjudicating crimes related to national 
security—has facilitated differential implementation of the constitution across the sexes and even 
gender-based discrimination where disputes fall under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts.138 In 
shari’ah courts women are already at a disadvantage considering Islamic law mandates the 
testimony of two women is equal to that of one man, and female expert witnesses and translators 
are not accepted in the court (Husseini 2010).  
In terms of women’s political rights, educated women were granted suffrage as early as 
1954, but universal female suffrage was not extended until 1974, garnering women the right to 
vote and stand as candidates for the House of Representatives (Lower House or Majlis al-
Nuwab).139 However, this royal decree was not enforced until 1989 when parliamentary elections 
were re-instated after two decades of martial law owing to internal conflicts with the kingdom’s 
Palestinian refugee population.140The re-instatement allowed the first group of women to 
                                                
138http://www.jordaninvestment.com/BusinessandInvestment/InvestorProtectionDisputeSettlement/TheJudiciary/tabi
d/156/language/en-US/Default.aspx  
139 The Senate or Upper House is directly appointed by the King. 
140 Prior to the Six-day War of 1967, the West Bank fell under Jordanian jurisdiction, thus Jordan has always hosted 
a sizable (if not majority) Palestinian population, alongside its primary indigenous inhabitants, the Trans-Jordanians 
(essentially Bedouin tribes). The Trans-Jordanians and Palestinians have had a particularly tense relationship since 
the events of Black September (1970-1971) when King Hussein moved to eradicate Palestinian militancy in Jordan 
in an attempt to restore Hashemite Rule. The period culminated with the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and its sympathizers to South Lebanon. 
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unsuccessfully stand as political candidates. In 1982 women were also granted the right to vote 
and to stand as candidates at the municipal and village councils, yet there were no female 
candidates until 1995 with the establishment of the “Network of Jordanian Women’s 
Committees” to directly encourage and oversee women running for local office.141 With the new 
millennium and in the wake of the second intifada, the government launched a national 
campaign under the slogan “Jordan First” to unite the kingdom across ethnic lines, which also 
extended to forming a series of national committees dedicated to strengthening political 
participation in the country overall. This particular initiative explicitly benefited women and in 
2003, with the heavy encouragement of King Abdullah, quota legislation passed reserving six 
seats for women in the House of Representatives.142 The quota was expanded to 12 seats in 2010 
after a decade of intensive lobbying on the part of the Jordanian National Commission for 
Women and its sister organizations. A 20 percent quota was adopted at the municipal level in 
2007, as well, under ostensible pressure from U.S. donors (Nanes 2010). Per Freedom House’s 
2010 report, an average of three ministerial portfolios had female appointments in each cabinet 
since 2004.143 In conjunction with legal changes further promoting women’s political 
participation, since 2005 the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) has 
actively participated in developing “gender units” within the more prominent ministries in a bid 
to implement “gender mainstreaming” more thoroughly within the political bureaucracy and 
under the direct advisory of USAID’s development contracting agencies (National Democracy 
                                                
141 The local level has traditionally been perceived as more of a man’s domain in Jordan. The Network of Jordanian 
Women’s Committees helped 20 women run for municipal office for the first time in 1995. 
142 Much as in Bahrain, the House of Representatives (Lower House) is directly elected and the Senate (Upper 
House) is appointed. 
143 This statistic if often downplayed due to the appointments largely being for “traditionally” female portfolios such 
as the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Culture. 
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Institute—NDI, International Republican Institute—IRI, and the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems—IFES) and the UNDP.144  
This flurry of state-sponsored institutional change has resulted in some tangible gains for 
women in the political arena. The 2003 elections featuring the gender quota increased women’s 
parliamentary representation from zero to 5.5 percent. The newly expanded quota reserving 12 
seats in the House of Representatives has raised this number to 11 percent. Still, it took 19 years 
for Jordan to see its first female representative in the lower house—Toujan Faisal—who was 
elected via an effective Circassian quota in Amman’s third district in 1993. Only with the new 
millennium have two women been directly elected to the House of Representatives: Falak 
Jama’ani won a seat outright in 2007 and Reem Badran won her seat in 2010.145 Dr. Jama’ani’s 
case is particularly instructive since she was originally elected to the Parliament through the 
quota in 2003, but was so successful in promoting her tribe’s interests through extensive public 
service provision, that she won 3,301 votes in her district, handily beating her nearest male 
competitor’s 1,820 votes (Husseini 2007). Women’s representation at the municipal level has 
also seen a boost with women winning a total of 215 seats across 93 municipalities, 195 of them 
through the quota and with an astonishing 20 through direct competition in the 2007 elections 
(Husseini 2010; Shukri 2007).  In fact, according to Shukri (2007) nine times more women 
nominated themselves for municipal council positions once the 20 percent quota was adopted.146 
 In the policy realm, steps have been taken to address domestic abuse with the opening of 
                                                
144 In an interview the former Director of Parliamentary Affairs revealed that UNDP actually had an advisory office 
within the Parliament to help implement suggested political reforms. 
145 Falak Jama’ani won a seat representing Madaba’s second district and Reem Badran won a seat representing 
Amman’s populous and rich third district. 
146 There were 355 women total who nominated themselves in 2007—a substantial increase from the 20 that 
originally ran in 1995. 
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the first women’s shelter, as well as the passage of the Family Protection Law in 2008, which 
reverts domestic abuse cases to the jurisdiction of civic courts, and legal and medical 
professionals.147There have also been lukewarm attempts to criminalize “honor killings”148, but 
even these new laws offer leniency to perpetrators. Women still face discrimination through 
nationality and citizenship laws barring their ability to pass either to their children or spouses. 
They are also vulnerable to gender-biased family laws (personal status codes) when it comes to 
disputes relating to marriage, divorce, child custody, and property; all of which still fall under the 
jurisdiction of shari’ah courts. Women in the labor force often cope with discriminatory 
practices in the provision of social security benefits and pensions. Finally, where legal equality 
has been guaranteed as in the political and economic arenas, local enforcement of these 
constitutional provisions is still problematic due to entrenched patriarchic norms (Amawi 2000; 
Husseini 2010). Consequently, while we see Jordanian women inhabiting political space, it is not 
readily obvious that they wield any political influence in it. 
Top-Down Empowerment 
Much of the aforementioned gender-related progress has been the product of the King 
and royal family’s personal initiatives to promote women into public positions and partially the 
result of homegrown lobbying on the part of feminist women’s organizations. Considering 
Jordanian women tend to enjoy more official freedoms than many of their Arab counterparts 
elsewhere in terms of mobility, health care, education, political participation, and employment, it 
                                                
147 There cases often fell under Islamic or tribal jurisdiction in the past. 
148 This practice effectively allows the male kin of a woman often arbitrarily accused of disgracing the honor of the 
family through loss of virginity out of wedlock, adultery, or some other social infraction. While laws have been 
passed proscribing this practice, in practice leniency is often offered to the perpetrators of these crimes since they 
fall under the jurisdiction of shari’ah courts. See Rana Husseini’s “Murder in the Name Honor” (2009) by 
OneWorld Press for a more thorough accounting of honor killings in Jordan. 
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is surprising they have not had a more instrumental role in this political renaissance. A 2006 
UNIFEM study criticized the female deputies appointed to the Senate in 2003 for failing to pass 
laws protecting women’s interests. In fact, until recently, female deputies openly avoided 
embracing women’s platforms once in Parliament for fear of alienating male colleagues and 
constituents (Husseini 2011, UNIFEM 2006).149                             
The Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) 
 Much as in Bahrain, Jordan hosts a semi-governmental body serving as an umbrella 
organization for women’s NGO activity—the Jordanian National Commission for Women 
(JNCW) whose patron is King Hussain’s sister, Princess Basma. The Commission is primarily 
responsible for drafting and promoting legislation on women’s issues and was created in 1992. 
The JNCW is also in charge of monitoring Jordanian compliance with the CEDAW treaty, which 
the kingdom signed in 1980 and ratified in 1990 with three reservations regarding women 
passing citizenship and nationality to their children.150 Members of JNCW, as well as its sister 
organizations The Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU), The General Federation of Jordanian 
Women (GFJW), the Business and Professional Women’s Association (BPWA), the Women’s 
Status Committee (WSC) and many others, drew up the first National Strategy for Women 
(NSW) in 1993, conceptualizing it as system of guidelines for the kingdom vis-à-vis women’s 
empowerment and attracting significant attention from the King Hussein. In 1996, the reigning 
cabinet decided the JNCW would officially become the government’s “reference point” for all 
issues related to women. Over time, the organization has also provided a ready pool of women 
for appointments to the Senate, and is responsible for providing training to vetted female 
                                                
149 This was also my impression from interviewing three former female deputies and three female senators in the 
spring of 2009. 
150 In 2007 the CEDAW was given force of law and one of these reservations was repealed. 
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candidates for the House of Representatives and the Municipal Councils. Out of the 13 female 
deputies currently serving in the lower house, six of them are members of the JNCW, while 52 
percent of the municipal councilors have been trained by or are members of this organization. 
While the organization has had a somewhat over-bearing presence relative to smaller 
independent NGOs, the JNCW has been instrumental in promoting the adoption of gender 
quotas, organizing professionalizing workshops for female representatives and candidates, and 
has kept women’s issues in the public eye (Brand 1998). Still, members of the smaller women’s 
NGOs I interviewed often complained of its tendency to dictate agendas across the civil society 
spectrum without fully understanding the needs of women in specific communities. They also 
criticized the petty competition for media attention between the royal figureheads running some 
of its sister organizations. In particular, the women of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political 
arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), believed the JNCW was unfairly speaking in the name of 
Jordanian womanhood, while only representing a small portion of the interests of women in 
Jordanian society.151 
Gender Quotas  
Quite possibly the biggest coup achieved by the JNCW and its sister organizations was 
the adoption of the “open quota” system.152As discussed previously, the adoption of reserved 
seats led to a groundswell of women running for office, though it also engendered much criticism 
                                                
151 This was also a position endorsed by the leftist Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) until it was semi-co-opted into 
the JNCW by its founder’s, Asma Khader’s“defection”. 
152 The open quota gave women the opportunity to run for a parliamentary seat through the quota system or by direct 
competition. Article 3 of the Election law governs the process of selecting quota seat winners: effectively, the 
percentages of votes across each individual candidate are tallied and the candidates who win the seats are those who 
have secured a place among the top six percentages. Article 45 of the Election Law mandates a vacant quota seat be 
filled by a candidate from the same district (al-Attiyat, 2005:42). 
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within Jordan among conservatives and liberals alike.153 However, there is no denying quotas 
have opened up the public political space to women in some very unlikely ways—especially 
considering Jordan’s women-inhibiting majoritarian electoral system. Since the quota results are 
calculated based on the percentage of votes obtained in each district, this biases the winners 
toward smaller districts with lower population densities. Consequently, the most successful 
female candidates have usually come from rural areas or smaller cities such as Tafileh, Mafraq, 
and Kerak, but never the capital until recently with Reem Badran’s direct win of a seat in 
Amman’s rich and populous third district. Islamic Action Front (IAF; Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami) 
candidate Hayat Massimi’s run in the densely inhabited Zarqa suburb of Amman was a notable 
exception and, up until recent deputy Abla Abu Olbeh quota seat for the Hashed Party in 2010, 
was the only successful female candidate to receive extensive backing from a political 
party.154The IAF rallied its considerable network and organization capacity to help her secure a 
seat through the quota system. Many claimed that she would have won the district of Zarqa 
outright but for widespread rumors of ballot tampering.155 
Generally, women tend to win quota seats in smaller districts since they are usually more 
advantageous for female candidates, sparing them the need to travel extensively when 
campaigning and increasing the likelihood that they are known in the community. Interestingly, 
these districts also tend to be the most conservative in the country. Nonetheless, smaller tribes 
have readily taken advantage of this opportunity to secure parliamentary seats and the 
                                                
153Dr. Massimi was only short some 50 votes of the next leading male competitor who was not a member of the IAF, 
which is hugely popular among Zarqa’s restive Palestinian population. See 
http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=30805 
154 The Islamic Action Front is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm. 
155 In my interview with her Massimi stated she had won seven times more votes than the nearest female candidate, 
showcasing the power of party connections to go out drive voters to the polls even in the case of a woman. 
 	  166 
consequent access to political rents by nominating women, while larger tribes hope to benefit 
doubly by directly electing popular male candidates, but also obtaining an extra seat by fielding 
women through the quota.156 In fact, the quota resulted in a few small districts being informally 
set aside for women—i.e. everyone knew that only a woman would win in these districts so all 
the tribes only put women on the ballot and threw themselves whole-heartedly into campaigning 
for them.157 Some small tribes even actively discouraged men from being candidates so as to 
insure their female candidates would not be robbed of votes. Jordanian tribes tend to vacillate 
between facilitating and inhibiting women’s political participation depending on their interests. 
Noted scholar and political activist, Amal Sabbagh, posited an interesting take on the role of 
tribes here, differentiating between a political and a social tribalism conditioning woman’s 
political incorporation.158 The political variant was pragmatic and actively used the women’s 
quota and women’s votes to finally secure seats for small tribes in Parliament; while the social 
variant wanted women to remain in the hearth and did not trust them in the political arena due to 
Islamic scripture and conservative patriarchic sentiments.159 In many respects, the Islamic Action 
Front fuses these two mindsets by using conservative women’s votes and female candidates to 
legislate the extent of women’s personal freedoms (specifically to veto any attempts at 
modifying Jordan’s personal status code). 
Political Parties and the Tribes 
“There are no real politics in Jordan, only tribes.”160 
                                                
156 Interview with tribal expert at the University of Jordan, Amman, March 2009 
157 ibid. 
158 Interview with Amal Sabbagh, Amman, Jordan, December 2008. 
159 Only one hadith relates to women’s political leadership. Mohammad is documented by Sahih al-Bukhari 
(5:59:709) as having said, “Such people as ruled by a lady will never be successful.” This hadith has often been used  
(but also challenged) by Islamic scholars as a justification for barring women from standing for political office. 
160 Interview with tribal expert at  the University of Jordan, Amman, March 2009. 
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Mohammad Masri (2008) argues that Jordanian women’s political agency is ultimately 
the byproduct of three structures: the state conditioning formal political participation through the 
legal environment, the institutional infrastructure for women created via the gender quota (this 
includes the gender units within ministries, as well as women’s organizations created to 
implement policy), and the patriarchic tribal society determining women’s roles in the private vs. 
public sphere. All three structures are very much the hallmark of “managed” political 
incorporation. Surprisingly, political parties are not prominent in Jordanian politics since tribal 
allegiance trumps all other loyalties.161 With two decades of martial law forbidding party activity 
in 1974,162 as well as the adoption of the one-man-one-vote electoral system,163 Jordan’s 
fragmented political party system was effectively and quite deliberately gutted. The resumption 
of political liberalization in 1989 and the passage of a new political party law resulted in 32 
registered political parties. However, women’s membership in them still does not exceed 8 
percent and very few women are present in the higher echelons of the party establishment.164 
Most of these political parties have a low profile and limited success in attaining representation 
within any of the kingdom’s governing institutions. The notable exception is the Islamic Action 
Front, which borrowed its platform and modus operendi from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
                                                
161 Surveys by the Center for Security Studies at the University of Jordan showed Jordanians primarily self- 
identified according to tribe. 
162 This was King Hussein’s response to Black September and the destabilizing activity of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization on Jordanian territory. 
163 “One person, one vote” replaced the law of proportional representation and representation by district. 
164 Article 4 of the Political Parties Law granted all Jordanians the right to form and join political parties from 1992 
onward. An overhaul of the party law in 2007 (Article 5(a)) required individual parties to have a at least 500 
founding members with the membership representing a minimum of five governorates with 10 percent of the overall 
membership in each governorate. These rules effectively reduced the number of registered political parties, but 
simultaneously created incentives for the recruitment of women to hopefully increase party numbers in a bid to 
abide by the law. 
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(Abu Hanieh 2008), and sustained a coherent party platform by rallying around the issue of 
Palestinian independence.165  
Most of Jordan’s political activity is centered on tribal affiliations with the majority of 
political candidates and representatives campaigning as “independents”, and effectively running 
as proxies for the dominant tribes across Jordan’s major electoral districts. Many argue the 
king’s decision to scrap proportional representation re-invigorated Jordanian tribalism and 
encouraged political patronage to the Hashemite dynasty (Brand 1998; Fathi 1994; Richards and 
Waterbury 2007; Shryrock 1997). A substantial number of my interview subjects argued this 
ultimately hurt women’s participation and openly criticized the King for conserving the policy of 
“one-man-one-vote” which promoted tribal identification over a more “neutral” culture of party 
identification. Certainly, the conservative patriarchic values tribes often cultivate are the most 
transparent detriment to women’s substantive political participation. Yet, reverting to a system of 
“independents” has penalized female candidates in other ways. In countries with more 
established political parties, the party will foot a substantial portion of campaign expenses. 
Without the party system in place, Jordanian women’s access to the labor market and familial 
wealth becomes of paramount importance and women’s limited labor force participation directly 
affects their political opportunities.166 In fact, lack of funds was and is probably the most 
commonly cited impediment to women seeking political office, alongside patriarchic values 
(Husseini 2010; Malkawi 2010). Until recently, political parties, civic organizations, and even 
women’s groups endorsing female candidates were uncommon. The first 12 women who ran as 
                                                
165 The Islamic Action Front is the political party incarnation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and has largely 
drawn its ranks from the Palestinian refugee population in the Kingdom—in particular, the city of Zarqa. 
166 Until recently there was no concept of fundraising in Jordan, rather one directly engaged in vote-buying from the 
community. 
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independent candidates in the elections of 1993 campaigned without endorsement from any of 
these civil society groups and, unsurprisingly, had no success (Abu Hanieh 2008). Such political 
dynamics have only gradually begun to change. Since 1997 even Islamist parties such as the IAF 
and the Muslim Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami) have begun nominating female 
candidates. However, the IAF is the only political party within Jordan with the profile and 
platform to consistently and successfully field candidates of any gender. Therefore, the 
government’s recent offer of financial incentives to political parties recruiting women seems a 
rather tepid overture to women in a political system where parties barely exist.167 
It is no accident that the women who attain posts in the Jordanian House of 
Representatives or in the Senate tend to be well connected and independently wealthy—often 
with close ties to the international NGO and business community. Yet even these women face 
significant challenges in obtaining campaign funding. In a candid interview with USAID (2007), 
Senator and a wealthy businesswoman in her own right, Wijdan Talhouni Saket, recalled almost 
being denied a loan because her husband was not with her during the application process: 
“Despite the fact that I inherited significant money, property and shares from my parents – and 
under Islamic law this remains mine – when I applied for a bank loan for my already established 
and successful antique business, the banker still insisted I get my husband to sign as guarantor on 
the loan. Why? Just because he is male. My husband is a government employee and would never 
be able to pay back the loan on his salary. It’s ridiculous. The same would never happen if the 
sexes were reversed. If a wealthy, established businesswoman like me still faces discrimination 
in access to credit, imagine how much harder it is for other women in business” (USAID 2007, 
                                                
167 al-Arab al-Yawm, 2004. [Daoudieh: Parties are national institutions that will be  
supported]. No. 2596, 14 July, p. 23. 
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9). Her words are not negligible in a political environment where all candidates are expected to 
fund their campaigns through extensive and direct vote buying.168 Consequently, women’s lack 
of participation in the labor force and independent access to funds, whether regulated through 
discriminatory Islamic inheritance laws or social norms (“women’s place is in the home”), 
directly affects their political opportunities in an environment where political parties do not 
extensively field or fund political candidates. According to Rana Husseini (2010), Jordanian 
women contributed 8 percent to the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2007, constituted 37 
percent of the workforce in the public sector and 12 percent in the private sector, but constituted 
a low 14.7 percent of the total labor force. This is striking considering the GCC countries’ 
women’s labor force participation is close to 30 percent (see Table 4.2 in chapter four). Most of 
these women are also employed in low-paying  “social professions’ such as education (41 
percent), health and social work (15.1 percent), and the broader service sector (5.7 percent) 
(Husseini 2010). While these statistics represent significant gains in the past decade from the 
single-digit numbers characteristic of the 1990s, they are also suggestive of the simple financial 
restrictions women may face in actively contesting political seats without significant, often 
inherited wealth.  
                                  Women’s Grassroots Mobilization 
As with Bahrain, women’s activism in the public sphere was largely confined to 
charitable and voluntary social activities prior to the independence of Jordan. Importantly, when 
women finally mobilized politically, it tended to be of a more explicitly feminist nature than in 
Bahrain. In fact, one of earliest women’s organizations was founded in 1945— the Jordanian 
                                                
168 Interview with sociology professor at the University of Jordan, Amman, April 2008. 
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Women’s Union—and had (has) the reputation of being secular and leftist.169The original 
women’s society—the Women’s Social Solidarity Society—was founded by Princess Misbah 
and mostly focused on caring for the poor and providing childcare for the needy. While this 
organization soon became defunct, it set the precedent for royal involvement in women’s issues 
that ultimately directly translated into the formation of the JNCW with Princess Basma at the 
helm. 
Probably the organization most instrumental and persistent in publicly promoting 
women’s suffrage from 1954 onward was the Arab Women’s Federation (AWF, Itihad al-
Mar’ah al’Arabiya) channeling both Palestinian and Trans-Jordanian women’s fervor for 
liberalization at the time.170It successfully pushed for the extension of full suffrage for women by 
1974. However, with the Six-Day-War of 1967 attention turned to the Palestinian question 
domestically and the women’s movement was overshadowed (Brand 1998). Furthermore, with 
the violent crackdowns on the Palestinian resistance movement within Jordan from 1970-71, the 
political dynamics in the kingdom changed and King Hussain imposed a martial law for the next 
two decades that effectively curbed most political activity. The only women’s organization that 
survived this period with its platform intact was the Business and Professional Women’s Club 
(BPWC) whose activities were too innocuous to come under the scrutiny of the Ministry of 
Justice or the Ministry of Interior. During the 1980s, as King Hussain relaxed his stance on 
political activity, the General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW) was formed in a bid to 
unite rival women’s activists under one roof. It took until the 1990s for a powerful, government-
sponsored umbrella organization to form under the auspices of a high-profile royal patron—
                                                
169 Jordan gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1946. 
170 The establishment of this organization coincided with the pan-Arab movement and its egalitarian sentiments 
directly influenced the AWF’s mission. 
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Princess Basma’s JNCW. Its formation was largely catalyzed by the reigning establishment’s 
need for Jordan to present a unified face at the U.N.’s Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing 
in 1995. Yet, as Brand (1998) points out, the co-optation of the women’s movement by a royal 
patron had some negative results—namely the development of patron-client relationships 
between the princess and varied women’s activists. In fact, every secular woman’s 
organization—even the staunchly independent Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU)—is now under 
the thumb of the JNCW. In less than a twist of fate, the former chair of the JWU—Asma 
Khader—is now the director of the JNCW. Furthermore, Brand states, “While Basma brings a 
generally enlightened outlook to many issues, her leadership of a national women’s movement in 
the kingdom means that certain topics will not be broached” (1998, 172). Brand claims further 
that many of the women’s activists she spoke with in the wake of Beijing (1995) were reticent to 
offer ideas on how to proceed with the women’s agenda for fear of offending the princess. 
An additional barrier to women’s parliamentary representation translating into tangible 
reforms is the tense relationship between female representatives and women activists, even 
though both groups tend to have cordial relationships with the royal family and its mission 
(Brand 1998; Husseini 2010). Deputies routinely criticized the women’s associations for lack of 
political support and for insulting their qualifications, while the women’s associations see the 
deputies as little more than tokens who neglect to promote the aspirations of women through 
relevant legislation and are preoccupied with securing rents for their constituencies.171 Many 
                                                
171 From my personal experience interviewing three female deputies and two Senators, I gathered procuring these 
rents was a full-time job in and of itself. During one of my interviews, the representative in question had a line of 30 
tribesmen and women outside of her door directly requesting either money or employment for themselves of their 
kin. In most cases, the representative obliged them. 
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believe the quota is being used by the deputies in question not for the advancement of women, 
but for self-advancement or other self-serving interests. 172 
On this note, perhaps it is not surprising that many Jordanian women are turning to 
Islamist women’s groups for guidance. Nearly 21 percent of the membership in professional 
organizations is female and includes a range of professions in its ranks from female engineers 
and physicians to lawyers and journalists—and a majority of these women are members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Ab Hanieh 2008). Islamist women usually run and coordinate women-
centric educational and informative events on issues ranging from breast cancer to family code 
policy within these unions. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood has promoted the creation of 
women’s committees and non-profit associations geared at recruiting women such as the 
Charitable Association of Virtue, as well as the Association for the Preservation of the Holy 
Quran, both established in 1992 and aimed at fostering women’s awareness regarding their rights 
as stipulated by Islamic law.173 More importantly, there has been a degree of revisionism in the 
attitude towards Islamist women’s participation with the split in the ranks of the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the IAF, down “traditionalist” and “progressive” lines. 
The latter has attempted to integrate a framework for the liberation of women into the party 
platform through progressive interpretations of Islamic ideology (Clark 2006, 2004; Abu Hanieh 
2008).  
International Influence 
Jordan’s precarious position in the Middle East, much like Bahrain’s in the Gulf, 
necessitates external aid to insure its continued peaceful existence both economically and 
                                                
172 The trend is for women to initially participate through civic organizations or public sector work and then move 
on to more political activity—though this is somewhat hampered by laws limiting political gatherings.  
 
173 Almost 400 branches of the Association for the Preservation of the Holy Quran exist across Jordan. 
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politically. The kingdom has long strived to satisfy its foreign donors and secure future 
assistance through strategic reforms and it is well documented that external relations influenced 
the way liberalization unfolded (Brand 1998; Carapico 2002; Choucair-Vizoso 2008; Greenwood 
2003; Ryan 2004). During the British colonial period, the U.K. propped up the kingdom, but 
with independence in 1946 Jordan began to rely more on a combination of Arab League and U.S. 
funds. The country is the fourth largest recipient of US foreign aid, garnishing approximately 
$225 million a year for the past decade and a half (Choucair-Vizoso 2008). In 2003 aid money 
alone funded 42 percent of government expenditures (Peters 2008). Nowhere was the 
conditionality associated with aid more evident than with the recent passage of the 20 percent 
gender quota for the Municipal Councils. Stephanie Nanes (2009) research directly tied the 
promotion of this policy to a $24.6 million grant from the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC). Her interviews with USAID officials confirmed the policy was adopted under pressure 
from the U.S. government: “…a governance advisor at USAID acknowledged that Jordan’s 2007 
Municipal Law, which included the provisions for the women’s quota was a “conditioned 
precedent,” i.e. among the reforms required of Jordan to qualify for the MCC Threshold program 
(Nanes 2010, 4). According to Nanes, this arrangement allowed the Jordanian government to 
appear progressive and modern, while avoiding controversial reforms that would more directly 
impact the status of women such as revisions to the personal status, nationality, and divorce laws. 
Laurie Brand’s historical research on previous efforts by the JNCW to appoint women to 
municipal councils lends credence to Nanes’ present-day anecdote. “Some contend that the 
regime had made a decision that women should be so appointed [to municipal council seats], 
since it is good for Jordan’s image with the West and with donor agencies to increase women’s 
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visibility in public life. The fact that these efforts took place during the immediate prelude to 
Beijing should also not be forgotten” (Brand 1998,170). 
Beyond funding, many external agencies have also played an instrumental role in the 
crafting and framing of gender-related policy. Princess Basma, the royal patron of the JNCW, 
directly requested that USAID participate in drafting the first National Strategy for Women in 
1993 (Brand 1998). In fact, the story of the JNCW’s creation illustrates the influence of external 
powers on the promotion of the gender agenda in Jordan. In 1991 a delegation from the United 
Nations Fund For Population suggested the establishment of such an institution to insure women 
would be part and parcel of the development process (Brand 1998). Amideast also partnered with 
the BPWA to sponsor workshops on women’s participation in governance and NGO networking 
during the 1990s—an activity somewhat beyond its mandate of linguistic and technical 
education. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has consulted with the Jordanian 
government on how to increase women’s political participation through various institutional 
mechanisms and runs state-approved workshops to professionalize female parliamentarians, 
while the International Republican Institute (IRI) claims this job for female municipal 
councilors. Of the non-U.S. organizations, the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), and the Friedrich Neumann Stiftung (FNS) have also played 
pivotal roles in conditioning how the kingdom approaches women’s political empowerment 
(Brand 1998).  
Why do foreign interests focus on Jordanians incorporating women into their politics? 
Much of the aid currently disbursed in the region has been earmarked for democracy promotion 
and reforms across civil society, the legislature, and the judicial system in a bid to democratize 
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Arab states without truly reforming authoritarian executives (Carapico 2002; Yacoubian 2004). 
The United Nations Arab Human Development Report of 2005 even suggested superficial 
reforms promoted by external aid interests often gave Arab government’s a carte blanche by 
allowing them to legislate shallow institutional changes such as quotas in the place of crucial 
reforms to personal status laws. The latter would genuinely change women’s status within 
Jordanian society, but also risk antagonizing restive Islamist factions, which the Jordanian 
government is none to keen on aggravating since the 2005 Al-Qaeda-masterminded terrorist 
bombings at the Day’s Inn in Amman.  
Ultimately, Jordan represents the curious case where all the institutional trappings that 
would facilitate women’s political participation are in place. There are gender quotas to insure 
women’s election at most levels of politics, the women’s NGO scene is fairly robust if not very 
diverse or independent from the state, and the overall level of economic development and 
education is high for the region. Yet, it is still questionable whether women would be elected 
without the incentive structure of quotas, and the enforcement of existing legislation 
guaranteeing gender equality is still choppy, partially due to a complex judicial system. The 
grassroots women’s movement has been almost entirely co-opted by Princess Basma’s JNCW, a 
powerful patron who women’s activists are leery of “offending” and thus only introduce tepid 
agendas. Furthermore, the lack of a strong political party system penalizes prospective female 
politicians since many women do not have independent access to campaign funds, while a 
majoritarian electoral system discouraged parties from fielding female candidates until the 
adoption of gender quotas. More than in any of the three cases covered in this chapter, women’s 
lacking labor force participation puts Jordanian women in a particular bind if they wish to wield 
 	  177 
any political influence. Certainly, foreign capital flows have been opportune since they have 
provided many of the candidates with lucrative jobs allowing them to self-fund their candidacies. 
And, of course, conditional development assistance has directly pressured the government into 
passing pro-women legislation, but it has largely lacked substance due to the absence of a strong 
grassroots movement to independently articulate the needs of a broader swathe of Jordan’s 
female citizens.  
Morocco—Grassroots Mobilization inspires state-sponsored feminism 
 
“Feminism is irrelevant because Islam has already granted rights, if people define 
feminism as struggling against repression.”174 
 
Women obtained the right to vote in Morocco in 1956 along with the right to a free 
education as the kingdom declared its independence from the French. However, the personal 
status codes established in 1957 effectively treated all women regardless of their background or 
marital status as dependents of their husbands, fathers, or even brothers—effectively, these 
women were treated as minors (Sadiqi 2009). The late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the 
creation of a significant number of women’s groups with close links or emerging from political 
parties, such as Association Democratique des Femmes Marocaines (ADFM) in 1985 and Union 
de l’Action Feminine (UAF) in 1987 that demanded the end of women’s legal inferiority – 
especially the principle of guardianship, polygamy, and unequal rights to divorce. The latter laws 
were all part of the Moroccan personal status code, commonly referred to as the Moudawana. 
King Hassan II introduced the first legal changes to the code in 1995, abolishing the necessity for 
women to have their guardian’s signature in order to obtain a passport. At the turn of the century, 
a new wave of activity on the part of women’s associations elicited discussion on the Plan of 
                                                
174 Interview conducted with founding member of the Subul Assalam Center, Fes, Morocco June 2008. 
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Action for the Participation of Women in Development (Plan d’Action pour la Participation de 
la Femme au Developpement) and galvanized a second round of gender-related reforms to 
Moroccan labor laws. The end of the repressive rule of King Hassan II in 1999 resulted in a 
groundswell of hope that his son Mohamed VI would be more of a reformer and the initial years 
of his reign partially confirmed these hopes. After two decades of lobbying for reforms in the 
Moudawana, as well as for revised citizenship laws and the adoption of gender quotas, the new 
millennium saw progressive changes in terms of women’s rights and their access to political 
space more broadly. Since 2002, a 10 percent gender quota has been in place raising the number 
of women in the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nawab or Lower House) from two in 1997 
to 34 in 2007.175 Furthermore, in 2009 a 12 percent quota was applied to the local elections, a 
measure which had also been vigorously championed by women’s NGOs, as well as the 
women’s units of Morocco’s primary political parties: Istiqlal, Union Socialiste des Forces 
Populaires (USFP), the leftist Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS), and the relatively new 
Mouvement Populaires (MP). Consequently, more than 3,400 women secured positions in the 
local elections, many of them through direct election. In addition to the adoption of legislative 
and municipal quotas, in 2007 the nationality code was revised to allow women to pass on 
citizenships to their children and in 2008 all reservations to CEDAW were lifted (Jamal 2010; 
Sadiqi 2009). Currently, seven women head ministries in the government across a range of 
portfolios including the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water, and the Environment. Women are 
even reasonably well represented in the judiciary largely due to the changes in the family law. 
From 2006 onward, women composed 19 percent of all judges and 16 percent of those on the 
                                                
175 The political parties in 2002 signed a charter that reserved 30 seats on a special National List, for women. The  
quota itself is not legally mandated, rather the parties themselves enforce it through a mutual charter.   
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Supreme Court (Sadiqi 2010). Most importantly, the Moudawana was revised in 2004 
standardizing legal procedures for divorce and requiring divorce be adjudicated in court, as well 
as limiting the Islamic practice of repudiation (talaq). Women were finally allowed to apply for 
passports on their own, enhancing their personal mobility. They were also permitted to file for 
child custody. Finally, the marriage age was raised to 18 and polygamy was officially 
circumscribed, though not banned outright. Alongside these seminal changes, the passage of the 
revised Moudawana laws also inspired progressive reforms to other laws such as those 
governing equality of employment and sexual harassment in the workplace (which was finally 
criminalized). Yet, the enforcement of the new Moudawana law is a notorious sticking point and 
activists complain the gender agenda has lost much needed steam since these reforms were 
passed, which indelicate pundits argue was the King’s intent all along (Sadiqi 2009). 
In many respects, Morocco has seen the greatest progress in terms of women’s political 
incorporation in the Arab world over the past decade and is deservedly highlighted as a beacon 
for development in the region. Using Schmidt et al.’s (2002) benchmarks for political inclusion, 
we can see that Morocco has been successful in incorporating women on a number of levels. 
Schmidt and company suggest full incorporation entails “(1) full access to participation, (2) 
representation in important decision-making processes and institutions, (3) influence in/power 
over government decisions, (4) adoption of public policies that address group concerns or 
interests, and (5) socioeconomic parity” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005,4). The extension of full 
women’s suffrage, the adoption of gender quotas as affirmative action policy, the direct election 
and appointment of women to political positions across the executive, legislative, and the 
judiciary, and the passage of the revised Moudawana laws all indicate the Moroccan women’s 
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movement has substantial political influence within the kingdom since all of these benchmarks 
have been part of its platforms in the past and present. The only category that has seen more 
limited progress is socioeconomic parity between the genders—a problem endemic to the 
broader world—and surprisingly, one that few women’s organizations in Morocco address. In an 
interview with a prominent member of the women’s NGO, L’Association des Femmes Chefs d' 
Entreprises du Maroc  (AFEM; the Association of Women Chief Executives of Morocco), my 
subject candidly spoke of the feminist networks’ lacking attention to the active discrimination 
against women in the labor force and in the business community more broadly.176 She openly 
criticized how the focus on women’s political rights was distracting from an appeal to improve 
their situation socio-economically, which she claimed would most directly enhance women’s 
standing in Moroccan society and give them a more substantive political voice.  
Women’s Grassroots Mobilization and Top-Down Empowerment 
 Of the three kingdoms discussed in this chapter, Morocco has had the most vibrant and 
pivotal grassroots women’s movement dating back to the struggle for independence in 1946 
(Brand 1998; Sadiqi 2009,). One of the signatories to the Independence Manifesto (Manifest de 
l’Independence), was a female relative of the most prominent independence leader, Allal al-
Fassi—the founder of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. Other Moroccan women contributed to 
the cause by actively smuggling food and arms to rebel leaders during their struggle against 
French colonial rule.  King Mohammad V even encouraged his eldest daughter Lalla Aicha to 
shed the veil in public and serve as a symbol for Moroccan women’s and the broader kingdom’s 
emancipation in 1947. Moroccan political parties were also quick to embrace a role for women in 
the women’s branches of the Istiqlal and Moroccan Communist Party in the 1940s. 
                                                
176 Interview with AFEM member in Rabat, Morocco, November 2009. 
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Consequently, many of the subsequent independent women’s organizations that developed were 
originally founded within these selfsame parties. The ADFM was actually an outgrowth of the 
Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (the Party of Progress and Socialism). While the stridency of 
the women’s movements demands has ebbed and flowed, it has always been feminist in 
character and decidedly more independent since the 1980s—a period of liberalization in the 
former King’s reign. Many of the movement’s offshoots also grew out of the world of the media 
and socialist literature. The UAF was thus formed by a group of leftist women who began to 
write and public the feminist magazine 8 Mars (Brand 1998). In particular, during the 1990s the 
one million signature campaign to revise the Moudawana re-invigorated the gender agenda and 
resulted in the creation of the Association Marocaines des Droits des Femmes (AMDF; the 
Moroccan Association of Women’s Rights) and the Ligue Democratique des Droits de la Femme 
(LDDF; the Democratic League of Women’s Rights) both of which dealt with issues of domestic 
violence and have increasingly turned to lobbying for rural women’s rights.  
 Much as in Egypt, the women’s movement developed independently from the ruling 
establishment and has consistently lobbied for reform of the personal status laws since the 
passage of the first family code in 1957, as well as for enhanced women’s rights overall. In 
Morocco we see the rare outcome of grassroots mobilization ultimately pressuring the state to 
foster progressive change in conjunction with significant reputational pressures from abroad. 
Sater (2007) contends “women militants” are now one of the key alliance groups for the 
monarchy alongside the more traditional alliances with the religious community (‘ulama), the 
rural elites, and urbane leaders of political parties. In fact, if anything the movement is in danger 
of becoming an “in-group” potentially alienated from the diverse set of women it aims to 
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represent.177The discussion of women’s rights suffers no censorship in the media despite being 
controversial among the more religious members of the Moroccan population. Furthermore, 
women’s rights activists are able to hold rallies when the police harass other dissident groups, 
and clearly enjoy a preferential relationship with the state (Sadiqi 2009; Sater 2007). The 
relationship between women’s NGOs and the monarch became particularly friendly with the 
beginning of the new millennium when the state openly used feminists as a bulwark against 
Islamic radicalism. Fatima Sadiqi (2008) claims the Moroccan government co-opted women’s 
issues to combat Islamist radicalization in the wake of the Casablanca terrorist attacks of 2003. 
Subsequent widespread anti-fundamentalist sentiment gave the feminist movement opportunity 
to pressure the kingdom and the government into real reforms of the antiquated family code. The 
Casablanca attack also enabled women’s organizations to frame their goals as part and parcel of 
the all-important transition to democracy, by highlighting their mission to re-orient Morocco 
towards secularism.  
 According to Zakia Salime (2008), both feminist and Islamist women’s networks used 
Casablanca to activate what she terms a “feminist agenda”—the former using the discourse of 
modernity and democracy to push for reforms of the personal status code, while the latter lobbied 
for positions within the state-controlled religious leadership. Both appealed to the “moderating” 
effect of women on popular sentiment—a catchphrase that the state was particularly sensitive to 
in the wake of September 11th and the resulting pressure from the West to curb perceived 
Islamist threats. Soon after, 30 female preachers (morshidate) were appointed to state-run 
mosques in the interest of moderating the “poisonous” tone of Friday sermons.  
 Interestingly, secular feminist NGOs co-opted the language of Islam with many of 
                                                
177 This is especially the case with women from rural areas and of Amazigh (“Berber”) descent. 
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organizations re-calibrating their message and appealing to women’s rights within the framework 
of Shari’ah law in an effort to appease Islamist factions critiquing changes to the personal status 
laws. The two factions have never seen eye-to-eye, as most secular activists see the Islam as 
fundamentally autocratic, fostering the patriarchic mentality that effectively curtails the 
enforcement of women’s rights even when they are constitutionally mandated. However, Islamist 
parties have also shown themselves to be extremely pragmatic when it comes to women’s 
political representation. The Islamist Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD; Justice and 
Development Party) immediately embraced gender quotas, much as the Islamic Action Front did 
in Jordan, in the interest of increasing their parliamentary representation.178 Currently, the PJD is 
the political party with the highest percentage of female parliamentarians. Of the 46 seats the 
party currently holds in the House of Representatives, six are filled by women whose names 
were strategically placed on the top of party lists to enhance their chances of election in 
conservative constituencies. Furthermore, it presented a list only made up of women to the 
municipal elections of 2003. My interviews with gender mainstreaming consultants from two 
prominent international NGOs: the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the German 
Gemeinschaft fur Technische Zwischenarbeit (GTZ) further impressed upon me how promoting 
women within party ranks had become an important strategy for the PJD. Representatives from 
both organizations revealed that when organizing workshops for political campaigning during 
the last municipal elections, the PJD were the only party to send their women to the training. 
According to an official from GTZ’s gender-mainstreaming unit, “In January [2009], Nouzha 
Skalli requested that we assist them with the municipal level elections. Organizations such as 
NDI and IRI were more instrumental in this. They told us when they held campaign workshops, 
                                                
178 The PJD is the Moroccan political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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however, only the PJD candidates showed up. The PJD also had the highest showing for women 
at the municipal level.”179 Yet, beyond the possibly cynical co-optation of women into the PJD, 
there is actually a very open attempt to meld Islam and feminism through the activism of Nadia 
Yassine—the daughter of nationally known opposition leader and avowed anti-monarchist, 
Sheikh Abdesslam Yassine. Sheikh Yassine was the founder of the ultra-conservative and 
currently banned Justice and Charity movement (Al Adl wa al Ihssane). Nadia Yassine 
maintains, “Secular feminists live in a separate world. They ape the imperialist West. The fact is, 
we are Muslims here. How else can women see rights except through Islam?” 180 
 The political successes and mobilization of women across the feminist and Islamist 
paradigms is particularly impressive considering the rampant illiteracy among both rural and 
urban women, much less the divisions between Arab, Amazigh (“Berber”), and African women 
in Morocco. The World Bank reported only 43.2 percent of adult women were literate in 2007 
(Sadiqi 2010). Yet, women have had prominent economic roles in Moroccan society since the 
1960s and the 1970s, with a full 27 percent of the workforce female in 2007.  Still, Morocco has 
some of the highest levels of women’s illiteracy in the region and even in the world, as well as 
rampant discrimination in the workplace. While labor codes and constitutional provisions 
guarantee women’s rights to private property, in practice it is a different story and exacerbated 
by the high illiteracy and lacking formal education of women, in particular.181 Furthermore, 
while well represented in the low-wage textile industry, women have limited access to the kinds 
                                                
179 Interview with gender project coordinator within GTZ, Rabat, Morocco, November 2009. 
180Williams, D. 2008. “2 Activists (and 2 views) of women’s rights in Morocco.” New York Times (June 10th). 
Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/world/africa/10iht-letter.1.13598220.html 
181 In conjunction with this, most women when employed are filtered into particular industries such as the low-
paying textile industry (where they make up 71 percent of the workforce, agriculture (employed 61.4 percent of the 
workforce), or they work as domestic servants. 
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of jobs that would generate enough independent wealth to fund political activity.  The presence 
of a strong party system somewhat alleviates this problem, but politics still remains the province 
of Moroccan elites whether nationalist, socialist, or Islamist. Per representative Milouda Hazib of 
the Parti National-Démocrate (PND; National Democratic Party): “The problem is that an 
electoral campaign costs a lot of money, and women are often financially dependent on men. If it 
comes to the question of who should stand for elections, men come first, and women second” 
(Sater 2007, 729).  
 Even these significant challenges have not been able to completely impede women’s 
agency as the case of the Soulaliyate Women’s Movement has demonstrated (Mandraud 2011). 
The Soulaliyate are a group of largely illiterate, divorced and widowed women lobbying to 
reform inheritance laws that deprive them of a stake in “common lands” in the vicinity of the city 
of Kenitra. For the past three years they have been attempting to gain compensation for the 
unlawful sale of their lands by male members of their tribe. However, most of these women had 
no recourse to contest this sale since they were all without male kin, and were thus forcibly 
evicted from their land to adjoining shantytowns. The Soulaliyate successfully partnered with the 
more prominent ADFM to fight for compensation from their tribesmen and won a decision by 
the Ministry of Interior on October 24th, 2010 to recognize the right of all women to enjoy 
compensation related to collective lands transfers in Morocco on an equal footing with men 
(TelQuel 2011). This legal outcome is almost incredible considering it was originally 
spearheaded by illiterate women who intelligently partnered with a women’s NGO they knew 
was prominent enough to plead their case to a higher authority...from watching television.182  
 
                                                
182 Interview with Soulaliyate caseworker at ADFM, Rabat, Morocco. November 2009. 
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International Influence 
 The role of women’s NGOs has been unprecedented in fostering increased state 
awareness of women’s issues in Morocco. The question arises why the Moroccan government 
and, more importantly, King Mohammed VI, decided to institute so many women-friendly 
policies at the turn of the millennium. The Casablanca attacks of 2003 played an important role 
in galvanizing government action. In fact, the founder of the ADFM, Najia Zariri, openly and 
somewhat bizarrely stated that the feminist movement’s promotion of democracy and modern 
values could curb the spread of radical Islam, preventing a possible American military 
intervention to “stabilize” Morocco (Salime 2007). Over the past three decades, the IGO 
community also created an environment in which empowering women became a tool for the state 
revamp its global image. “Gender was central to the repositioning of the Moroccan state in this 
international context” (Salime 2007, 4).  
Morocco’s relationship has largely remained cordial with its former colonial master—
France, thus the country has continued to receive aid from the European Union, and newly from 
the U.S. During the 1980s Morocco even made a failed bid to join the European Community 
arguing it was a logical extension of the union considering the E.U.’s South Mediterranean 
Policy. However, it was summarily rebuffed when it formally applied in 1987 with the E.U. 
member states affirming the Treaty of Rome stipulated any future members would both have to 
be European and democratic (Brand 1998)—a political outcome that would further inspire King 
Mohammed VI’s reforms. One of my interview subjects openly stated, “the government is 
conforming to US and EU pressure as a means to overcoming terrorism; it’s a way to control 
Islam in Morocco.”183 More importantly, women’s networks used the state’s increasing 
                                                
183 Interview with a representative of the Subul Assalam Center, Fes, Morocco, August 2008. 
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sensitivity to international norms and the global fear mongering of radical Islam as a launching 
point to promote gender reforms.  
The activities of women’s organizations have been directly funded and heavily 
influenced by European and U.S. organizations. Middle East expert Laurie Brand (1998) cites 
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Amideast, and USAID 
as directly impacting and facilitating change through funding women’s conferences, seminars, 
and, in general, lobbying for relevant policy change and insuring women’s access to public 
platforms. According to Brand, prior to the 1990s women’s organizations in Morocco chose 
activities based on personal assessments of the needs of women, yet in a post-1990 world awash 
with development aid, many women’s groups found their agendas shaped by the projects they 
could secure funding for from international donors (1998, 66). Essentially, Moroccan NGOs 
have always been politicized, but external funding gave them and their government more 
incentive to expand women’s political opportunities.  
Perhaps the most striking contrast between Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain is the lack of a 
government-sponsored umbrella organization to monitor and coordinate women’s empowerment 
in Morocco. While the ADFM is the most high-profile women’s NGO in the country and its own 
Nouzha Skalli is currently the Minister of Social Development and Family Affairs, the 
organization has remained independent from the government and Minister Skalli has not made 
any overtures to detract from this position. Both feminist and Islamist networks tend to 
collaborate with the government, but are largely independent of it, and in many respects have a 
tit for tat relationship with the state as demonstrated by the bargaining of the feminists for 
reforms of the family code and the Islamists for the appointment of the morshidate (female 
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preachers) to state-run mosques. Furthermore, women’s NGOs are often aided by the women’s 
units of political parties in their activities further bolstering their credibility and reach within 
Moroccan political society. This may ultimately explain why Morocco is the only country to 
have substantially reformed their personal status laws in a direct concession to two decades of 
feminist lobbying and despite much consternation from Islamist factions. Women’s groups 
operate within and without the government and can thus more readily offer critical assessments 
of regime policy and genuine additions to and improvements on it. Finally, a relatively vibrant 
party system, partially due to a proportional electoral system, offers women more opportunity to 
externally fund political campaigns.  
Conclusion 
 The interaction of grassroots mobilization, elite/state agency, and international economic 
incentives conditioned very different approaches to and results for women’s political 
incorporation across Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. State support for gender empowerment is 
consistent across the three cases, but its implementation varies. In Jordan and Bahrain, the 
government via the monarch created umbrella-organizations (GONGOs) with royal patrons to 
coordinate and oversee women’s political participation and NGO activity, while in Morocco 
these activities were largely coordinated by the NGOs themselves. This autonomy allowed 
Moroccan NGOs to genuinely engage in agenda setting. Women’s grassroots mobilization high-
lighted how social movements vary across the individual countries and hinted at a potentially 
significant factor for substantive incorporation—the presence of an independent and explicitly 
women’s rights-oriented social movement. Furthermore, extensive development assistance in 
both Jordan and Morocco has helped sustain women’s political mobilization when funding from 
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mediating institutions (political parties, etc.) has been unavailable.184In the Moroccan case, it has 
even allowed feminist networks to mobilize independent of the state. While external aid did not 
explicitly generate substantive political outcomes for women, it facilitated and sustained political 
access for those interested in lobbying on women’s behalf. 
 In Bahrain an incipient women’s movement developed around incentives from the 
monarchy, but never managed to co-opt the larger and more activated female Shiite population. 
Conversely, in Jordan King Abdullah revitalized a dormant women’s movement with his bid to 
put “Jordan First” enhancing political participation and re-opening political space to women, but 
the local women’s movement has been largely co-opted by and turned into a pet project for the 
royal family. Finally, Morocco always enjoyed an active and explicitly feminist women’s 
movement, which served as the necessary catalyst for King Mohammad VI to promote women-
friendly policies and the revolutionary reforms of the Moudawana. Notably, terrorist attacks in 
both Morocco (2003) and Jordan (2005) in the post-September 11th, further galvanized the 
monarchs in these two countries to seek out support from feminist groups, in the hope that 
empowering them would have a moderating and secularizing effect on their societies.  
 The results from this case analysis imply that an independent women’s movement in 
conjunction with external funding, as well as even a haphazard commitment from political 
leaders yields the most progressive policy results for women. It is quite likely that without the 
overt commitment of foreign donors to Morocco’s landmark women’s movement, it would not 
have been capable of sustaining itself over time or so effectively popularizing its mission. 
Moroccan women activists represent the primary architects of gender-related policy and a 
tangible veto-player in their kingdom’s political system—effectively a sign of their growing 
                                                
184 See Wolbrecht and Hero (2005, 10) for more exhaustive explanation of mediating institutions. 
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political influence (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005). While Jordan currently has more female 
representatives within its governing institutions than Morocco (see Table 5.3 in the 
Appendix),185they have been less capable of legislating for meaningful gender-related policy 
change, which aptly illustrates the gap between descriptive representation and substantive 
participation. Even with an increased number of female representatives, Jordanian women still 
cannot pass on citizenship or nationality to their children. The judicial system still offers 
leniency to the perpetrators of honor killings and the arbitrary right to divorce through 
repudiation still exists (Husseini 2010). While descriptive representation may offer future 
generations of Jordanian women with female role models (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007), 
passing substantive legislation gives contemporary Moroccan women more tangible political, 
economic, and social opportunities.  
 
                                                
185 At the time of fieldwork, Jordan had fewer representatives and a more restricted quota (only 6 reserved seats). 
 	  191 
  
6. CONCLUSION 
  
 The stirrings of revolutionary protests across the Arab world in 2011 have re-invigorated 
the debate on women’s roles in the politics of the region. Furthermore, women’s current activism 
has engendered polemical debates whether Western democracy promotion and gender 
empowerment efforts have been instrumental in creating the necessary groundswell and skill-sets 
that allowed protesters to coordinate and appeal for change (Carothers 2011; Democracy Digest 
2011). The situation for women still remains precarious, as there are no guarantees that their 
current boldness will be rewarded with greater legal and social recognition in any transition to 
new regimes (Cole and Cole 2011). The experiences of women in the independence movements 
of Morocco and Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s attest to how easily women were relegated to 
second-tier status after being at the forefront of both revolutions. Still, many female activists see 
a new dawn with women taking to the streets in protest alongside men, and even deem it the 
beginning of a social revolution. However, political liberalization without social liberalization is 
a very likely outcome of the current unrest. How did Arab women come to this crossroads yet 
again and will they be able to sustain an active political role whilst rebuilding their societies? 
 This dissertation has no ready to answer to the question posed above, but has aimed to 
convey the complex story behind women’s political incorporation across the Arab world, 
hopefully illuminating the roles Arab women have always played within politics. Over time, 
these roles have become more varied and with the revolutionary sentiment of 2011 even more 
visible. In particular, my research gauged the levels of women’s political inclusion across 
indicators of descriptive representation, women-friendly policy change (i.e. gender quotas and 
revisions to personal status laws), and women’s capacity to enjoy the social, political, and 
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economic rights that afford them a space at the political table. As mentioned in chapter five, 
Western perceptions of democratic inclusion broadly expect it to reflect an out-group’s access to 
participation, institutional representation, influence over government decisions, the promotion of 
related policy, and socioeconomic parity with the in-group (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005). While it 
is impossible to assert that Arab women enjoy all of these benchmarks fully (and questionable 
whether Western women do either), they have made considerable progress as evidenced in the 
quantitative and qualitative research presented here.  
Summary of Findings 
 The empirical chapters demonstrated that external financial flows have had a growing 
impact on women’s status across the region—especially with the onset of the new millennium. 
This is partially a byproduct of the renewed strategic importance of the Arab world since the 
September 11th Al-Qaeda attacks, which re-invigorated efforts to moderate the region through 
democracy promotion by both Western governments and Intergovernmental organizations. 
Women’s empowerment became a focal component of these efforts once gender was identified 
as the most meaningful “gap” between Islam and the West (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 
2003a, 2003b). Official development assistance was shown to have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of adopting gender quotas and on women’s economic and social rights. Surprisingly, 
it had limited effect on women’s legislative representation and political rights. Here, foreign 
direct investment displayed an astonishing impact and was consistently positively related to 
increases in women’s legislative representation. My explanation for this intriguing relationship is 
that many of the female deputies I spoke with had at some point been employed in foreign firms 
or had close relationships with foreign business interests—which, in turn, directly increased their 
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access to funds for political campaigns and enabled them to bribe their constituencies more 
effectively. As was illustrated in the case of Jordan, especially in systems where political parties 
are weak women’s independent access to funds becomes of paramount importance for funding 
political campaigns and negotiating daily political activities such as public service provision.186 
While it is surprising that development assistance did not have a greater impact, it is perhaps 
expected that it may all come down to Arab women’s direct access to money if they wish to be 
involved in politics at the institutional level.187  
 In the case of gender quota adoption, development assistance showed the most robust and 
consistently positive relationship with the likelihood of adopting this electoral policy, overall, 
and specifically in the case of adopting reserved seats. Reserved seats demand the most radical 
institutional overhaul of existing chambers of power since they require the earmarking of a 
specific number of seats for women within governing bodies. This particular quota seems to be 
the most widespread among impoverished authoritarian regimes with a dependence on foreign 
aid (Krook 2006). Both chapters three and five outlined the pressures Arab countries faced to 
implement these policies and their relative unpopularity among conservative Muslim 
constituencies. Interestingly, remittances—a variable initially included in the analysis as a 
control for the impact of rival sources of foreign exchange had a positive impact on the 
likelihood of quota adoption. I will touch upon this further in the section dealing with future 
avenues for research.  
 Finally, the last empirical chapter (four) considered the capacity of women to access the 
                                                
186 Connections to both the private and public sector can be invaluable for insuring the employment prospects of a 
given district, as my shadowing of deputy Falak Ja’amani impressed upon me.  
187 This is especially surprising considering many IGOs and foreign development agencies directly fund workshops 
and programs to train female candidates. 
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political arena through an accounting of their political, economic, and social rights. The results 
paint a complex picture where development assistance positively impacts both social and 
economic rights, while remittances negatively affect both. Neither of these indicators displayed 
an effect on political rights, which raises the question why foreign capital would still have an 
effect on the adoption of gender quotas. An explanation for this lies in the sensitivity of 
Cingranelli and Richards’ measure for political rights to the timing of universal suffrage. Women 
were extended the right to vote in almost all Arab countries (with the exception of the GCC 
states) earlier than the 1990s (see Table 4.8 in the Appendix), yet the period under investigation 
in this dissertation is from 1990 until 2009. Thus, aid would not have had an impact on the 
extension of universal suffrage—especially since the only countries to grant women the right to 
vote in the new millennium were the oil-wealthy states of the GCC. Quota adoption has been 
much more recent and followed the increase in capital flows of the 1990s. Therefore, we easily 
observe a pattern where financial instruments would and do have an impact on this particular 
electoral policy. Remittances negatively affected women’s economic and social rights by 
bolstering household income, which effectively abolishes the need for women to work outside of 
the home and thereby lobby for improved economic rights (Ross 2008). Finally, foreign direct 
investment was positively associated with women’s economic rights, countering claims that this 
type of capital necessarily renders women more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of globalization. In 
the Arab world it seems to offer opportunity as Tunisia’s textile-industry poignantly illustrates, 
and more of a bargaining chip vis-à-vis government (Ross 2008; White 2001).  
 It is important to note that these findings have limited meaning without situating them 
into the context of the actual experience of Arab countries. Furthermore, due to the paucity of 
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data available for the region (whether because countries do not release or do not collect data), 
there are many important concepts influencing levels of women’s political incorporation that are 
not readily quantifiable and were thus not included in the empirical analysis. The inability to 
capture the interests of relevant actors instrumental in lobbying or legislating for gender 
empowerment renders quantitative analysis an unsatisfying venture when considering the 
incentives and actors behind the decision to politically incorporate women. Chapter five dealt 
with these setbacks through a qualitative analysis of the interaction between grassroots women’s 
movements and the agency of relevant political leaders as structured by international economic 
incentives. My observations in this chapter were based on over 100 in–country elite interviews 
and extensive case research on Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. The findings are suggestive, 
demonstrating that substantive incorporation was largely the by-product of autonomous and 
explicitly feminist grassroots mobilization partnered with subsequent government support as in 
the case of Morocco. Importantly, external funding served a crucial role in sustaining these 
movements through multiple decades of lobbying on the part of women activists and helped 
popularize their mission through direct cash inputs and, in some cases, pressuring the state. 
These conclusions are not surprising considering extensive evidence that robust women’s 
movements have often been connected to the promotion of women’s rights within Western 
governments as well as those in other parts of the world (Htun and Weldon 2007; Katzenstein 
1989; Stetson and Mazur 1995; Weldon 2006). However, they do suggest a closer assessment of 
how these movements operate internally would be instructive. For example, I am sure the women 
of the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) would all claim they are staunch 
feminists promoting an explicitly women-oriented agenda. That said, their intimate connection to 
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the government and the royal family prevents them from advancing independent agendas and 
explicitly critiquing the kingdom’s gender-related policies. 
 There are several important policy implications from these findings. Development 
assistance obviously has an impact on incentives to politically incorporate women in the Arab 
world across myriad indicators, but has to be more selective of whom it is funding. A 
government-based umbrella organization such as the JNCW (Jordan) stifling women’s 
autonomous political participation and out of touch with local women may not be the best aid 
investment, whereas an ADFM (Morocco), which facilitated diverse participation and 
successfully lobbied for voiceless women in the Soulaliyate case shows potential. 
 Furthermore, the empirical data suggests a re-evaluation of the monolithic ways in which 
paradigms such as Women in Development (WID) and Gender and Development (GAD) 
perspectives view the effects of foreign capital. As it was shown, the effects of development 
assistance, foreign direct investment, and in some cases remittances were incredibly divergent, 
and this divergence may even more drastic in other regions of the world. Again, it is important to 
emphasize that the Middle East is a unique case and the patterns unveiled in this analysis may 
not hold elsewhere because of regional specificities. 
Limitations 
 The most direct limitation of this research has been the difficulty to obtain accurate and 
thorough quantitative and qualitative data on the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, the 
more social variables are not always readily available since the culture of documenting such 
information is a relatively new practice, which coincided with the entrance of intergovernmental 
organizations and development agencies into the region during the past decade and a half. I made 
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a concerted effort to visit the national statistics offices of Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, as well 
as the regional offices of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in both 
Rabat, Morocco and Amman, Jordan in the hope of obtaining original data. However, most of 
the data I used was already available online through the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund.  
 The absence of “religion” as an important constraint for women is a notable problem with 
the empirical models introduced in previous chapters. There are, as of yet, only limited 
quantitative indicators encapsulating Muslim religiosity and most gender-related studies have 
treated the peculiarities of the Muslim faith by incorporating a binary variable indicating whether 
a country was majority-Muslim or not (Fish 2002; Hughes and Kunovich 2007; Inglehart and 
Norris 2003; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; Ross 2008). In 
this analysis, all of the countries are majority Muslim so a binary variable was not an option. 
However, the analysis here is more interested in exploring the structural variation in women’s 
political incorporation across a region that is majority Muslim, than considering the religion 
itself specifically. 188As we can see throughout this dissertation, even across a subset of 22 Arab 
League countries there is significant divergence in the levels of women’s political incorporation, 
contrary to the expectations of scholars who view the faith as having a unitary impact on 
women’s and more broadly human rights. The research presented here does not directly account 
for the salient differences in how Islam is practiced across Sunni vs. Shiite populations in the 
quantitative section, though it does cursorily touch on it in the evaluation of women’s status in 
Bahrain. 
                                                
188 I do attempt to capture some of this “religiosity” by controlling for Saudi Arabia’s sphere of religious influence 
through a “Gulf dummy”. 
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 Weldon and Htun (2007) make a compelling case that the significance of religion 
depends on the gender issues in question—i.e. religious organizations may not be opposed to 
women participating in politics, but have more strident views on doctrinal topics such as abortion 
(Htun 2003; Weldon 2007). This has been the case in much of the Arab world where progressive 
Islamists have not directly opposed and, in some cases, even embraced gender quotas and the 
extension of universal suffrage. However, amending personal status laws is a completely 
different matter and strikes at the heart of Muslim doctrine regarding the appropriate roles and 
responsibilities of the sexes. Considering the empirical analysis in this chapter has largely used 
non-controversial indicators of women’s political inclusion such as legislative representation and 
the adoption of gender quotas, this could be construed as a moot point. On the other hand, 
women’s “social rights” are more directly related to controversial personal status codes and do 
require a thorough accounting of the effects of religiosity. 
 Ultimately, the results described in this research are specific to the Middle East and North 
Africa and therefore may not hold across other regional contexts since they are exploring a 
predominantly Muslim and largely conservative culture where tribal dynamics still play a 
significant role (Charrad 2001; Gause 1994; Shryrock 1997). Cultural specificities likely make 
specific gender-related policies more or less controversial than they would be in other regions of 
the world. Furthermore, since September 11th and even dating as far back as the oil crisis of 
1973, the West believes it has an important stake in the political and economic development of 
the region. This belief renders the international community acutely aware of unfolding politics in 
the Arab world and more willing to intervene in them. It is no accident that out of the three 
conflict situations the United States is currently involved in two are located in Arab countries; 
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namely, Iraq and Libya.  The region also attracts the most sizable chunks of U.S. foreign aid as 
multi-billion dollar inputs into Egypt, Israel, and Jordan confirm. Thus, there may be more 
interest in insuring foreign aid is allocated “appropriately” in Arab settings, than in less 
strategically important regions. All of these peculiarities render the Middle East and North Africa 
a unique environment whose experiences with foreign capital and women’s political inclusion 
may not readily translate to other regions.  
 What is generalizable from this research is that macro-level analysis veils significant 
differences between and across regions in terms of the effects of foreign capital and, more 
precisely, the effectiveness and relative fungibility of foreign aid. In the context of women’s 
political incorporation in the Arab world, it has shown itself a potent force, yet this may not be 
the same for other development-related projects in the region or even for gender-related 
programs in the rest of the world! I hope these findings encourage policymakers to view the 
disbursement of aid as well as the encouragement of investment abroad in instrumental terms—
recognizing both the potential and the pitfalls each can engender in specific environments. 
Future Research 
 In an expansion of this research agenda, I hope to elaborate further on the intriguing and 
unexpected effect of remittances on domestic policy (quota adoption) and human rights 
(women’s economic and social rights). In this dissertation, we see that remittances can impact 
policies other than those related to the monetary and fiscal realm (Singer 2010), which raises the 
question whether these monies are flowing into the region to fund political activity alongside 
bolstering household incomes (Kapur 2003). In my conversation with an Amazigh (“Berber”) 
women’s activist in Morocco, she explicitly stated that the Amazigh diaspora in France and Spain 
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financed local dissident activity in Morocco—wiring funds through Western Union.189She 
highlighted their success in pushing for the kingdom to initiate school instruction and television 
programming in the Berber language, Tamazight as well as officially recognizing more Amazigh 
names given unto newborns. Up until recently all Moroccan children’s names had to be arabized 
(Human Rights Watch 2010). Considering the revolutionary protests currently rocking the Arab 
world, an accounting of the role of remittances in sparking, funding, and sustaining these types 
of collective action is important. However, remittances may also play a salient role in funding 
dissident organizations petitioning for changes in social policy through institutionally approved 
channels much as the Amazigh rights movement did in Morocco. Where remittances are sent 
from may also be important since alongside monies, values may also be exported. For example, 
North Africa receives the majority of its remittance money from expats in the E.U. while the 
Levant  (Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Syria) receives remittances from the GCC. Perhaps 
there are important differences regarding which political agendas such wired monies foster and 
how they impact domestic policy change.190 
     Final Conclusion 
 This dissertation represented an important personal and academic journey into exploring 
the political influence and roles of Arab women. It has also been an uncharacteristically timely 
one considering recent events. Arab women have shown themselves to be amazingly resilient in 
the face of tremendous odds inspiring and sustaining revolutionary fervor across Egypt, Tunisia, 
Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and, newly, Morocco. They have been “protesting, organizing, blogging, 
                                                
189 Interview with women’s activist, Marrakesh, Morocco, December 2009. 
190 In addition, North Africa tends to send more female labor to the EU than the Levant does to the GCC. This could 
also likely impacts how money is sent and spent in the home country.  
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and hunger-striking” according to a Guardian article on the Arab Spring.191 Many fear that even 
if this activism results in regime-change, women’s status will not change substantially. Still, it is 
now clear that Arab women have more political tools at their disposal than their Algerian and 
Moroccan counterparts did in the 1950s, between experienced grassroots networks and generous 
external funding—here’s hoping they will not be afraid to wield them in the future. In the words 
of Alia al-Faqih, a 19-year-old Saudi woman, “The protesters in Egypt and Tunisia did 
something that was almost impossible... If they could bring down two tough presidents, why 
can’t we demand our rights?”192 According to the findings in this dissertation, the key to 
sustaining this momentum is for Arab women to band together and continue to independently 
promote explicitly women-oriented goals through the prism of secular feminism or even 
progressive Islam, and for international aid agencies to continue offering them financial support. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
191 Rice, X., K. Marsh, T. Finn, H. Sherwood,  A. Chrisafis, and R. Booth. 2011. “Women have emerged as key 
players in the Arab Spring.” The Guardian, April. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/women-arab-spring 
192 Benson, K. 2011. “Women in the Arab Uprisings.” International Labor Research and Information Group, April. 
Available at http://www.ilrig.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27:women-in-the-arab-
uprisings&catid=3:building-womans-activism&Itemid=5 
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APPENDIX A (CHAPTER 2) 
 
Table 2.4 Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Population-Averaged Model of 
Women’s Legislative Representation 
              Independent           Exchangeable        Auto-regressive 
Official Development 
Assistance (log) -0.05 -0.14* -0.07 0.12* 0.12 0.12 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.04) 0.07 0.09 0.06 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (log) (0.05)*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Remittances (log) - 0.11** 0.04 - 0.29*** 0.29*** - -0.00 -0.00 
 - (0.05) (0.07) - (0.09) (0.09) - (0.08) (0.09) 
Democracy Score -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.04* 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Level of Economic 
Development (log) -0.59*** -0.37** -0.47*** 1.61*** 1.60*** 1.63*** 0.44 0.24 0.23 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.33) (0.40) (0.40) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) 
Fertility Rate -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.14** -0.21** -0.22** -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Electoral System 
(Majoritarian) -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.22 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.30) (0.40) (0.40) (0.26) (0.34) (0.34) 
Gulf Dummy -0.96*** -0.82 -0.90 -4.49*** -2.95** -3.12** -2.59*** -2.07** -2.08** 
 (0.28) (0.44) (0.45) (1.10) (1.46) (1.52) (0.90) (0.99) (1.01) 
Women’s Labor 
Participation - - -0.01 - - -0.01 - - -0.00 
 - - (0.01) - - (0.03) - - (0.02) 
          
Observations 269 218 218 269 218 218 224 202 202 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5 GEE Population-Averaged Model with Reduced Observations of Women’s 
Legislative Representation (controlling for the election cycle) 
 Independent Exchangeable 
Official Development Assistance (log) -0.14 -0.07 
 (0.13) (0.14) 
Foreign Direct Investment (log) 0.12*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
Electoral System (Majoritarian) -0.45 -0.69* 
 (0.33) (0.44) 
Democracy Score -0.14*** -0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Level of Economic Development (log) -0.91** -0.54 
 (0.44) (0.50) 
Fertility Rate -0.58*** -0.44** 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
Gulf Dummy -1.65* -2.20** 
 (0.92) (1.04) 
   
Observations 46 46 
Insufficient observations with auto-regressive correlation structure. No convergence with unstructured 
correlation structure. ODA and FDI are coded as a percent of GDP.  Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6 Prais-Winston Time Series Regression with Panel-corrected Standard 
Errors of Women’s Legislative Representation 
 
Base 
Model 
Exp. 
 Model 1 
Exp.  
Model 2 
Exp. 
Model 3 
Exp. 
Model 4 
Exp.  
Model 5 
Only 
During  
Election 
Cycle 
Official Development 
Assistance (log) -0.05 -0.14* -0.07 -0.07** -0.06 -0.04 -0.14 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (log) 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Remittances (log) - 0.11* 0.04 - - - - 
 - 0.06 0.08 - - - - 
Democracy Score -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Level of Economic 
Development (log) -0.59*** -0.37** -0.47*** -0.41*** -0.67*** -0.37*** -0.91** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.41) 
Fertility Rate -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.27*** -0.58*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) 
Gulf Dummy -0.96*** -0.82* -0.90* -0.89*** -0.66* -0.43 -1.65* 
 (0.29) (0.48) (0.48) (0.24) (0.33) (0.38) (0.89) 
Electoral System 
(Majoritarian) -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 0.36*** -0.12 -0.09 -0.45 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) (0.31) 
Women’s Labor 
Participation - - -0.01* - - - - 
 - - (0.01) - - - - 
Presence of Gender 
Quota - - - 1.21*** - - - 
 - - - (0.16) - - - 
Women’s Economic 
Rights (CIRI) - - - - 0.37** - - 
 - - - - (0.15) - - 
Women’s Political 
Rights (CIRI) - - - - - 0.77*** - 
 - - - - - (0.11) - 
R-squared 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.51 0.46 0.53 0.62 
Observations 269 218 218 269 250 249 46 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5 Multi-Nomial Logistic Regression of Quota Adoption 
                                                                            
                                                                    Base Model                                           Expanded Model 
 
Political 
Party 
Quotas 
Legal 
Candidate 
Quotas 
Reserved 
Seats 
Political 
Party 
Quotas  
Legal 
Candidate 
Quotas 
Reserved 
Seats 
Official Development 
Assistance (log) -3.62*** 18.91*** 1.20*** -3.53*** 9.29*** 4.44** 
 (0.99) (0.79) (0.32) (0.53) (1.29) (1.97) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(log) 0.71 -5.86*** -0.00 -0.17 -3.49*** -0.11 
 (0.58) (0.18) (0.04) (0.42) (0.20) (0.13) 
Electoral System 
(Majoritarian) -75.39*** 10.34*** -4.41*** -59.88*** 5.27** -6.42*** 
 (2.58) (1.75) (0.98) (3.58) (2.21) (2.10) 
Democracy Score -4.08*** 0.08 -0.04 3.42*** -0.46*** 0.15 
 (0.84) (0.21) (0.12) (0.66) (0.15) (0.15) 
Level of Economic 
Development (log) -68.09*** 11.96*** -1.62*** -50.93*** -7.31*** -0.08 
 (3.37) (0.81) (0.43) (2.37) (1.54) (1.43) 
Fertility Rate -68.22*** 15.94*** 0.72*** -49.26*** 12.41*** 1.65* 
 (2.44) (0.61) (0.23) (2.48) (1.04) (0.97) 
Women’s Legislative 
Representation - - - 2.30*** 1.61*** 0.69* 
 - - - (0.39) (0.49) (0.39) 
Women’s Secondary 
Education - - - 0.11*** 0.59*** -0.15* 
 - - - (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) 
Women’s Labor 
Participation - - - -3.24*** 1.49*** -0.37** 
 - - - (0.30) (0.13) (0.15) 
 Pseudo R2 0.71 0.83 
Observations 269 132 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 Testing the Proportional Hazards Assumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Rho              chi2                 df                  Prob>chhi2 
Official Development Assistance (log) 0.11 0.50 1 0.47 
Foreign Direct Investment (log) 0.15 0.86 1 0.35 
Electoral System (Majoritarian) 0.23 1.30 1 0.25 
Democracy Score -0.05 0.05 1 0.83 
Level of Economic Development (log) 0.02 0.02 1 0.88 
Fertility Rate -0.03 0.03 1 0.86 
Women’s Legislative Representation 0.13 0.43 1 0.51 
Women’s Secondary Education 0.13 0.92 1 0.33 
Women’s Labor Participation 0.20 1.15 1 0.28 
Global Test  11.69 9 0.23 
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Figure 3.1 Official Development Assistance per Capita for Morocco vs. Lebanon 
 in U.S. Dollars.193	  
 
 
 
                                                
193 It is important to note that Morocco has a GDP per capita of $5000 adjusting for PPP, while Lebanon’s is 
$10,746 according the International Monetary Fund’s 2011 data. Essentially, while Morocco’s per capita aid 
disbursement may seem smaller, especially as it is being “eaten up” by a precipitously growing population (Lebanon 
has had declining birth rates), $50 goes a lot further in Morocco than in Lebanon. 
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Table 4.8 Year Universal Suffrage Granted  
in Arab League Member States 
 
Arab League 
Member State 
 
Year Suffrage Granted 
Algeria 1962 
Bahrain  2002 
Comoros 1956 
Djibouti 1946 
Egypt 1956 
Iraq 1948 
Jordan 1974 
Kuwait 2005 
Lebanon 1952 
Libya 1964 
Mauritania 1956 
Morocco 1963 
Oman 2003 
Palestinian 
Authority 
1946 
(Under British Mandate) 
Qatar 2005 
Saudi Arabia Not Applicable 
Somalia 1956 
Sudan 1964 
Syria 1949 
Tunisia 1959 
United Arab 
Emirates 
2006 
(Limited) 
Yemen 1967 (South Yemen) 
1970 (North Yemen) 
     Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Suffrage Database at 
      http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm 
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Table 4.9 Ordinal Logistic Regression of Women’s Rights 
                                                        
 Political Rights Economic Rights Social Rights 
Official Development 
Assistance (log) 0.26 0.25 0.62*** 0.55*** 1.33*** 1.45*** 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.39) (0.41) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(log) -0.38 -0.61* 0.78*** 0.78*** -0.35 -0.43 
 (0.34) (0.37) (0.30) (0.28) (0.49) (0.52) 
Remittances (log) -0.18 -0.24 -0.65*** -0.69*** -0.57*** -0.55*** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) 
Democracy Score 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.11 -0.08 -0.03 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) 
Level of Economic 
Development (log) -1.22* -0.91 1.66** 1.69** -3.94*** -4.32*** 
 (0.68) (0.64) (0.67) (0.69) (1.43) (1.54) 
Fertility Rate -0.99** -0.80** -0.50 -0.31 -3.36*** -3.59*** 
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.33) (0.34) (0.79) (0.87) 
Electoral System 
(Majoritarian) -0.33 0.34 - - - - 
 (0.44) (0.52) - - - - 
Women’s Legislative 
Representation (lagged) - 0.28*** - 0.13** - 0.10* 
 - (0.06) - (0.05) - (0.05) 
Gulf Dummy -1.70 -0.22 -3.52 -2.95 8.33** 10.78*** 
 (2.81) (2.28) (2.52) (2.28) (3.76) (4.00) 
       
 Pseudo R2 0.29 0.34 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.33 
Observations 145 139 146 140 119 113 
Log-likelihood -87.88 -76.20 -75.16 -70.83 -67.89 -63.07 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Time Varying covariates incorporated. Odds not proportional.  
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 	  235 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10 Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Fixed Effects of Women’s 
Rights 
                                                                  
 Political Rights Economic Rights Social Rights 
Official Development 
Assistance (log) 0.08 0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(log) 0.06 0.01 0.09*** 0.07 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) 
Remittances (log) -0.18* -0.24** -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
Democracy Score -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Level of Economic 
Development (log) -0.60 -1.28*** -.72*** -1.01*** -1.89** -2.34** 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.20) (0.31) (0.94) (1.09) 
Fertility Rate -0.36*** -0.33** -0.06** -0.08* -0.26** 
-
0.35*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.03) (0.05) (0.12) (0.13) 
Women’s Legislative 
Representation (lagged) - 0.04*** - 0.00 - 0.01 
 - (0.01) - (0.01) - (0.03) 
 Pseudo R2  0.29 0.32 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.22 
Observations 145 139 146 140 119 113 
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.   
Incorporates time-varying covariates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.3 Country-case Breakdown According Indicators of Women’s Political 
Incorporation and Foreign Capital Flows 
 Bahrain Jordan Morocco 
 
 
Women’s 
Legislative 
Representation 
Upper House 
*(11 women; 27.50 %) 
Lower House 
*(1 default; 2.5%) 
 
Upper House 
*(9 women; 15%) 
Lower House 
*(12 seats reserved, 1 
seat won directly; 
10.83%)  
 
Upper House 
*(3 women; 3.33%) 
Lower House  
*(30 seats reserved, 4 won 
directly; 10.46%) 
 
 
Gender Quotas 
Not Applicable Reserved Seats Political Party quotas and 
Reserved seats 
CIRI Women’s 
Political Rights 
Score  
1 1 2 
CIRI Women’s 
Social Rights 
Score 
1 1 0  
CIRI Women’s 
Economic 
Rights Score 
1 1 2 
Official 
Development 
Assistance  
$57 million 
($106 per person) 
$400 million 
($130 per person) 
$1.2 billion 
($26 per person) 
 
Foreign Direct 
Investment  
$1 billion (oil-related) 
($1156 per person) 
$2 billion 
($157 per person) 
 
$2 billion (textile-related) 
($28 per person) 
 
Remittances 
(2009) 
None /Pays out 
($0 per person) 
$3.6 billion /14% of 
GDP 
($392 per person) 
$6 billion/7% of GDP 
($112 per person) 
GDP per 
capita (ppp) 
$20,616 $4481 $4747 
 Sources: All data as of 2009.World Bank Development Indicators (2010), Cingranelli-Richards  
 Humans  Rights Database (2009), University of Stockholm Quota Project (2010), International 
 Parliamentary Union Parline Database (2011). 
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Table 5.4 Sample Questions from Elite Interviews Conducted in  
Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco (2008-2009) 
Introduction • Are women playing a role in politics these days; if you agree, what is the main 
cause?   
• What is the government’s interest in addressing women’s issues?  
• Which issues do you believe the government chooses to address and why? 
 
State • Which government institutions have had the most impact on women’s political 
activity? 
• Does the type of election (parliamentary vs. municipal level) make a difference 
for women’s political participation?  
• Do quotas, districting, the campaign cycle, or inter-party politics make a 
difference for women’s political participation? 
Labor • Does public vs. private sector employment affect women’s political 
opportunities? If so, how?   
• Are there any particular economic/labor backgrounds of women who are 
elected/appointed to political office? Explain. 
• How does public vs. private sector employment color women’s experience and 
efficacy in fulfilling political roles?  
Education • Does educational attainment translate into political activity for women?   
• How do women enter politics or become political; what is the process? 
• Is there any political socialization of women at the university level (i.e. 
political recruitment by organizations, political parties, etc.)? 
 
Social 
Networks 
• Which social networks/organizations affect women’s political activity and how 
(unions, political parties, foreign/local special interest non-profits, religious 
organizations/communities, tribe, etc.)? 
• What is the nature of these networks? Are the most influential networks local 
or international, religious or secular, state-sponsored or independent? 
• What is the role of the media in conditioning public perception of politically 
active women before and after election season? 
 
Comparison • How does your country compare to the rest of the Arab world in terms of 
women’s political status?   
 
 
